Second meeting of President Harry S. Truman and advisors at Blair House. Image: Blair House, the Presidential residence during White House renovations in 1950. Photo: Abbie Rowe, National Park Service. Source: Truman Library [O]n Monday, I was told that the President had said [at the previous night's Blair House meeting of June 25] that he wanted to be advised at once of any prospects for further Russian action in other areas . . . . He wanted to know if this was the beginning of a series of Russian moves, and for some days a group of us worked on that. Counselor George Kennan "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           About 10:00 A.M., the President met with [Press Secretary to the President] Charles Ross, [Special Counsel to the President] Charles Murphy, and G.M.E. in his office to discuss the press release. He handed each of us a draft release . . . . It was my understanding that the first draft had been sent over by [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson, and that the President had revised it. G.M.E. suggested the insertion of the phrase "Joint Chiefs of Staff" in the first paragraph, and a rewording of the second sentence in the second paragraph relating to the U.N. Security Council. Ross made several other suggestions for editorial reasons, all of which were accepted by the President, and Ross then released the statement to the press. Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on Elsey's notes, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           The next day - Monday the 26th, we met again at the State Department and the news which came in continued to be very serious, indeed . . . elements of catastrophe were beginning to form. I had a meeting with my associates, and after we talked about the situation for a while I asked them to leave me so that I might spend a couple of hours by myself to think, which is rather hard to do in . . . a high position in the government at a time of crisis. You have so many people coming in making recommendations, talking, giving you pieces of paper. But you don't have time to think about it. So I asked them all to go away and told my secretary that I did not want to answer the telephone for anyone except the President, and I wanted to be left alone until I said otherwise, to think about it. So they left me in that state. And I drafted out a paper with five recommendations which I then went over with my colleagues . . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-62 Papers of Merle Miller           It was thought desirable on Monday, after the meeting of the United Nations on Sunday, to recommend to the United Nations that a new and more drastic resolution be passed. The Sunday resolution had been passed when the situation was very obscure. It was not clear how great the attack was - it was not at all clear that the South Korean forces could not deal with it - and therefore the important thing on Sunday was to recognize that there had been an attack - to call on the attacker to stop - and to ask everybody to assist the nation aggressed against to defend itself. On Monday it appeared quite clear that the situation was far more serious than this - no help to the South Koreans was going to be adequate. This was an attack which was in imminent danger f succeeding - it could only be stopped if new troops - other troops - new power was introduced to stop it. And therefore we felt that we should remove all doubt from the much milder resolution on Sunday by having a new one, which would declare that an aggression had taken place - that it violated the charter - that the members of the United Nations were called upon to resist it - and to call on all of them to contribute forces for that purpose. This was the reason for the second resolution - and for this reason it required more consideration, as indeed the Indian delegation found necessary because it was not prepared to vote in the morning but had to wait until Tuesday afternoon to get instructions from their government before they were able to vote. Secretary of State Dean Acheson Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-62 Papers of Merle Miller           . . . Monday . . . [June 26, Secretary of State] Dean Acheson called and said they would like to have another meeting [at Blair House] of the same men who were there the night before to discuss further action, and at that meeting the Air Force was directed to protect the Korean Army from the Soviet Air Force The Secretary of the Navy was directed to prevent any interference with Formosa, the Philippines, or Japan. And also, the Secretary of Defense was directed to take such proper actions as were necessary for the all-out support of the United Nations Security Council order. Then the situation of Formosa was discussed at some length. President Harry S. Truman Memorandum for the record based on June 27, 1950, conversation with the President, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           The decisions taken that night were, first, to order U.S. air and sea forces to give Korean forces cover and support. This was going beyond what had been done on Sunday night [June 25], and was to repair the [unexpected action of the U.S. air elements in] sticking so close to orders issued on Sunday night that they [U.S. planes] did not interfere with North Korean air unless it interfered with the air ports in South Korea. This [expanded order] was to engage in physical activity by sea and air with all North Korean forces [south of the 38th parallel, no matter what the circumstances]. . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           One of the interesting facts is that the original decision to go in was made on the basis of the belief that this could be handled by air and naval forces. It was not originally contemplated that land forces would participate. I think that if it had been contemplated, that land forces would participate, the decision would have been considerably harder to make, but on the basis that it could be handled by the Air and Navy the decision was much simpler. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview, January 22, 1972           The Joint Chiefs of Staff summary of events in Korea prepared for the Senate Committees summarized events in Korea on June 26 which led to the decision to employ United States Air and Naval forces as follows: It appeared that the North Koreans could take Seoul within 24 hours; North Korean tanks were in Seoul. The South Korean Government had to flee to Taegu. Ammunition and other supplies were being loaded in Japan; nothing had arrived in Korea. The ROK forces had not succeeded in halting the advance of the North Koreans. Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff April 30, 1951, Summary for Senate Committees, no date Papers of George M. Elsey           By Monday night it was clear that this was a rout. Or pretty much a rout. The second decision made on Monday night was that the Seventh Fleet was to prevent any attack on Formosa, and any attack from Formosa [Taiwan] against the mainland. The latter was to put ourselves into a defensible position. We obviusly would be in a very bad box if we said that we would interfere with any attack of the [mainland "Red"] Chinese on ["Nationalist"] Formosa, but leaving these people [Chiang Kai-shek's forces] free to provoke the very attack which we would then be called upon to repulse. So in the interests of the security of the whole operation--nobody shall attack against it or from it. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson           This [order regarding the 7th Fleet], you will recall, was a recommendation which I had made the night before and which the President had postponed. By this time the fleet was in position and the President was prepared to consider the recommendation. The third [recommendation of June 26] . . . was to strengthen our forces in the Philippines. We felt that if the situation degenerated, as it later on did in Korea, there would be great nervousness and a great deal of trouble, not merely on Formosa but perhaps in the Philippines also, where, as you will recall, the [insurgent communist] Huks were making a great difficulty . . . for the government. The fourth recommendation was to accelerate aid to Indochina and to send a military operation to Indochina if the French would accept it. This was for the same reason. We supposed that whoever the Russians or the Chinese, who had instigated the attack . . . that they would undoubtedly stir up trouble all along the coast and, therefore, we wished to strengthen all positions. Our fifth recommendation was to instruct Ambassador [to the United Nations Warren] Austin to report everything that had happened to the UN. And we also recommended to the President that we should continue with some work, which we had ordered earlier . . . which was to make a survey of all trouble spots between us and the Russians and to see what might develop elsewhere. These matters were talked over . . . and this evening the President asked us to go in to what was likely to happen if there was a catastrophe in Korea. Suppose the Korean forces were not able to rally, form a line, hold a line? Suppose air support and naval support was not enough? What then? This led to a very considerable talk in which I expressed the view that it would be very important for the United States to see that the support of South Korea did not fail from a political point of view, from an international point of view. It was essential that this did not happen. Our military leaders then discussed what military action might be necessary. Secretary of State Dean Acheson Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-62 Papers of Merle Miller           Neither I nor any member of the Military Establishment in my presence recommended [at the Blair House meeting on Monday, June 26, that] we go into Korea. The recommendation came from the Secretary of State, but I want to repeat that it was not opposed by the Defense Department, all the members of which had severally pointed out the trouble, the trials, tribulations and the difficulties. . . . We had discussed all the angles of this thing on Sunday night. On Monday night we opened up with the suggestion of the State Department that we go in. If we wanted to oppose it, then was our time to oppose it. Not a single one of us did. There were some pointing out of the difficulties and I [had] pointed out [difficulties] the night before [at the meeting of June 25]; and then the President made his decision which, as I have said, I thought was the right decision. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson Congressional testimony, June 14, 1951           [Secretary of State] Dean Acheson and I were the last two to leave [the second Blair House Meeting]. . . . He had something else to talk to the President about, I've forgotten what it was now, The President said, "Now, let's all have a drink. It's been a hard day." So we had a drink, I think it was bourbon. He said, "I have hoped and prayed that I would never have to make a decision like the one I have just made today." "But, he said, "I saw nothing else that was possible for me to do except that." He said, "Now, with this drink, that's out of my mind." He turned to me and said, "Jack, . . . [t]here's something I want you to know." He said, "In the final analysis I did this for the United Nations." He said, "I believed in the League of Nations. It failed." And he said, "Lots of people thought that it failed because we weren't in it to back it up." He went on, "Okay, now we started the United Nations. It was our idea, and in this first big test we just couldn't let them down." He said, "If a collective system under the UN can work, it must be made to work, and now is the time to call their bluff." Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, June 5, 1973           At 9:55 p.m. following the Blair House meeting, the President called [to] . . . set up a meeting of Congressional leaders on Tuesday morning. . . . The White House operator put the call through to G.M.E. and the President asked G.M.E. to invite a number of Congressmen, whose names he gave, to the White house at 11:30 a.m. next morning. . . . [Special Counsel Charles] Murphy and I then between us telephoned and invited all the people the President wanted summoned to the meeting. G.M.E. phoned the President at 10:15 to report on the calls and the President phoned Murphy again at 10:45 to add a few names. Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on "Miss Hachmeister's records and G.M.E.'s note," no date Papers of George M. Elsey           Well, Monday night [June 26] about 7 o'clock I got word that all 385 or 387, I forget the exact number, [American dependant] women and children were already on board the vessel in the harbor at Inchon, and on the way to Japan. I never felt so relieved at any time as when I got that word. By midnight the situation had deteriorated so fast that we decided to call for additional planes to take care of all male members of the staff of the several entities, including the Diplomatic Corps (five countries were represented there), and the United Nations Commission. It was decided that I would stay on with four, and [Counsellor of the Embassy Everett] Drumright would stay on with four other members of the Embassy staff, and we would move south as the Korean Government did and not be in Seoul when the Communists came in. The last bus left . . . with the personnel being evacuated at about 11:00 in the morning [on Tuesday, June 27]. I had not been back at the [ambassador's] residence since Sunday morning when I left following Drumright's message. I went by the residence, opened up the food and liquor lockers, and told the servants to help themselves and not to be found there at the residence. . . . I went into the residence and I picked up my cigars and I told Sergeant Edwards, who was my right-hand man, to get a case of Scotch and I packed a bag with some clean socks, and underwear, a hat and a few shirts, and started down to KMAG [Korean Military Advisory Group] headquarters, got there about noon. KMAG headquarters was attached to the Korean army headquarters. There I caught up with the Minister of Defense, Shin Sung Mo , and the chief of staff of the Korean forces, "Fat" Chai [Byung Dok], and the whole senior hierarchy, military hierarchy, and the KMAG officers who had not yet left and were awaiting transportation to come back from the airport for them. . . . There had been several passes by Yaks [Soviet-made fighter planes], and spraying of certain areas of Seoul by the Communists' air force including Korean army headquarters just on the outskirts of the city of Seoul while we were there. Twice we took refuge under desks. Since there was also a lot of talk going on about blowing up the bridges across the Han [River], . . . I decided we had better get across the Han as soon as possible. . . . So, we . . . finally got to Suwon about 6:00. And here was some thirty-five, forty KMAG officers and men still on the edge of the strip waiting for planes to come in from Tokyo to evacuate them. Now from the final plane off came Major General John Church. He had started out from Tokyo as head of a survey group, with seven or eight officers, and while he was still in the air his instructions were changed. He became ADCOM, Advanced Commander. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral History Interview, February 10, 1971 Go to June 25, 1950    Back to Week of Decision    Go to June 27, 1950

Back to Week of Decision Go to June 25, 1950 Go to June 27, 1950 Document links June 26, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Presidential calendar of appointments for June 26, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Matthew Connelly Files. (1 page) Statement, dated June 26, 1950, from President Harry S. Truman announcing that it will be the policy of the United States to support the effort of the U.N. Security Council to put an end to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (1 page) Memorandum, dated June 26, 1950, by Dean Acheson regarding a telephone conversation about Korea between the Secretary and Senator Tom Connally. Papers of Dean Acheson. (1 page) Memorandum of conversation, dated June 26, 1950, by Lucius D. Battle regarding the Secretary's report on the Korean situation to Senator Alexander Wiley. Papers of Dean Acheson. (2 pages) Memorandum of telephone conversation, dated June 26, 1950, by Lucius D. Battle summarizing the Secretary's telephone conversation with Congressman John Kee, in which the Secretary discussed what had happened in Korea so far and his upcoming testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. Papers of Dean Acheson. (2 pages) Memorandum, dated June 26, 1950, from Dean Acheson regarding Congressman John Kee's request for a briefing on the Korean situation, particularly what was being sent into Korea. Papers of Dean Acheson. (1 page) Memorandum of conversation, dated June 26, 1950, by Dean Acheson, describing a meeting between President Harry S. Truman and the Korean Ambassador to the U.S., at which Truman received a request. for help from the Korean Parliament. Papers of Dean Acheson. (1 page) Memorandum of conversation, dated June 26, 1950, by Philip C. Jessup regarding a conversation at Blair House among President Truman and top U.S. military and state department officials in which Truman agreed that the U.S. should provide military support to South Korea, but only south of the 38th parallel. Papers of Dean Acheson. (8 pages) Notes by George M. Elsey of a June 26, 1950, teleconference between the Pentagon and General MacArthur regarding the lifting of restrictions on the use of certain forces in South Korea. Papers of George M. Elsey. (2 pages) Teletype Conference, dated June 27, 1950, between the Pentagon and General Douglas MacArthur regarding authorization to use naval and air forces in support of South Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files. (8 pages)