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The Korean War

Holding the Line: September 9-14, 1950

accounts
Defense Secretary Louis Johnson resigns. General George C. Marshall is the new Secretary of Defense. MacArthur's invasion force is assembled off the shore from Inchon, port city of the South Korean capital, Seoul.

I had made up my mind to tell [Secretary of Defense Louis] Johnson . . . [that his resignation] was necessary. That was Friday Sept. 1, 1950. I had to talk to the nation that night and postponed the terrible chore until Monday--and then another week.

President Harry S. Truman
Diary entry, September 14, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

P[resident Truman] then decided to ask for [the resignation of Defense Secretary Louis Johnson] . . . on Mon., Sept. 11. At his request, J[ohnson] came to [the] P[resident]'s office [for an] off-the-rec[ord] meeting at 4:00 P.M.

The Pres[ident] said to him: "Lou, I've got to ask you to quit."

Johnson wilted. He said, Mr. P[resident], I can't talk."

The P[resident] explained that the pressure against J[ohnson] had become too gr[ea]t to be withstood; that Congressmen were telling him that J[ohnson]'s continuance in the cabinet would defeat their reelections.

John[son] was with [the] P[resident] about 40 min. He left in a very dejected frame of mind.

Pres[ident Truman] said later that this had been the toughest job he'd ever had to do. He said: "I feel as if I had just whipped my daughter, Margaret."

Johnson, on leaving, said he would like a couple of days to think it over.

Immediately after J[ohnson] left P[resident Truman] came to [Press Secretary to the President] C[harles] Ross' office, said what had happened, & a[d]m[itte]d he'd be glad to have a drink.

Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
Notes of conversation with Charles Ross, no date
Papers of George M. Elsey

         

Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson came to the White House again at 12:30 on Tuesday, September 12, for the regular weekly appointment. This time he brought the Secretary of the Air Force, Tom Finletter, with him and it was again impossible for the President to bring up the matter of [Johnson's] resignation.

I saw the President a few minutes after Johnson left at 1:00, and the President told me he had just hung up the phone after calling Deputy Secretary of Defense, Steve Early. The President said he had urged Early to try and bring the matter to a head. The President also asked me to talk to Steve.

I did this, and Steve assured me that he would try to get Johnson to write and sign an appropriate letter of resignation as soon as he got back to the Pentagon. The urgency for getting the matter closed out had been heightened by newspaper leaks that Johnson had been asked to resign.

About 3:00 o'clock, Steve called me and read the rough draft of a letter which he--and I assume other advisors--had prepared for Johnson's signature. I told Steve I thought the letter was excellent. Steve said he would put it before Johnson right away and try to get him to sign it and bring it with him to the Cabinet meeting at 4:00 p.m.

Press Secretary to the President Charles Ross
Dictation of "circumstances of the resignation of Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson," September 13, 1950
Papers of George M. Elsey

         

[Defense Secretary Louis] Johnson came to the 4 o'clock cabinet meeting Tuesday. He looked like he'd been beaten. He followed me into my office after the cabinet adjourned and begged me not to fire him. The he handed me the [soon-to-be-]published letter--unsigned. I said "Louis you haven't signed this--sign it." He wept and said he didn't think I'd make him do it.

Then I called in [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross who had been in touch with [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Steve Early, working on a reply to Johnson's letter of resignation. We finally made the release after I'd phoned Gen. [George C.] Marshall [the next Secretary of Defense] informing him of what had happened.

I tried to make it as easy on Johnson as circumstance would permit--but I had to force him to work in his own interest. He is the most ego maniac I've ever come in contact with--and I've seen a lot.

President Harry S. Truman
Diary entry, September 14, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

         

"Every word you wrote [in the notes prepared for Charles Ross on the circumstances of Louis Johnson's resignation as Secretary of Defense] is true . . . . I had one hell of a time with Lou Johnson. I've never had anyone let me down so badly as he did. I've known for months--ever since May--that I would have to fire him, but I just couldn't bring myself to do it. You know I would rather cut my own throat than hurt anyone. I've known Lou for thirty years and I hated to have to do this to him, but the worst part about this job I have is that I can't consider my personal feelings. I have to do what is right and I just couldn't leave Johnson there any longer.

"You were right in those notes when you said I told Johnson that I was asking him to quit because of the pressure on me. I did that so as not to hurt him. The terrible thing about all this is that Johnson doesn't realize he has done anything wrong. He just doesn't seem to realize what he has been doing to the whole government. I couldn't let it go on any longer and that's why I asked him to leave."

Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
Memorandum for the file based on conversation with the President, September 16, 1950
Papers of George M. Elsey

         

I cannot tell you, if you are asking why I was ousted from the Defense Establishment, my answer is truthfully under oath, I don't know; I don't know to this day.

On [the U.S. amphibious landing at] Inchon, I carried out the responsibility, along with General [Douglas] MacArthur. I resigned 2 days before Inchon. . . . That hurt me, because I had been carrying along with General MacArthur the responsibility for Inchon. [Army Chief of Staff] General [J. Lawton] Collins--maybe the censors will want to strike this out--did not favor Inchon and went over to try to argue General MacArthur out of it.

General MacArthur stood pat. I backed MacArthur, and the President has always, had before backed me on it. He went ahead. The date had been fixed quite some time before, so that was distressing because I felt that Inchon would have cleared up much of the criticism. . . . No. I do not know why I am out of the Defense Department.

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
Congressional testimony, June 14, 1951

         

We leave here at 11 a.m. to go aboard ship [for Operation Chromite, the amphibious landing at Inchon]. I have “joined the Marines” . . . .

Now as I set out I wish to make record, in writing, to you of 3 matters.

1. I have obeyed your orders strictly. You have never told me to do anything & then directed my how to do it; one of the reasons why, I welcome service under you. I know my mission & I know that I can not meet it unless I can say, “ I went, I saw, I know” & perhaps during the next two years it will be important to have available someone who can say that very thing. Hence, I wish you to know that I have taken only the most modest & carefully calculated of risks, & shall continue that policy.

2. I cannot undertake this mission without making comment to you re the Formosa incident [both General Douglas MacArthur’s visit to the island to review the military situation, which disturbed some in the State Department and the White House, and the General’s message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (V.F.W.) that the President ordered withdrawn]. Of course this was, & is, no part of my mission but, located as I was, & am, in [MacArthur’s headquarters in] the Dai Itchi Bldg., in Tokio [sic], & working all that Sunday on an agenda for conference with Gen. MacArthur at 6 P.[M.]--I could not fail to know about it & I know to my own complete satisfaction that the following is factual.

(a) Gen. MacArthur had no knowledge; no information in any manner or form, that there was any change--or contemplated change in or study of--the Formosa policy you fixed in press releases of 27 June, ’50.

(b) He went to Formosa in compliance with the orders to prevent its capture by China Reds. He knew of no other way to evaluate defense possibilities pursuant to orders rec[ieve]d [from the Joint Chiefs of Staff] by him.

(c) His message to the V.F.W. was a personal message to comrades in an organization to which he had belonged for years & was very calculated to give ringing militant & unqualified support to your position. . . .

(d) I was not present when [Special Assistant to the President] Mr. [W. Averell] Harriman held his two conversations with Gen. MacArthur but I know to my own complete satisfaction that nothing was said by Harriman to the General that could cause him to believe that your declaration of 27 June, ’50 did not govern him in all his actions.

For him to have submitted his message thru [Defense Department] channels would have defeated the very purpose of the message.

It was a black day for me & a blacker one for the General--that Sunday. I never saw a man so utterly shocked & hurt. I had hoped late in the day, as I noted the trend of events[,] that my opinion might be asked at the end. I even went so far as to prepare a terse statement that I could read to you, giving the facts as I know them.

(e) I know that the General told [his aide, Brigadier General] Courtney [Whitney,] that never in his 51 years of service had he received such abrupt messages as those two were from the Sec[retary] of Defense. I also know that soon after my arrival he told Courtney that he was so pleased to have me here that he found it difficult to express his satisfaction; that it was the first time in all his life when he felt that, entering a grave emergency he had the unqualified confidence, approval & support of his C[ommander] in C[hief].

I’ve not seen nor I have I talked with the General since that black Sunday. As soon as he had dispatched his reply--urging most careful consideration of cancellation of his message to the V.F.W. (I wonder if you have seen & read his message & the curt reply from the Sec. for Defense, that closed the incident as far as the General was concerned) he sent for me & received my agenda.

Since then he has been kindness itself to me--& in many ways[--]but he is the type of man who knows where my first & overall loyalty rests & he will do nothing to embarrass me. I know that when this is over & I am returned to inactive status that our friendship of 20 years will pick up right where it was before I came out here. . . .

Now I must meet a 9 a.m. deadline to courier pouch this news to Japan & on to you.

Military Aide to the President General Frank Lowe
Frank Lowe to Harry Truman, September 11, 1950
Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files

     
Back to Holding the Line
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 Document links
September 9-14, 1950
See the record from which the decisions were made
  • Radio address by Harry Truman, dated September 9, 1950, speaking on measures needed to increase defense production in light of the Communist threat. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Files of Charles S. Murphy. (6 pages)
  • Note and "Fifth Report of the United Command Operations in Korea for the Period 1 to 14 September 1950" from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, dated October 5, 1950, to the President, United Nations Security Council. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Selected Records Relating to the Korean War. (6 pages)
  • The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum is one of twelve Presidential Libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration.

    500 W. US Hwy. 24. Independence MO 64050
    truman.library@nara.gov
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