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How Far to Go: September 26-30, 1950 |
 Elements of X Corps and the 8th Army link up near Osan. Seoul is officially re-established as the capital of the Republic of Korea. With North Korean forces in full retreat, authorization is given to cross the pre-war border of the 38th parallel.
I read the instructions to [the commander in the Far East] General [Douglas] MacArthur, they in fact said it was left to him what he did, removed the 38th parallel as a barrier said that he was to deal with this in military terms and left it in my judgment, much too much to his own discretion in the crossing of the parallel [into North Korea] and will he stop thereafter. And I said this to the Secretary. And I said I think this is too vague it is too general. And he got furious with me, and he turned to me and said, look, how old are you. And I said that I am 30 years old, and said are you going to take on the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. I said this instruction is wrong. I don’t know what Mr. Truman’s position was at that moment. I was not present in a discussion of those orders with him, because we were in New York we stayed in New York, and right after my objection and Dean Rusk was standing there and everyone thought I was ridiculous maybe--in terms of the propriety by role it would probably be right. And from there he took the instructions back and they went out. . . .
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Lucius Battle
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins
 Image: North Korean prisoners captured as 1st Marine Regiment moved into Seoul, September 27, 1950. Although General Ned Almond's X Corps and MacArthur's Far East Command announced the recapture of Seoul on September 25, 3 months since the North Korean invasion, fighting continued in the capital for several more days. Source: Truman Library. . . . [At the September 28 press conference, the President was asked if the] government had given General MacArthur "specific authority" to cross the 38th parallel in Korea and he replied that he could not answer that now. In answer to another question he said that MacArthur was under strict orders of the President and the Chief of Staff and he would follow those orders. (Previously the President had indicated to us that MacArthur had been given orders not to cross the parallel without further orders.) A questioner pointed out that a week or so ago the President had said the matter of crossing the 38th parallel was a United Nations decision. The President said that was correct and the reporter then said the President had just said MacArthur was under his direct orders. The President replied that was correct but the United Nations would have to act on it first. Then some confusion over questions arose that later caused us considerable trouble. A reporter said that Americans in the United Nations had given out a six-point program for settlement of the Korean situation and the President asked, in reply, "You mean the broadcast asking them to surrender?" The correspondent said no, what he was thinking of was a plan for the settlement of the Korean situation based on our point of view. The President replied it had not been taken up with him and that "the broadcast of General MacArthur - I think made today - was taken up with me, inviting them to surrender. I think he is making that broadcast today. You will have to consider that off the record, however, until General MacArthur makes the broadcast." He was asked if that was a demand for unconditional surrender and the President replied "you will have to wait for General MacArthur's broadcast, and then I will comment on that and answer your question." Later in the conference he was again asked about the broadcast and it being off the record and he repeated that it was until MacArthur makes it. Sometime afterward, during the late afternoon, newspapermen came in to see me and then to see [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross and raised a considerable rumpus. Apparently they wanted it put on the record but it was not clear just what they were after. We learned, however, that the President was mistaken in thinking the broadcast was to be today. Instead we were informed it would be made on October 1st [September 30 in Korea].
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
And he was . . . told that operations north of that line must be conducted by Korean troops and what the Korean troops could accomplish they could accomplish, and what they couldn't accomplish wouldn't be accomplished -- that the 8th Army as such -- or the 10th Corps, that had then been separated -- would be held at that point. This, I think, was originally sent out in some form or other on the 27th. It was discussed by the President and General Marshall and with me. All the various considerations which later became important were mentioned; the difficulty of operations north of that line as your own communications were extended, as your troops got more and more into an area of trouble on the other side, and your own air forces became attenuated; the danger of misconstruction on the Chinese part, and the fact that this had been a very tender and delicate part of Korea for almost all the years that the Japanese were in occupation -- there was always [guerilla] trouble up in this area. . . . I agreed that this was the right thing to do. And a directive was sent off, I think dated September 30th by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, giving him this instruction. I went off then for some time - back to New York and various places - and regarded this matter -- as far as I knew, this was settled. This was where the army was and whatever happened north of that would be a feeling out operation . . . . MacArthur made his demand for surrender on the 30th of September.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
The halt that took place after the Inchon landing, which was something magnificently spearheaded by the Marines - the halt in crossing the parallel was due entirely to logistical difficulties. It was with the greatest difficulty that troops could be supplied.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
United Nations forces have practically reached the 38th parallel in some sections and Bradley referred to newspaper reports that they were holding up there. He said he did not know the basis of those and indicated that orders had been given permitting [U.N. Commander General Douglas] MacArthur to continue the drive over the parallel and into north Korea. The President indicated this was so. Bradley reported that since outbreak - in the past 95 days - the air force has flown over 40,000 missions. [Naval Aide to the President] Admiral [William] Dennison asked the General if all our forces were a part now of the 8th Army. Bradley said that the 10th Corps at Seoul, which made the landings, have not yet been made part of the 8th Army but are directly under General MacArthur. He said they probably would be made part of the 8th as soon as the two forces, those coming up from the South and those Seoul join up completely. . . . The President left about 12:30 for the [Presidential yacht U.S.S.] WILLIAMSBURG to have lunch aboard with Admiral Dennison. Others who are to leave on the cruise were to go aboard during the afternoon. . . . Charlie Ross and [The Special Assistant to the President] John Steelman will fly down Tuesday morning from Anacostia to the Patuxent base and join the ship and [Special Counsel to the President] Charlie Murphy and [Administrative Assistant to the President] George Elsey will join it Wednesday.
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
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Image: Lieutenant General Omar Bradley. Direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur, and MacArthur's interpretation and implementation of his orders, was a later cause of controversy. Photo: Defense Department. Source: Truman Library.
Image: Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Source: Truman Library.
