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Establishing a Position: July 10-12, 1950 |
 After meeting with Congressional leaders, President Truman temporarily abandons the idea of a message to Congress. The defense buildup necessitated by Korea galvanizes support for implementing an important national security proposal, NSC 68, even though its impact on the economy is unclear. Again, U.S. troops come to grief.
At our staff meeting at 11 o'clock this morning, the President commented that he had a "right" satisfactory conference with the Congressional leaders . . . .
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
The President informed me that at the meeting of the [Congressional] Big Four [Vice President Alben Barkley, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas and House Majority Leader John W. McCormack] this morning he was advised by all that the present time was not an opportune one for a message to be sent to Congress. He is considering taking some action and possibly asking for funds . . . . At that time he would send a message [to Congress] and he wants a message prepared and ready.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
[Special Counsel to the President Charles] Murphy was responsible for the preparation of all the president's speeches, his other major public statements, and all presidential messages to Congress. Furthermore, Murphy was generally responsible for staff work on the development of the administration's legislative proposals, on the selection of issues and emphases in the president's own legislative program, on final review of enrolled bills, and on preparation of Executive Orders. . . . Thus, the special counsel held the acknowledged staff lead on preparation of all the formal documents which expressed, explained, or defended the president's major policies and programs-foreign and domestic, executive and legislative, governmental and "political" alike. Now if this did not put Murphy "in charge" of policy and program planning, at least it got him deeply and strongly involved in the process. . . .
Special Assistant in the White House Richard Neustadt
On Monday, July 10, [Special Counsel to the President Charles] Murphy, [Administrative Assistants to the President Stephen] Spingarn, [David] Bell, and I went to Secretary of the Army [Frank] Pace's office for an hour's discussion about Korea and to get Pace's frank estimate of what the military services would need by way of men, material, and money. This was an off-the-record meeting; because we were short-circuiting the Secretary of Defense [Louis Johnson]. Bell and Spingarn saw Pace and his Assistant Secretaries again on Tuesday, July 11, for a further discussion of military needs.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
. . . [M]essages [of the President to Congress], speeches, Executive Orders, and the like are not merely vehicles for expressing policy, they are devices for getting policy decided. They have deadlines attached. And there is nothing like a deadline on the statement of a policy for getting a decision on what that policy shall be. Thus [being responsible for a Congressional message, Special Counsel Charles] Murphy had not only the power that goes with choosing the words but also the power that goes with presenting the issues for decision. And as a corollary, he had the responsibility for determining what the issues were, clarifying them, counteracting the premature commitment, counterbalancing the one-sided presentation, flushing out the hidden controversies, surveying the alternatives. The preparation of these great "action" documents was rarely an editorial matter. Ordinarily it was a matter of helping the President decide what to say, as well as how to say it. And inevitably, it was also a matter of “when” - of timing, as well as words and substance. . . .
Special Assistant in the White House Richard Neustadt
In the fall of 1949, President Truman had established a special ad hoc committee from the Department of State and the Department of Defense to review our Defense posture in the light of the Communist threat. They produced a paper [ultimately known as NSC 68] and . . . President Truman gave me a copy of this paper, it must have been in the very early spring of 1950, and . . . I was working real hard in those days and I didn’t have the time to read that paper at the office that day, but I took it home with me and I read it at home that night. Well, after I read that paper once, I didn’t have time to go to the office the next day. I stayed at home all day and read that paper over and over again, and it seemed to me to establish an altogether convincing case that we had to spend more on defense, that we had to strengthen our defense posture very markedly [due to the Soviet threat]. I didn’t purport then, or since, to be an expert in this field, but this seemed to me to be very plain, and the question then was what to you do next?” . . . I went back to the President and . . . . recommended to him that for this purpose that he ask Leon Keyserling, who was then the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, to sit with and serve as a member of what was called the senior staff of NSC [the National Security Council] because the reason that had been given for the cutback in defense expenditures was that if we spent more than that on defense it would destroy the economy. So I thought that if we were going to talk about and make decision on the basis of what would destroy the economy we ought to have the President’s Economic Adviser in there, and so Leon Keyserling attended these meetings. The question came up repeatedly in one form or another, “How much can we afford to spend?” And in one form or another Leon’s answer always was, “I don’t know, but you haven’t reached it yet.” He always said “You can afford to spend more on defense if you need to.” . . . [I]n the late spring of 1950, we, in this operation-this is the only time I suppose that I ever went regularly to the meetings of the NSC staff, but we were trying to find out, through this machinery, using all the President’s advisers and the departments, what was the best thing to do about our defense posture. We came, I think to a firm judgment that our course ought to be sharply changed from what it had been. And so the next question in 1950 . . . [developed] when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, and from then on we explained it in terms of the Korean problem, which I think was permissible. It got kind of muddied, but we had in mind, I think, a clear belief that the general necessities, so far as defense was concerned, required a large increase in our defense strength [per the findings of NSC 68] as well as [funding specifically for] the Korean fighting. So I expect you’ll find in presidential documents all during that period, sort of an effort to explain this [budget increase] in two-fold fashion, maybe with particular emphasis on the Korean part of it.
Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy
To the office and at 10 o'clock to the staff meeting with the President. During the session there was some discussion, principally between [Special Counsel] Charlie Murphy and the President, about the possibility of a message to Congress. The president was opposed to a message at this time, particularly any that would result on the part of consumers in buying goods that would cause a shortage.
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
[W]hile [Special Counsel Charles] Murphy had his hands on several of the key "action" processes around which policy was made, there were some others more or less outside the range of his recognized assignments. One of these was the budget process . . . . Similarly, on the actions issues forced to decision by the course of the military campaign in Korea and by major political developments in the “cold war” around the world, the Special Counsel had no recognized hunting license, no established part to play, unless the President needed to say something, or to recommend legislation, or to issue an Executive Order. Yet the conduct of hot war or cold war is another of those root processes of Government which continually thrusts up certain urgent issues, deadlines attached, where policy is made, perforce, and inaction is as decisive as decision. Here again there was no mandate pushing Murphy regularly into the channels of cold and hot war information and discussion and decision. The absence of a mandate which regularly involved him in these processes did not mean that Murphy or his staff never got into budget decisions or foreign and military policy. From time to time, they got in very deeply. But Murphy's technique was always to move under the cover, however tenuous, of some recognized mandate that he did possess. He always sought a "handle," an excuse, to rationalize his appearance in someone else's bailiwick. . . . It is hard to say how much Murphy's technique - the constant use of “cover,” the tendency to await some semblance of a "mandate" - was an inherent limitation in the Counsel's job and how much was an outgrowth of Murphy's own temperament and training as focussed on the job. To some degree the limitation was, of course, inherent. The post of Presidential Counsel generates no independent leverage. On the White House staff, all glory is reflected, and partial or total eclipse - sometimes momentary, occasionally sustained - can be a common occurrence.
Special Assistant in the White House Richard Neustadt
Image: North Korean prisoners of war under guard before they are interrogated at the 21st Infantry Regiment’s command post, south of Chonui, July 10, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: National Archives Central Plains Region.
That morning, several companies of the 21st attempted to maintain a roadblock just outside of Chonui on the eastern fork following a split in the main highway. They had to retreat by noon, although a counter attack by the 3rd Battalion of the 21st retook much of the area. After dark, the 3rd Battalion fell back to the next line of defense north of Choch’iwon. An early morning attack by over 1,000 North Korean 3rd Division infantry supported by tanks overran the 3rd Battalion positions killing the battalion commander and inflicting heavy casualties. 345 out of 667 U.S. troops were killed, wounded or captured. The 1st Battalion of the 21st, including the remnants of Task Force Smith, now prepared to defend Choch’iwon. As an attack by an estimated 2,000 enemy soldiers developed on the morning of July 12, it was decided to withdraw to the next line of defense, the Kum River line. In the same period, the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment had covered the remainder of that regiment’s retreat following the defeat at Chonan. The 34th took the west fork of the highway. By July 12, the 34th occupied the town of Kongju, also on the Kum River line.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
I deeply appreciate the letter and the spirit of your message relating to your appointment as the United Nations Commander of the international forces in Korea. Your words confirm me--if any confirmation were needed--in my full belief in the wisdom of your selection.
President Harry S. Truman
US forces here are finding the north Koreans a much more redoubtable foe than had been anticipated. The northern soldiers are reputed to be well trained and are hard fighters. They have lost a good many tanks these last few days [primarily to now-dominant U.S. air power], but they seem to have a goodly number in reserve. The northerners vastly outnumber US-ROK [Republic of Korea] forces and, although their supply problems must be great (they are resorting to the ox cart), they continue to take the offensive and have been slowly pushing our forces back. . . . ROK forces continue to give a good account of themselves these last three or four days. Remaining elements of Gen[eral William] Dean’s [24th] division are now on their way up and once they get on the scene the present uncertain situation ought to take a decisive turn for the better. . . .
Counsellor of the Embassy in Korea Everett Drumright
It was good to see you yesterday, just as it is always good to see you & especially to find you looking so well & so fit. During the past 30 years you have been called upon to carry somewhat more than your fair share of burdens.
Yesterday, I could have wished that my education & training had been along legal lines, to the end that I might have made better presentation of my case [requesting an assignment in Korea as a representative of the President]. Perhaps it was not necessary.
You know that 1940-1946 were not overly happy years for me & they would have been far less so, had it not been for your confidence and militant support.
I repeat, I’ve never asked for an order nor for an assignment, nor have I asked ever, to have one changed. I’ve taken it as it was dealt to me & done the very best I could to carry out my orders.
Just the same, I’d cheerfully give a leg to be ordered back to active duty under your command & sent to the Far East to serve in the same status that I undertook to serve as your subordinate in W.W. #2 [as military liaison to the Special Committee of the Senate to Investigate the National Defense Program chaired by Harry Truman].
Judging from the messages I’ve received from him since ‘46 - I do not believe that there is anyone who would be made more welcome by General [Douglas] MacArthur. . . .
U.S. Army Reserve Major General Frank Lowe
I appreciated very much your good letter of the twelfth. I understand exactly what you have in mind and I hope that I can manage to work it out to the satisfaction of both of us.
President Harry S. Truman
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