General [Douglas] MacArthur was over here two days ago; he is thoroughly conversant with the situation. He knows where we are and what we have to fight with. He knows our needs and where the enemy is hitting the hardest. General MacArthur is doing everything possible to send reinforcements. A Marine unit and two regiments are expected in the next few days to reinforce us. Additional units are being sent over as quickly as possible. We are fighting a battle against time. There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines or any other term you choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat. Every unit must counterattack to keep the enemy in a state of confusion and off balance. There will be no Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan. A retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end. Capture by these people is worse than death itself. We will fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together. Any man who gives ground may be responsible for the death of thousands of his comrades.
I want you to put this out to all the men in the Division. I want everybody to understand we are going to hold this line. We are going to win.
Lieutenant General Walton Walker
Words to 25th Division staff, July 29, 1950
Image: General
of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Photo: Department of
Defense. Source: Truman Library.
MacArthur's responsibilities included
governance of Japan as the Supreme Commander of the Allies in the Pacific
(SCAP), command of U.S. troops in the Far East as Commander in Chief Far
East (CINCFE) and the United Nations' military effort in Korea as
Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC). MacArthur's
July 31 to August 1 reconnaissance visit (as CINCFE) to Formosa is often
cited as the first in a series of incidents culminating in the General's
dismissal by President Truman. Parts of the State Department and the
White House saw his actions as running counter to the President's policy
of "neutralizing" Formosa.
On July 28, based on a decision of the
National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur a
message suggesting that a Communist Chinese invasion of Formosa was
imminent. MacArthur responded, "I concur completely with the
recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [then before the President
proposing that Chiang be allowed to mine coastal waters and launch
pre-emptive air strikes]. I am proceeding to Formosa with a selected group
of staff officers on July 31st to make a brief reconnaissance of the
situation there." When Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed his
disapproval of the Defense Department plans, the Joint Chiefs advised
MacArthur he might want to postpone a personal visit in favor of a senior
officer leading the military survey adding, however, "If you feel it
necessary to proceed personally on the 31st [of July], please feel free to
go since the responsibility is yours."
MacArthur did indeed choose to go and his high profile trip irked Acheson
who, aside from believing the State Department was not properly consulted,
felt the trip imperiled the "neutralization" policy which
appealed to key U.N. allies, especially the British.
We [in the National Security Council had] debated a long time whether we would defend Formosa . . . . The Joint Chiefs [of Staff in 1948] said that with 2 and 1/3 divisions we could not defend it. The State Department - [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson - would write a memo to the Secretary of the [National Security] Council that the Joint Chiefs say we should use all economic and political means to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Reds. Suppose the economic and political means are not adequate. Is it still of such strategic importance that we should use military means? Well, he had quite a time making them stand pat, or face up to it. Finally, they said, “No, even if we have to take it after a war begins, we can’t take it now.” And the President approved that. It became government policy. Acheson was always blamed for giving up Formosa, but it was the Joint Chiefs. . . .
It was part of our policy which was [also] to withdraw our troops from Korea in 1948. Louis Johnson [of the Department of Defense] and [the Department of] State didn’t want to do that. But [future] President [Dwight] Eisenhower, who was then Chief of Staff, urged it. The Secretary of Defense [James Forrestal] said, when Louis Johnson came in in April 1949, “If those troops are not out in one month, the State Department has to pay for them.” So there we were. Acheson [later] announced [in his January 12, 1950, speech to the National Press Club] that it was another line of defense, that didn’t include Formosa and Korea, but he was just enunciating policy that had been passed on because of the strong representation of the military. Maybe the military should not have influenced it, but they felt without mobilization of the whole country, you couldn’t hold it. That was all. That [decision to consider Korea and Formosa outside the U.S. military sphere] was [made] in 1948, but when we went back into Korea [in 1950], the President took advantage of the situation to stick the 7th fleet in between Formosa and the mainland [of China. Truman declined anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek's offer of 33,000 of his troops from the island of Formosa to help in Korea. Instead the President used the fleet to separate the potential combatants in a "neutralization" policy].
Special Consultant to the President Sydney Souers
Presidential memoirs interview, February 15, 1954
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files
When I visited Formosa, the week before that, I had been receiving reports from the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing trepidation for the safety of Formosa, and I reported back that under these conditions, hard pressed as I was in Korea at that time, that I would go down there and make a personal reconnaissance and within the limit of time I spent there, I got very definite impressions. The generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] has probably in the neighborhood of a half million troop. The personnel is excellent. . . . Their material equipment is spotty. They lack trucks. They lack a great many of the modern refinements. They are capable of being made into a very excellent force. And their air--I should say they probably have between 200 and 250 planes. Their pilots are rather good. And for such a jerk-water group, they make a pretty brave showing.
Their navy is not a navy. It is a conglomeration of small ships. I went aboard one or two of them. They looked rather smart, but they are only capable of small coastal work, but the force represents a potential of a half-million first class fighting men.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Congressional testimony, May 3, 1951
Image: Troops of the 35th Infantry Regiment
man a rocket launcher, July 29, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library
Across the center of the United Nations line, the continuing retreat of U.S. troops that prompted
General Walton Walker's "Stand or Die" speech lessened, but did not
halt. The 24th and 35th Regiments of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division
fell back south of Sangju by the end of the month. About the same
time the 1st Cavalry Division withdrew to Kumch'on. However, its
rear was almost immediately threatened by the North Korean 3rd
Division.
An even greater threat was posed by the North Korean flanking
maneuver in the western sector. Opposite the North Korean 4th
Division, the weary 24th Division sought to hold a line along the
north-south road between the towns Kumch'on and Chinju, almost on
the southern coast. By July 29, the 34th Regiment had been forced
out of Koch'ang falling back to the east and the 29th Regiment was
retreating south from Anui toward Chinju. Walker reinforced the
Koch'ang area with the South Korean 17th Regiment and part of
the U.S. 21st Infantry, while the southern half of the left flank
was to be reinforced by the 27th Regiment pulled out of the center
of the allied line. At Chinju, facing the North
Korean 6th Division, was a mixed force including part of the 29th
Regiment, South Korean troops and the badly shaken 19th Regiment,
victims of the Hadong ambush. In fighting beginning the night of
June 30 they failed to hold. Chinju was abandoned the next day. The
withdrawing forces and other portions of the 29th Regiment
ultimately assembled at a position called the Notch on the northern
road to Masan, the last key city before Pusan. The 27th Regiment,
as it came into position, assumed defense of the southern route to
Masan. Reinforcements also included a company of medium tanks, the
first of the larger tanks to arrive in Korea. On the southern road, the tanks
were used to accompany the 1st Battalion of the 27th on a hard
fought reconnaissance in force toward Chinju on August 2. A similar
tactic the same day at the Notch was a failure, but the American
and South Korean troops were able to hold their positions. The
situation in the west was so critical that the remainder of the
25th Division was transferred to join the 27th Regiment and the
24th Division in defense of the southwestern sector. In the
meantime orders were issued for the remainder of the United Nations
troops to withdraw into what would be known as the Pusan Perimeter.
In preparing the 
