



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1948

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SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

BERLIN Molotov informed the three western representatives in Moscow yesterday, after reading their aide memoire summarizing the three basic points of disagreement which had blocked the negotiations in Berlin, that he considered this a one-sided and incorrect statement of the position of the Soviet Military Governor and also an incorrect version of the directives previously agreed on in Moscow. He first proposed that the question be referred back to Berlin, but then promised to give the Soviet reply without this step "as soon as possible". Ambassador Smith concludes that the interview confirmed his pessimistic forecast and that both he and the British representative feel it is now clear that the USSR is merely playing for time and is willing to prolong negotiations in one form or another indefinitely and that Moscow desires to place on the western powers responsibility for any break in the negotiations.

HYDERABAD We are instructing our Ambassador in New Delhi to inform the Indian government that we feel it might derive significant advantages by proposing a course of action by which the United Nations could contribute to an early solution of the Hyderabad problem. While we have always favored the close association of all the princely states with either India or Pakistan and are generally sympathetic to the Indian position, we have not yet fully formulated our position on the present issue and do not in any way condone the use of force respecting Hyderabad. We are also informing our representative on the UN Kashmir Commission that we feel the death of Jinnah and the Indian invasion of Hyderabad have created a new situation and that the Kashmir Commission should therefore remain in the area pending further developments.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979

By NLT-HL NARS, Date 11-13-80

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