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After the Western Powers submitted their official complaint to the United Nations on September 29, they seemed to lose interest in a negotiated settlement. Even with winter approaching, the Western Powers, and especially the United States, seemed to believe that time was on their side.
On October 3, 1948, the Soviet Union disputed the competence of the United Nations Security Council to deal with the Berlin crisis and proposed, instead, a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss Berlin and Germany as a whole. The Western Powers declined a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting as long as the Soviets were blockading Berlin, but agreed to such a meeting if the Soviets would first lift the blockade. The Soviets, still not convinced that the airlift could succeed through the Berlin winter, were not willing to lift the blockade without a concession and a chance to stop the formation of the West German state. The Western Powers, and especially the United States, were determined not to permit the question of the provisional West German government to be raised. The German Constituent Assembly was working on the draft of the Basic Law (or provisional constitution) and slow progress was being made. Over the objections of the Soviet Union, the Berlin question was put on the UN Security Council agenda and the Soviet Union promptly announced it would not participate in the Security Council discussion.
During October, the US presidential election was coming to a climax with Truman still appearing to be a certain loser. In light of the tension of a potential war and the desire for peace discerned by Truman during his campaign, he allowed some of his political advisors to persuade him to propose sending US Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Moscow on a "peace mission." To Truman's credit, he withdrew this obvious political ploy after meeting determined opposition from Secretary of State Marshall who had not been consulted on this proposal. Marshall's objections were that such a unilateral action would undercut the US position at the United Nations and that it would be misunderstood by its British and French allies.
Truman rebounded later the same month with another firm decision for continued support for the airlift. On October 22, he approved a National Security Council recommendation that 66 additional C-54s be allocated to the airlift and that adequate steps should be taken to insure availability of aviation fuel, personnel, and financial support. Clay and Murphy had again been brought back to Washington for this important National Security Council meeting and Clay stated later, "that Truman had impressed him as a man of great courage and one who did not hesitate to make his own decisions."(7) With this decision, a reaffirmation of the July 22, 1948, decision to commit to an airlift versus war or withdrawal, Truman put the airbridge on a sound foundation for the winter and thereafter.
In October, the UN Security Council presented a resolution calling for the lifting of all restrictions on traffic and commerce; resumption of quadripartite talks on the currency problem; and a reconvening of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the entire German question. The three Western Powers voted to accept the resolution on October 25, but the Soviet Union vetoed it. Stymied, the Western Powers proposed that the United Nations select a commission of experts to study the Berlin currency problem, which, as noted earlier, the UN agreed to do. However, the UN also advocated direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers to resolve the Berlin dispute. On November 13, the UN secretary general and the president of the UN General Assembly addressed a letter to the Four Powers advocating this step. The Soviet Union basically agreed to the proposal on November 16.
Truman and Marshall, though, would have none of this as long as the Soviet Union continued the blockade of Berlin. Having confounded the political experts by defeating Dewey on November 2, Truman held his first post-election press conference on November 17. When asked about the UN proposal for direct negotiations with the Soviet Union, Truman emphatically stated he would not go to Moscow to see Stalin and that the United States would not negotiate with the Soviet Union over the German situation until the blockade of Berlin was lifted.
By late January 1949, it was apparent that the airbridge had succeeded in breaking the back of the blockade. This technical achievement had enhanced the standing of the United States and Great Britain in the eyes of Germany and all of Western Europe. The Berliners had survived the worst months of winter and, although they had been cold and hungry at times, had been forced to chop down some of their beloved trees for firewood and had seen their city split, their food rations had actually been increased and genuine hope now existed that the Western Powers would not sacrifice their interests and freedom. The currency reform in Western Germany had awakened the economy and Marshall Plan funds were beginning to flow into Western European countries. The Italians and the French had, at least temporarily, withstood the challenge of the Communists. It was too early to proclaim victory, but the Western democracies led by the United States and Great Britain had demonstrated the will to challenge Soviet Communism on the European continent.
In addition, the counterblockade initiated by the Western Powers in mid-1948 was beginning to have a profound effect on the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. Although loosely applied at first as a countermove to the blockade of Berlin, the counter blockade had been expanded and tightened to cut off steel, chemicals, and manufactured goods from Western Germany and Western Europe. Moreover, goods and raw materials transiting the Soviet Zone could no longer pass through Berlin's western sectors with rail and barge traffic suffering severe dislocations.
On January 20, 1949, Truman was inaugurated for his second (first full) term as President of the United States. He named Dean Acheson as his Secretary of State to replace the ailing Marshall. Almost immediately after assuming his post, Acheson was presented with an opening to solve the Berlin crisis.
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An East Sector truck driver's papers are checked during the counter blockade. |
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On January 31, Stalin replied to a question posed by Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service on whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to remove the restrictions on access to Berlin if the Western Powers agreed to postpone the establishment of a separate West German state pending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He answered that Soviet restrictions could be removed, provided that the transport and trade restrictions introduced by the Western Powers were removed simultaneously.
No mention had been made of the currency question or other preconditions for lifting the blockade. Acheson, Charles Bohlen, and other State Department officials were determined to ascertain if these omissions had been intentional or not.
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