Image: President Truman speaking at the dedication of Friendship (now Baltimore-Washington) International Airport, June 24, 1950. Source: Truman Library The North Korean People's Army invades the Republic of Korea (South Korea). With President Harry S. Truman in his home town of Independence and other key officials away, the Department of State takes the lead in developing the nation's response. I don’t want to cause anyone any embarrassment, but I am terribly anxious to state the facts as they were, from my viewpoint - not from someone else’s - what I saw and what I acted on, not as a Monday-morning Quarterback. I want to state conditions as they were then - like the conversations you [Secretary of State Dean Acheson] and I had about Korea [on June 24, 1950], the flight to Washington [the next day], and the steps that were taken to meet the situation [after North Korea invaded South Korea]. President Harry S. Truman Presidential memoirs interview, February 16, 1955 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files           The trip out [departing from Baltimore's new airport for a short Presidential vacation] was smooth and we landed about 2:00 P.M. [in Kansas City] . . . . The president was met by his sister [Mary Jane Truman] and others and drove . . . to his home in Independence [Missouri] . . . . Later in the evening I received queries from the United Press about reports of fighting in Korea where the communist-inspired armies in the north launched an attack on the American-dominated southern portion. I did not communicate with the president, however. During the night I was awakened by the delivery of a message to the president from Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson, forwarding a report from Korea of the outbreak of hostilities. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers Diary entry, June 24, 1950 Papers of Eben A. Ayers           Image: The Truman residence, Independence, Missouri, 1950. Source: Truman Library The morning of the 25th of June, I got a call from my deputy, [Everett] Drumright, just about 8 o'clock, telling me that in the past hour KMAG [U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group] headquarters had been receiving reports from the several units along the front of an onslaught across the 38th parallel [the border between the Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)]. He said he had held up calling me until he could get a better indication of what was really going on. (We had had so many reports of that kind in the two years prior, that it was hard to determine if these were just forays across the 38th parallel or whether it was something beyond that.) And I said, "Well, I'll meet you at the office right away." Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral History Interview, February 10, 1971           The fight in Korea broke out across the parallel at 4:00 A.M. and that was Sunday morning, the 25th of June. This was still Saturday - seven hours earlier, Washington time. In other words, that would be five o’clock Saturday afternoon, the 24th of June. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Undate Talent Associates Interview, c. 1961-2 Papers of Merle Miller           I walked over, it was about a five minute walk from the residence to the chancery . . . . On the way over about 8:30, I ran into Bill James of the U[nited] P[ress]. He apparently had had a restless night and was heading toward his office. And he said, "What are you doing stirring at this time of the morning?" It was Sunday morning. And I said, "Oh, we've had some disturbing reports from activities on the 38th parallel, you might want to look into them." And went up and [Everett] Drum[right] and I drafted a telegraphic report to Washington which was very carefully worded because we were not too--it was not too clear yet just what was going on. But that was the first flash to Washington, which left the Embassy there just after 9:00 on the morning of the 25th (Korean time). Of course that whole day, Sunday, was filled with all kinds of rumors. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral History Interview, February 10, 1971           It was Saturday night, I guess about 10 o'clock. In those days night calls weren't unusual. . . . This call was from the watch officer of the Far Eastern Bureau, and said, "There's a development and I think that you would want to come in right away. I can't discuss it on the telephone." . . . I got my car and drove down . . . . [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs] Dean Rusk and one or two of his boys and I were the only ones [thus far at the Department of State] . . . . He had talked to the Secretary [of State Dean Acheson], I think the Secretary had a secure line with the State Department that couldn't be tapped--what we called a scrambler or something . . . . Rusk and I talked it over and decided that obviously the first thing we'd do . . . would be to raise the question in the UN. Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, June 5, 1973           Source: Truman Library.   Such then was the background which brings us to a summer Saturday night at my farm in Maryland to which I had gone from the State Department, around noon time, expecting to have a relaxed and quiet weekend. And this is a quiet old Maryland farmhouse, about twenty miles north of the capitol, built in the 19th century, very simple, very small, very quiet and very secluded. I was sitting there reading with my wife on Saturday night when about ten o'clock or ten-thirty I received a telephone call on what we then called the White Telephone. . . . I had in my office and also in my house a white telephone which was connected directly with the switchboard of the White House and went through no other switchboard at all. While not entirely secure against eavesdropping, this was far more secure than the usual telephone system. If one lifted the receiver, one got the switchboard in the White House and one could be directly connected immediately with the President, or through that switchboard with any other department or cabinet officer in Washington. This telephone rang, as I say, about ten o'clock and I answered it to find on the wire Assistant Secretary of State Jack Hickerson, who had charge of international organization affairs including the UN. He said he was in the State Department with Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . and they had just received an alarming message from Ambassador [John] Muccio in Seoul. This message was to the effect that there was a serious attack along the whole northern border of South Korea. They were not sure whether this was a determined final effort of the North Koreans to penetrate South Korea or whether it was a larger than usual border incident. . . . I asked him what recommendations they had and he said it was that it was their view that we should call for a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations the following afternoon, Sunday, and obtain a resolution requesting all parties, or ordering all parties, to return within their borders, to cease any aggression and calling upon all members of the UN to assist in this endeavor. I said they were to proceed with this at once and to get in touch with the necessary officials of the UN - to get in touch with our representatives to the United Nations - have them available in New York the next day and in the meantime I would call the President, who was then at his home in Independence, and would confer with him. And if the President approved this action, they would have already started upon it. If he disapproved it, they could stop it at once. But I thought time was so pressing that we should not even delay while I spoke to the President. . . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson Undated Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-62 Papers of Merle Miller           Senator [Warren Robinson] Austin, was our permanent representative to the UN. I knew that the Senator was out of town . . . . Ernest Gross was his deputy. . . . He was out for the evening. I left urgent word with one of his daughters to trace him if she knew where he was and have him call immediately. . . . I don't know the age of this girl, and we just couldn't wait. Around midnight I decided that we just couldn't wait and I called Trygve Lie, Secretary General [of the United Nations] at his home, on the telephone, and told him what had happened. . . . I never shall forget, Lie was quite the fellow. I liked him. He, of course, was Norwegian, spoke English very well, but with a pronounced accent. I told him what had happened and his first words were, "My God, Jack, that's against the Charter of the United Nations'" (in a strong Norwegian accent). I couldn't think of anything more original to say than, "You're telling me, Trygve, of course it is!" Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, June 5, 1973           I called the President and told him we thought there was a major invasion of South Korea, but that there was a great deal of confusion; it was very much mixed up. The ambassador couldn’t get things straight. . . . But it seemed evident that this was a major push and that the South Korean forces were disintegrating, very serious. When my people [at the Department of State] called me, I had instructed them to get Ernie Gross [Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations (UN)] or the Senator [Warren Austin, UN Ambassador] and get him to work on calling a meeting of the [UN] Security Council as early on Sunday as they could. I thought that since the Russians were not in the Security Council, we could get a resolution [condemning the North Korean invasion]. I told the President that Secretary of Defense [Louis] Johnson was away - he had been in Japan and was coming back. [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar] Bradley was away. I had to get hold of someone. Would it be all right if I gave the word, if I wanted someone to work with us, that it was the President speaking. Yes, that was all right. He said, “Shall I come back? It sounds bad.” I said, “No, you ought not to fly at night, and there’s nothing you can do. You wait until we get the full reports tomorrow.” I told him about the meeting of the UN. I said, “Everything is being done that can be. If you can sleep, take it easy. I will call you in the morning.” Secretary of State Dean Acheson Presidential memoirs interview, February 18, 1955 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files           Photo: U.S. Army Signal Corps. Source: Truman Library.   Well, . . . we were having dinner that evening at [columnist] Joe Alsop's, and by an interesting coincidence [Assistant Secretary of State] Dean Rusk was also having dinner that evening at the same place. And Dean Rusk was called and advised that evening about the North Korean invasion of South Korea and he advised me and he went to the State Department and I went to the Pentagon and I was there all night long . . . . [B]etween the time we heard about it and the Blair House meeting [of June 25 the next night] our function really was primarily one of correspondence by Telecom with General MacArthur [and his staff] keeping informed, making sure what was happening and trying to collect all the evidence to permit the President to make the decision that he ultimately had to make. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview, January 22, 1972           By that time [Deputy Ambassador] Ernie Gross telephoned. His daughter had located him, and I told him . . . to get in touch with [U.N. Secretary General Trygve] Lie about this emergency meeting of the Security Council. I also told him that my boys and I were drafting a resolution for him to present stating that the North Koreans had committed the aggression and calling on them to go back where they came from, and various things. . . . Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson Oral history interview, June 5, 1973           [My] teen-aged daughter was having what was called in the adolescent vocabulary a “slumber party.” A dozen or so of her teen aged friends were sprawled . . . all over the living room floor, and I had to sort of stagger over the recumbent bodies to get to the telephone. . . . [T]he girls, for the rest of the night, listened to everything that went on and they . . . sort of clustered around the telephone and . . . they began to get very excited about it. And they were the first, outside of the State Department - the first people - members of the public that knew exactly what was going on. But they didn’t really get in my way. They listened and they were excited. And I imagine for them it was probably a memorable night, but they didn’t get any more sleep that night than I did. Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest Gross Talent Associates interview, February 2, 1962 Papers of Merle Miller           When it was suggested to me that we should convene a meeting of the Security Council and lay this situation before them, it seemed to me that there was no other sensible alternative at this time, and that this step should be taken whatever further or other steps were taken and that this ought to be done at once. This was true to me for several reasons. In the first place, it was the proper procedure to take under the charter of the United Nations. Here there was an aggression. An aggression was contrary to the provisions of the charter. The charter had provisions for dealing with it and for the United States to proceed to deal with it in disregard of the charter would immediately indicate our opinion that the charter was worth nothing and that we were regarding this as a mere scrap of paper. Therefore, whatever else we did, we most certainly would have to do that. The second place, it seemed to me quite clear . . . that this would go a long way to assuring that our position would be regarded by our own people and by the world as right and that those who opposed us would be regarded as wrong. Therefore, we oriented ourselves in the proper way to begin with. And in the third place, this was something which one could do immediately, other things would take time. Meetings would have to take place. Considerations would have to be weighed, orders would have to be issued and it would be several hours, perhaps several days, before other action could be taken. But this action could be immediate, as fast as people could travel from where they were to New York. And one of the considerations which were uppermost in my mind, and I’m sure the President’s mind throughout all of this period, was the necessity for decisive, immediate, crisp, sharp action and this is why I directed that we should call a meeting of the Security Council. Secretary of State Dean Acheson Undated Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-62 Papers of Merle Miller Back to Week of Decision    Go to June 25, 1950

Back to Week of Decision Go to June 25, 1950 Document links June 24, 1950 See the record from which the decisions were made Presidential calendar of appointments for June 24, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Matthew Connelly Files. (1 page) Telegram, dated June 24, 1950, from U.S. State Department to President Harry S. Truman regarding reports of North Korean forces invading the Republic of Korea. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. (1 page) Notes by George Elsey describing communications on June 24, 1950, between President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson regarding the North Korean advance across the 38th parallel. Papers of George M. Elsey. (1 page) Note from 1951 by George Elsey describing communications with the President and White House staff June 24-25, 1950. Papers of George M. Elsey. (1 page) Teletype Conference, dated June 25, 1950, between the Pentagon and General Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command discussing post-invasion posture of the North Korean military and the South Korean response. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files. (7 pages)