And, of course, we gradually fed in additional troops - additional air units [to the fighting in Korea],
and even this didn't stop them completely but it did save the situation and kept the North
Koreans from taking the whole peninsula. We were finally hemmed in a pretty small circle,
down near the southern tip of Korea [at Pusan], but we did hold there.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley
Talent Associates interview, January 24, 1962
Papers of Merle Miller
It was quiet at the office today. I walked down and at 9:30 went in to the President's office
for [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley's briefing. Other than the
president, only Brig. Gen. [Robert] Landry, air force aide [to the President], and I were
present. The situation looks better.
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 19, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
During the early days [of the Korean War] I briefed him [the President] every day. Later on when things became a little more general, I usually briefed him once, maybe twice, a week.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley
Presidential memoirs interview, March 30, 1955
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Papers
At the final conference before the Inchon landing [held in Tokyo on August 23, 1950], [General Douglas] MacArthur overruled the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], and Admiral [James] Doyle, who had the amphibious shipping [and would lead the Naval attack force, Task Force 90], and [Admiral Arthur] Struble, who was the Navy [7th Fleet] commander. MacArthur just overruled them, said that he had a lot more experience than the Navy or any of them had all through the Southwest Pacific [in World War II]. He said he had nothing but admiration for what the U.S. Navy could do, and that the date [of the landing] would be the 15th of September. Well, nobody raised any objections--none of them. General [J. Lawton] Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, said, “Well, the argument is all over. Now you’re going to have to set about.” General MacArthur had said he wanted an Army corps [to be known as X Corps] for the Inchon landing. General Collins said, “We’d better get busy picking the corps commander.” General MacArthur said, “No. He’s already been picked.” Collins said, “Well, who’s that?” He said, “Well, Ned Almond [MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, who would retain that title] is.” Collins got half out of his seat and said, “What.” And, well, that in itself would have been enough to make Almond mad at Collins. Now they had no regard whatever for each other. . . .
Secretary, Far East Command General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel John Chiles
Oral history interview, July 27, 1977
The only question that [Admiral] Forrest Sherman, who was chief of naval operations, and I, as chief of staff for the army and executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], had [regarding General Douglas MacArthur's plan for an amphibious landing at Inchon] was not so much about the concept of an envelopment around the left flank, but about the exact spot of the landing, and then the conditions under which it was to be done and the timing. General MacArthur was a much older, much more experienced man than any of us. We were relative youngsters on the JCS at that time. We could get no details from MacArthur as to what these plans were. The navy was very skeptical about it and the marines were very skeptical about it, because of the tremendous tides in that area and the very narrow waterways that lead up to Inchon. So, finally, not getting any details from MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs decided to send us over [to Japan] to see what we could find out in the way of details. We did question MacArthur about it; he defended his position, and ultimately the Joint Chiefs, after we had gotten his plans, gave approval; the plan was approved then by the president. That’s the gist of it.
Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins
Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975
The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)
To the office and at 9:30 in the President's office for [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] General [Omar] Bradley's briefing on the Korean situation. This shows improvement in the situation as more U.S. troops move in and the advance of the North Korean forces seems to have been pretty well halted.
Assistant Press Secretary to the President Eben Ayers
Diary entry, August 23, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
