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The Airlift Begins
Chapter section from:
Airbridge to Berlin --- The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath
By D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin
© 1988
(Used with permission)
When the airlift began, there were only two airfields in
Berlin; Tempelhof with one runway in the US sector and Gatow with one
runway in the British sector. In 1945, when the Americans arrived in
Berlin, Tempelhof's lone runway was sodded and had been used only for
small aircraft and fighters during the latter stages of World War II. It
was beautifully equipped with hangars and a large terminal building, but
it was surrounded by high apartment buildings which required a 500 foot
ceiling in thick weather. Before June 1948, US Army engineers had built a
12 foot thick rubber base runway and covered it with steel landing mats
which was adequate for US military needs before the airlift. However,
under the continuous pounding of heavy, loaded aircraft the steel landing
mats started to break. Depressions in the runway began to form and soon a
force of 225 men was kept busy working on the runway between plane
landings in attempting to keep the field operational. In early July 1948,
construction on a new runway at Tempelhof began without interrupting
airlift traffic and during the same period the old runway was being
constantly repaired. In late 1948, construction began on a third Tempelhof runway.(26)
Gatow, the other available airfield in West Berlin in June 1948, was located in the far southwest corner of Berlin and on the west side of Wannsee. In late June 1948, construction began at Gatow to lengthen and improve the one existing runway, and, on July 16, 1948, the new 1,800 meter concrete runway was opened for service. Plans were also made to construct a second runway at Gatow, but it became obvious that, if the airlift continued to expand, a third West Berlin airfield site must be found.
On July 5, the first British Sunderland flying boat participating in the airlift landed on the Havel Lake in Berlin. Soon ten of these planes from the Royal Air Force Coastal Command were shuttling between Hamburg and Berlin. On July 7, the first twenty C-54s to carry coal to Berlin landed at Tempelhof. By July 15, the US effort numbered 54 C-54s and 104 C-47s making runs to Berlin. The combined US-British tonnage being flown into Berlin was averaging around 2,500 tons in over 600 daily flights. It was still short of the 4,500 tons established by the planners as the daily minimum requirement to feed and support the Allied military and Berlin civilian population, but a marvelous achievement in such a short period of time.
During the first month of the airlift, enthusiasm was high, but confusion often reigned. Many pilots and air crews who had been desk bound for months and even years were pressed into service while others were making their way to Europe. It was a great adventure at first to report to Flight Operations, get a plane on the spur of the moment, and take off for a four hour round trip flight to Berlin. However, the tedium and danger soon became apparent. Pilots and crews were asked to make two and more round trips a day, seven days a week, in all kinds of weather, in World War II airplanes-often in need of repairs-poorly suited for cargo duty, and landing on makeshift runways.
Ground operations were also uncoordinated during the first month. Planes often sat at airfields in Berlin for an hour or longer before unloading began. Air traffic control units were understaffed and operating under out-dated procedures which required 25 minutes separation between take-offs. Other operating procedures, not suited to an emergency airlift operation, requiring the utmost in use and efficiency, also died hard. These included one which required each pilot to visit the airfield weather office and sign a clearance form before take-off. Because the Airlift Task Force-which would later prioritize cargos according to absolute needs of the Berlin civilian and military population-was just getting organized, planes sometimes carried some frivolous and unnecessary cargo into Berlin.
There also remained some very real differences of opinion on whether the Allies could maintain their position in Berlin and on what course of action should be taken. Walter Lippmann, the most prominent columnist on foreign affairs at the time, believed the Allies should negotiate the German peace treaty because ". . . to supply the Allies sectors of Berlin by air is obviously only a spectacular and temporary answer to the ground blockade. . . The operation can only be carried on for a while in the summer months. But in the long run, especially in the fog and the rain of a Berlin winter, the cost in lives of the pilots and crews of planes which would have to be replaced, and of the money, would be exorbitant."(27) On the same day, Churchill proclaimed that if the Western powers yield to the Russian attempts to squeeze them out of Berlin they would "destroy the best chance which is now open to us of escaping a third World War."(28)
In the Time, International Edition of July 12, 1948, Harold MacMillan, at that time leader of the British Conservative Party and the opposition to the ruling Labour Party, was quoted on the situation in Berlin: "We must . . . face the risk of war. . . . The alternative policy-to shrink from the issue-involves not merely the risk but almost the certainty of war." And U.S. Secretary of State Marshall was quoted as saying: "We intend to stay." But Time also editorized by stating that ". . . it was obvious that Operation Vittles could not be carried on at the summer rate when winter comes. . . ."
As it became more apparent that the Soviets had no intention of lifting the blockade and that the airlift was going to last more than a few weeks, it became clear that the airlift would have to be expanded and that operations at all levels would have to become more efficient. The romanticism would have to be sacrificed for standard procedures if the airlift was to have any chance for success through the fall and winter months.
The first month of the Soviet blockade and the Allied airlift brought anxiety and change to the lives of Berliners residing in the three Western Sectors. Although they had become accustomed to spending most of their waking hours seeking food and shelter, they now had to cope with the possible loss of their freedom if they identified too closely with the Western powers and the Western powers decided to pull out.
Although Clay, Robertson, and the Western political leaders publicly stated the Western powers would remain in Berlin, the Soviet and German Communist press and radio constantly printed and broadcast reports and rumors of the eminent Allied departure. There were also not-too-veiled threats that those Berliners who openly supported Allied policies would be harshly dealt with when the Allies left. Who was telling the truth? Would the Soviets lift the blockade after a few weeks as they had previously in April? If not, could the airlift possibly supply Berlin over an extended period? Would there be war? These were the questions uppermost in the minds of Berliners in June and July 1948.
As Ernst Reuter had predicted, the Berliners were prepared to make sacrifices for their political freedom. They demonstrated their determination throughout the 11 month ordeal in spite of Communist intimidation and harassment which eventually led to the split of their city.
All of this determination was not immediately apparent during June and July 1948. What was apparent to the Berliners was their former foes were not willing to sacrifice Berlin on a matter of principle, and the Berliners responded by pitching in and supporting the airlift. Although the position of the Western powers for remaining in Berlin was based on international power politics rather than any altruism, there became a shared comradeship between the Allied personnel and the West Berliners. Although the sacrifices by Allied personnel were minor compared to those of the Berliners, the occupied and the occupiers began to identify with each other for the first time since the war ended.
Many Allied personnel who were in Berlin during the blockade and the airlift have commented on this change of their attitude towards the civilian population. And the Berliners who were old enough to have experienced the blockade and airlift have demonstrated over and over again by word and deed their support for the continued presence of the Western powers. Undergoing a common ordeal brought about a cooperation, support, and understanding that was not previously evident.
On a street corner in Lankwitz, Sergeant Major Jim Madison of the 18th Constabulary squadron was as moved as his wife - "standing there with forty Berliners . . . we were just one person as the planes went over." Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, at Tempelhof on an inspection trip, felt a lump rise in his throat as he watched little girls in pigtails, wearing white puff-sleeved blouses and velvet bodices, pressing nosegays of flowers on the pilots as they piled from their planes. The wife of Berlin's American Overseas Airline chief, Barbara Parsons, summed up the mood that the armada evoked: "It was no longer 'them' and 'us'-it was 'us'."(29)
During the first weeks, the Berliners had to learn how to cope with dehydrated potatoes, powdered milk for infants, a lack of fresh fruit, vegetables, and meat, a dual currency system, reduced electrical power requiring severe rationing, and loss of jobs because of restricted power which forced many factories and offices to close. They also had to deal with the subways, elevated trains, buses and streetcars operating on reduced schedules because of gas and electric rationing. In short, every phase of what they had become accustomed to as normal daily routine was disrupted. They were forced to adapt to survive.
Fortunately, the average Berliner had grown accustomed to rationing and shortages during six years of war and three years of occupation. The ordeal of the blockade was an additional burden, but it may have been more difficult to overcome had the Berliners not been accustomed to hardships.
As stated earlier, certain essential services and rationed food could by law be paid for with either East or West marks in the US, British, and French Sectors of Berlin. In addition, no person employed in the Western Sectors could demand more than 25 percent of his wages in West Marks.
The strict controls on the amount of West Marks circulating in Berlin plus the population's awareness of Communist hostility to private capital caused a flight to the West Mark. Initially pegged at par, the West Mark quickly rose against the East Mark in black market trading. By July 1948 it was two East Marks to one West Mark; in August, 3 to 1; and by October 1948, 4 to 1. The exchange rate then fluctuated between three to four East marks for one West Mark for the remainder of 1948 and early 1949. In July 1948 the first official exchange offices were established in the Western Sectors by the Berlin Finance Office in an attempt to gain some control over exchange rates and to facilitate legal currency transactions.
The exchange ratio between East and West currency also caused certain government agencies to run up large deficits. A prime example of this was the Berlin postal department which was required to sell postage stamps and other services for East Marks if offered in payment. It was also required, as all Berlin employers, to pay their employees 25 percent of their salaries in West Marks.
In July 1948, the Soviets froze the Berlin Magistrate's funds then on deposit in a bank in the Soviet Sector. Almost overnight the city administration was bankrupt and unable to pay city employees. Even after this crisis was overcome, city employees and contractors were often paid late due to continuing city fund shortages causing dissatisfaction and morale problems.
One of the most severe problems faced by the Berliners was the lack of sufficient electrical power sources in the Western Sectors. Upon commencement of the blockade, this required immediate and strict rationing for homes, factories, offices, and transportation services. Family home life soon became regulated around when electric power was available. For most, this was two hours a day and staggered over the 24 hour period. Schedules were printed and, depending on district of residence, some Berliners were forced to get up at 2 am to accomplish tasks, such as cooking requiring electrical power. Lack of electrical power caused many factories to close, increasing the unemployment rolls. Even when goods could be manufactured they could not be exported because of the blockade.
In spite of these hardships, the Berliners demonstrated their political independence by continual challenge to Soviet pressure. The Berlin City Council passed a resolution on June 30, requesting the United Nations mediate the dispute between the occupying powers. On July 11, at the Schoeneberg District Hall in the US Sector, Reuter condemned the Soviet blockade and reiterated the unshakeable will of the Berliners to resist an attempt to starve them into political submission. On Thursday, July 29, the City Council, meeting at its regular location in the Soviet Sector, courageously passed a resolution demanding the blockade be lifted. Its instigators were charged with a "crime against humanity.''
In July, the inevitable split of the Berlin city government began. Because of repeated insubordination, Paul Markgraf the Communist appointed city police president, was suspended on July 26 by the Magistrate. Dr. Johannes Stumm was appointed Acting Police President. The Soviets refused to recognize Markgraf's suspension and, because the Berlin police headquarters was then located in the Soviet Sector, Stumm and the Magistrate were forced to make a decision. Stumm set up an alternate police headquarters in the US Sector and called for all police to report to the new headquarters on Wednesday, August 4. Approximately 1,500 of the 2,000 personnel reported to the new police headquarters while the remainder stayed with Markgraf.
Thus, the Berlin police department became the first city department to split.
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