The South Korean army abandons the capitol city of Seoul. The world reacts to events in Korea and the United States. An important thing, I think, is the response all over the world, to the President's decision [announced] on the 27th was a tremendously enthusiastic response. I think that the betting had been everywhere that the United States would not do anything, that we would find some way of referring this to a committee or a commission or a protest to the U.N. but that here the machine on the other [Communist] side had started to roll and we wouldn't do anything. When we did, there was a most enthusiastic response from everyone. This had its good effect, at that time; it also had its bad effect later when the reverses in North Korea occurred--there was an almost corresponding depression: that we had tried to do our best [in Korea] but after all we weren't even able to deal with this small outfit in a distant part of the world. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           [U.S. Ambassador to Korea John] Muccio sent a message to [the Department of] State marked 28 June 10 A.M. (presumably Korean time) with the following statements: "Situation had deteriorated so rapidly had not President's decision plus arrival General [John] Church party become known here, doubtful any organized Korean resistance would have continued through the night. Combat aid decision plus Church's orders [from General Douglas MacArthur establishing him to head the U.S. Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea] have had a great morale effect. . . ." Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on White House Files, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           It [the U.S. announcement of June 27] was the enunciation which was the very antithesis of defeatism, which has been so pronounced that we could not meet aggression except in one area of the world. It meant that we, if the enemy was going to encroach in two areas, we would meet him on two areas; in three areas, we would meet him on three areas; that he was just as divided as we were; that if we could not defend wherever he aggressed or started to attack, you admit before the conflict that you are going to be defeated. This is global . . . and you can't let one-half of the world slide into slavery and just confine yourself to defending the other. You have got to hold every place. Now, in the Far East there was a tremendous belief that we were not going to defend the Far East, and when we moved in to defend Korea, it gave an enormous uplift throughout that entire section of the world. If there is anything that I have said that lead you to believe that I was critical of the decision to defend Korea, I would correct it immediately. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Congressional testimony, May 3, 1951           It was agreed that I would come home . . . and become the president's special assistant on foreign policies. State and Defense at that time were at logger-heads because of the personal rift between [their respective Secretaries] Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson. Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman Truman Library Institute conference statement, May 1977 The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945-53 (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980)           The [return from Europe of W. Averell Harriman to become Special Assistant to the President] . . . had a great deal of importance later on, and a great deal of importance to me. . . . An interesting thing about this is that as soon as it was announced that Averell was coming back--this was at a time when I was under a great deal of attack--the papers all announced that Averell was going to succeed me, that he was going to be the new Secretary of State and that the way was being paved to ease me out. In fact, everything was done which could possibly sow ill will between two old friends . . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           Showed [for White House clearance a draft of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's proposed speech to the American Newspaper Guild] to H[arry]S.T[ruman] noon 28th June; his o.k. was phoned to . . . State. Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Note to file, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           We have had some hectic times since . . . [Special Consultant to the Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles and you left us. Contrary to all predictions, the North Koreans unleashed an all-out, barefaced attack on the ROK [Republic of Korea]. And though we knew they had certain offensive capabilities and were well trained, they actually came at us with far more power than we had ever expected. It is now clear that the attack was prepared long in advance and stealthily executed. In a word, it took us all by surprise. As you know, the North Koreans attacked at certain points all along the [38th] parallel. . . . Except for the fact that it was raining the first morning of the attack, the enemy might have reached Seoul the first or second day. As I look back in retrospect, I think the ROK forces did pretty well to keep the enemy out of Seoul for three days. . . . During and after the breakthrough there was much confusion, a great deal of straggling, and, unfortunately, the ROK forces lost or abandoned most of their heavy equipment, including anti-tank guns, howitzers, mortars, machine guns, etc. By the time the ROK forces lined up on the south bank of the Han [River] . . . they had from 20,000 to 25,000 poorly organized and ill-equipped forces to face a formidable enemy with tanks, heavy artillery, airplanes and the Seoul victory. One grievous error was the premature blowing of the Han River pedestrian bridge. This was done early on the morning of the 28th [of June]. It could have been postponed several hours without harm and the Koreans could have evacuated a lot of personnel and equipment. . . . Counsellor of the Embassy in Korea Everett Drumright Everett Drumright to John Allison, July 5, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Selected Records Relating to the Korean War Go to June 27, 1950    Back to Week of Decision    Go to June 29, 1950

Back to Week of Decision June 27, 1950 June 29, 1950 Document links June 28, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Presidential calendar of appointments for June 28, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Matthew Connelly Files. (2 pages) Minutes, dated June 28, 1950, of the 58th meeting of the National Security Council, at which President Harry S. Truman and the council reviewed the Korean situation with respect to possible repercussions in the U.S. and abroad. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (3 pages) Memorandum of conversation by Philip C. Jessup, dated June 28, 1950, recounting a National Security Council meeting in the White House Cabinet Room among President Harry S. Truman, the Security Council, and top State Department officials, who discussed the Soviet Union's potential responses to the U.S. defense of South Korea, among other issues. Papers of Dean Acheson. (4 pages) Memorandum, dated June 28, 1950, from Marshall Shulman to Ed Barrett outlining recommendations for Secretary of State Dean Acheson's speech to the Newspaper Guild. Papers of George M. Elsey. (3 pages) Memorandum of conversation by Niles W. Bond, dated June 28, 1950, reporting a visit from South Korea's Ambassador, who told Secretary of State Dean Acheson of the gratitude of the South Korean president and people for the action of the U.S. in helping to defend South Korea. Papers of Dean Acheson. (1 page) Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Guild, June 28, 1950. Public Papers of the President, 1950.