

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ~~TOP SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON



COPY NO. 50

November 17, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR NSC STAFF

SUBJECT: U. S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea

REFERENCES: A. NSC 81/2
B. Record of Meeting of the Senior NSC Staff,
November 16, 1950, paragraph 2.

The enclosed draft interim report on the subject, submitted by the Senior Defense member in accordance with the agreement at the Senior Staff meeting on November 16, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Senior Staff at its meeting on Monday, November 20, at 2:30 p.m.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(c) and 5(D) (1)
NSC
with letter, 6-24-75
By NLT/MS, NARS Date 3-16-76

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DRAFTFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY

(Senior Staff)

November 16, 1950

Interim Report by the National Security Council

on

United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea

1. The National Security Council has continued its review of the situation created by the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea. This report is supplemental to the interim report of the Council dated November 14, 1950*.

2. The military operations of the United Nations in Korea are being carried out in accordance with current directives. The resistance by the North Korean forces, fortified by substantial numbers of Chinese Communists, continues. Men and materiel continue to flow across the Manchurian boundary to the support of the North Korean troops. Communist aircraft, notably the Russian built Mig-15, continue to engage our forces and to return to sanctuary across the Yalu River.

3. While hoping that the United Nations forces will achieve a rapid success in spite of this, the Council recognizes the possibility that the military situation may result in a request by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces for authority to reduce Chinese Communist support by air attack against targets in Manchuria.

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E. O. 12958, Sec. 1.01 and 1.02 of (7)

NSC Exec. 6-28-76

By S.L.T. H.S., NARS Date 3-12-76

*NSC 81/2

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For NSC Staff Consideration Only

4. The Council believes that two major policies should dominate our actions in Korea, one affirmative and one negative.

The affirmative policy is to continue our vigorous support of the United Nations and the consequent development of that organization as the medium through which it is hoped that aggression will be prevented and war eliminated as a human institution.

The second policy is to avoid having the Soviets succeed in involving us in a war with Communist China.

5. The Council believes that the creation of a situation whereby United Nations aircraft would attack targets in Manchuria would increase very substantially the likelihood that we would become involved in war with Communist China and therefore believes it important that all possible action be taken to eliminate the necessity for such attacks by United Nations forces.

6. At the moment the military action of the United Nations forces is going reasonably well and there is reason to hope that even without such attacks in Manchuria the United Nations forces may succeed in driving the Communist forces out of Korea.

7. On the other hand this happy result may not be forthcoming and it may be that the best that the United Nations forces can do, without undertaking air attacks against Manchuria, is to hold the line. Should this situation arise, the Council believes that such a line should be held as long as possible.

8. If, however, the Chinese Communists, through their assistance to the North Korean forces, succeed in causing the United Na-

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tions forces to retire, the Council believes that the most serious consideration should be given to a political course of action by the United States, within the United Nations, which would openly and effectively hold Russia responsible for the action in Korea.

9. To hold Russia responsible for this action would be a very grave step. The Council believes, however, that unless the prestige of the United Nations, built up at so much cost in the Korean war, is to be lost, and the cause of peace correspondingly harmed, the United Nations forces cannot accept a military defeat in Korea without making it clear to the world that such defeat is caused by the Soviet Union.