The Eighth Army defends Taegu. The U.S. 7th Division in Japan begins augmentation with South Korean draftees as the KATUSA program is established. Foreign policy discord mounts in Washington. Image:Refugees moving south in the P'ohang sector after receiving evacuation orders from the South Korean army, August 12, 1950. Mixed South Korean and American forces counterattacked in this eastern sector halting the North Korean advance. The endangered South Korean 3rd Division was withdrawn by ship from its position further up the eastern coast and, along with part of the 23rd U.S. infantry Regiment, added to the counterattack. By August 17, the North Korean forces had withdrawn northward into the mountains. Photograph U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library.           I got to the office shortly before 9:30 a.m. and went in to the President's office with [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley . . . and some of the [White House] office staff . . . for the regular briefing by General Bradley on the Korean situation. While the situation is still "fluid" there, it is improving, although there is still severe fighting and a long way to go for the U.S. and Southern Korean forces before they are in control. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, August 12, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           The thing that surprised all of us was the performance of the Korean fighting men. Up until July 1949 it was called a constabulary, not an army. Very little had been done towards organizing and training the Korean constabulary from 1945 to 1949. It wasn't until the final U.S. fighting unit, the 31st Regiment, left in June of 1949 that we really seriously started to train the Korean military forces, and to organize them. And KMAG [the Korean Military Advisory Group], 500 officers and men, left behind to train, had one year between June 1949 and June 1950. This was enough time, of course, to train squads and companies, but they did not have time to get the leadership personnel organized and trained for large-scale operations. But in spite of that, there wasn't a single Korean unit that gave up as a unit. There wasn't--they held on desperately, they gave us time, and for awhile, several months, the U.S. and other UN forces were so desperately pressed that we didn't have the time to train and refurbish and reorganize the Korean forces. But once we got them underway, first by picking up Koreans under the so-called KATUSA [Koreans Attached to the United States Army] program, this, I think helped our own units a great deal in working through the desperate perimeter days until forces could come out from continental U.S.A.--and the unusual qualities of the few Korean units that were still intact when the fighting centered above Taegu. And once we had the time and the resources to start reorganizing, and retraining, the Koreans fitted in beautifully and did an excellent job. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral history interview, February 18, 1971           Image:A South Korean Infantry Officer points out cover positions to his patrol, August 13, 1950. Photograph U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library. Although the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was largely able to contain or repulse North Korean crossings of the Naktong River in the Taegu sector, enemy advances further north against the South Korean 1st Division threatened the temporary capital, which was swollen with refugees. The U.S 27th Infantry Regiment was detached from elsewhere in the Pusan perimeter and rushed General Walton Walker to the defense of Eighth Army Headquarters. The 27th would defend the main Taegu-Sangju road in an area that became known as the Bowling Alley while Major General Paik Sun Yup's 1st Division troops continued to defend the high ground on either side of the road. A first North Korean night assault down the Bowling Alley was stopped on August 18 with the destruction of several enemy tanks. Perhaps the greatest threat to the Pusan perimeter was the enemy force across the Naktong River occupying Obong-ni Ridge and several other hills in and above the Naktong Bulge. On August 16, General Walker committed his strongest reserve force, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, to join the 24th Division in clearing these positions. The attack began slowly on August 17, but by August 18 the North Korean 4th Division was in retreat as survivors attempted to recross the Naktong.           . . . I remember very clearly the discussions with [Secretary of State Dean Acheson] . . . and with [Counselor to the Secretary of State] George [Kennan] about the question of bombing . . . . [the North Korean city of] Rashin [located within 20 miles of the Soviet port of Vladivostock], and it was very early, in the minds of every one, even before the success of the Inchon landings, as to the possibility of this war spreading out into a worldwide conflict, either with Russia or the Chinese communists. . . . Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 14, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           The morning newspapers today carried a story from Washington that Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had issued a statement attacking the Administration, particularly the President and Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson for having brought on the Communist attack in Korea. It was signed by Senators Alexander H. Wiley of Wisconsin, H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts. They announced that Senator [Arthur] Vandenberg, who has been ill, had seen the text of it and. was “in general agreement.” [Press Secretary to the President] Charlie Ross, at our staff meeting, said [Special Assistant to the President W.] Averell Harriman had called him about it and thought something should be done to counteract it and he suggested that Senator [Tom] Connelly of Texas, chairman of the committee, ought to lead in combating it. As a matter of fact, a statement by Connelly already had come out and Ross had something from the news ticker on it. The President commented that this action by the Republicans was a most “demagogic” thing. It is, of course, a purely political move and it is understood that the Republicans have been planning to make the Korean situation their leading issue in this year’s congressional elections. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, August 14, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           . . . I think from the very beginning great insistence was put on localizing to the greatest possible extent everything that went on. You remember on the first decisions of the President [on June 25-26, 1950], when the Air [Force] was to protect the airfields and get the Americans [dependants and noncombatants] out [of South Korea], there was a rigid order that no American aircraft could go above the 38th parallel. That was removed about the third or fourth day of the Korean intervention and they were allowed to go into North Korea. There were very strict instructions about not going within a certain area of the frontier, making it perfectly clear that we weren’t going to have violations along the Yalu [River, which is the border to Chinese Manchuria]. The whole question of [bombing the city of] Rashin [near the Soviet border] came up very early in the thing, and this was again laid down. That whole northeastern corner [of North Korea] was an extremely sensitive one, and we were sure we’d get into trouble. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 14, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           I am much concerned by the situation which we discussed before [the] Cabinet meeting yesterday . . . on the bombing of Najin [also called Rashin]. You indicated to me that the action in question had been taken after prior approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself, and that the State Department should not be disturbed about the possible reactions. As you will recall, the pertinent directive to General [Douglas] MacArthur was worked out in its final form at a meeting at the White House by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department and this final text was thereupon approved by the President, Secretary [of State Dean] Acheson and yourself. That directive contained the clear statement that while bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel were authorized, our planes engaged in the operations should stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. Najin [Rashin] is just 17 miles south of the Soviet and Man­churian frontiers and its bombing does not, in the opinion of this Department, conform to the terms of the aforesaid directive. We have a deep concern in this matter which in the view of this Department vitally affects the national security of the United States and our basic foreign policy objective to prevent the outbreak of a general war. I therefore feel that any modification of the above direc­tive should be jointly considered with this Department for recom­mendation to or decision by the President. The injunction to stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers in bombing operations in North Korea stemmed in our view from the extreme sensitivity of the Kremlin to any military action in this area which they consider to be of vital military importance to them and from the common State and Defense objective to avoid if possible direct Soviet participation in the conflict in Korea or else­where. It is the view of those in this Department most familiar with the Soviet Union and its policies that the bombing . . . can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area. . . . In our opinion, this action greatly increases the possibility of a Soviet military reentry into North Korea, and the possibility of placing strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal for operations against our forces or our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater danger of serious complications, will affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the con­tinued hope of avoiding them altogether. In the light of the foregoing, I consider it to be highly important that the Department of State be consulted in advance of any repetition of the bombing of Najin [Rashin] or any other place equally close to the Soviet or Manchurian frontiers. Under Secretary of State James Webb James Webb to Louis Johnson, August 16, 1950 Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VII, Korea           [Secretary of Defense] Louis Johnson was somewhat of an individualist, and Louis Johnson was not what you would call a cooperative member of the Cabinet. He was running his own show, and he didn't want any interference from anybody else, and I don't think he asked very often for opinions from anybody else. Appointments Secretary to the President Matthew Connelly Oral history interview, August 21, 1968           . . . I believe Secretary [of State Dean] Acheson was away. I got quite a strong letter as Secretary of Defense from Jim Webb as Acting Secretary of State protesting [the bombing of Rashin, viewed as an important source of military supplies by the Defense Department] . . . . They [General Douglas MacArthur’s command, backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff] wanted to bomb [Rashin] a second time, and I took Secretary Webb’s letter to the President and told him that unless he, the President, told me not to, I was going to follow the military recommendation, and I got clearance from the President to do it. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson Congressional testimony, June 14, 1951           I showed the President a number of excerpts from . . . [Counselor George] Kennan’s reports of August 8 and 14 with respect to the present pattern of Soviet intentions, and also the attached letter under date of August 16 to Secretary [of Defense Louis] Johnson, with respect to the Rashin bombing. The Presi­dent’s first reaction was that he thought we would have to take whatever risks were necessary to destroy the points from which supplies were flowing, but when I made the point that departures from agreed instructions should not be made without thorough consultation with the State Department on the political implications, the President agreed. I later had a brief conversation with Secretary Johnson on this matter and he also agreed that we should have such prior consultation. Under Secretary of State James Webb Memorandum, August 17, 1950 Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VII, Korea           To the office and at 9:30 in the President’s office for General Bradley’s briefing on the Korea situation and at 10 o‘clock to our staff meeting. The President had his usual list of appointments afterwards, among them one at 12:15 with John Foster Dulles, Republican, adviser to the State Department. Home for lunch and back afterward and about 3:00 to the President’s office for our pre-press conference briefing session. We went over most of the current topics of news that might be the basis for questions and during the session the President mentioned Dulles’s call on him and said he had chided Dulles on the statement issued by a group of Republican senators of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, criticizing administration policies. The President said he told Dulles he understood he wrote the statement. Dulles vigorously denied he wrote it but said the statement had, been brought to him and he had gone over it and suggested some changes. But Dulles told the President, the changes weren’t made and the statement was issued without them. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, August 17, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           [Responding to the question “Mr. President Senator [Kenneth] Wherry of Nebraska made the comment that the blood of our soldiers in Korea was on the shoulders of Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson. Would you care to comment on the accuracy of that remark?”:] I think that is a contemptible statement and beneath comment. . . . You can quote it verbatim. President Harry S. Truman Press conference comment August 17, 1950 Public Papers of the President, 1950           You know to his dying day what Mr. Acheson called Mr. Truman, "My President. He was my President." There was a mutual admiration society there. [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson was Eastern establishment, if you will--all the right schools, all the right clothes, intellectually arrogant, as he sometimes was. But he and Truman really were buddies; and Acheson had the warmest admiration for him, and vice versa. Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, January 26, 1973 Go to August 6-11, 1950    Back to Holding the Line    Go to August 19-23, 1950

Back to Holding the Line Go to August 6-11, 1950 Go to August 19-23, 1950  Document links August 12-18, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Response from Harry Truman, dated August 12, 1950, and letter from John Dingell, dated July 19, regarding the Congressman's suggestions for equipping U.S. troops in Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files-Official File. (4 pages) Message to President Syngman Rhee on the Second Anniversary of the Republic of Korea, August 14, 1950. Public Papers of the President, 1950. Press Release "Report of the United Command Operations in Korea for the Period 1 to 15 August 1950, Transmitted by the Representative of the United States to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council." Papers of Harry S. Truman: Selected Records Relating to the Korean War. (5 pages) The President's News Conference, August 17, 1950 Public Papers of the President, 1950. Letter to the President of the Senate on the Defense Production Bill, August 18, 1950 Public Papers of the President, 1950.

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