After considerable deliberation, the German leaders agreed to accept the responsibility after it was agreed to call the group preparing the constitution the "Parliamentary Council" instead of Constituent Assembly and the document they were to prepare the "Basic Law" (Provisional Constitution) instead of the Constitution.⁽¹⁰⁾ These were efforts to maintain the provisional nature of the proposed government on the outside chance the Soviets might agree to their zone later joining the government.

  When the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London broke up in December 1947, and the United States and Great Britain decided to proceed with a currency reform for their zones and to establish a provisional West German government, Clay and Robertson realized the Soviets would take counter-action. Because of Berlin's exposed position and its potential as a thorn inside the Soviet sphere, there was little doubt the first challenge to the Western democracies' resolve would come there. Before his return to Berlin, Clay accurately predicted the early end of the Allied Control Council.⁽¹¹⁾

  Clay and Robertson did not have to wait long to find out what kind of action the Soviets contemplated. In January 1948, Soviet guards stopped a British military train and detached from it two cars carrying German passengers traveling under British auspices. In February, it was the Americans' turn when the Soviets delayed a US military train enroute to Berlin at the Soviet Zone border on a technicality.

The Unter den Linden in the Soviet sector looking toward the Brandenburg Gate and British Sector.

  Soviet attacks in the Allied Control Council became more abusive and pointed. At the February 11, 1948, Allied Control Council meeting the Western powers protested that the Soviet authorities in Berlin had barred them from a political meeting in the Soviet Sector of Berlin to which they had been invited by Germans. Sokolovsky answered the protest with an attack claiming Berlin was part of the Soviet Zone and accused the Western powers of using "their position to prejudice their right to remain in Berlin."⁽¹²⁾ Clay felt the Soviets were attempting to build a record to justify the future blockade.

  The attacks were not limited to the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura meetings, but continued daily in the German Communist press and radio in Berlin. In January and February 1948, Communist authorities in the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Sector of Berlin began confiscating Western literature in violation of Four Power agreement on free circulation of all literature, other than Fascist literature, within Germany.

  Because of their loss of the Berlin elections in 1946 and the obvious preference of a majority of Berliners for Western style democracy over Soviet Communism, the Soviets and their German Communist satraps resorted to various tactics.

  The Soviet response to these political setbacks took the form of a gradually increasing effort to get the Western Allies out of Berlin. Virtually no instrument of intimidation short of actual military force was beneath Soviet use. Planted rumors, press attacks, direct statements, and even Kommandatura conferences were used to spread the idea that the Western powers would leave Berlin.

  These efforts, in spite of Western denial and counterclaim had the effect of shaking the confidence of the Berliners in the West. More importantly, it shook their faith in the democratic institutions the Western Allies in Berlin represented. Many Germans in Berlin hesitated to identify themselves with the West, knowing full well the direction Soviet reprisals would take if in fact the Western Allies did vacate the city.⁽¹³⁾

  The March 20, 1948, Allied Control Council meeting proved to be the last one. After the usual arguments about which power had the best interests of the German people at heart, Sokolovsky suddenly demanded to know of all agreements on western Germany reached by the United States, Great Britain, and France in London in February and March. He was informed his request was reasonable and the answers would be forthcoming after their respective governments reviewed and approved the conference report. Sokolovsky hardly waited for the translation before declaring "I see no sense in continuing this meeting, and I declare it adjourned," whereupon the entire Soviet delegation arose and walked out.⁽¹⁴⁾

  Because Sokolovsky was chairman for March and he did not call another meeting, this effectively ended the existence of the Allied Control Council for Germany after almost three years of existence. As Truman was later to observe: "For most of Germany, this act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time, namely, that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was the curtain-raiser for a major crisis."⁽¹⁵⁾

The May 13, 1948 meeting of the Berlin Kommandantura, one of last meetings that the Soviets representatives attended.

  Berlin and the Western powers did not have to wait long to find out what the Soviets planned. On March 31, 1948, the Soviets issued an order requiring personnel and baggage on military trains to and from Berlin be checked by their inspectors. They also decreed freight on military trains departing Berlin could not be cleared unless a permit was obtained from the Soviet commander in Berlin. This was in direct violation of Zhukov's oral agreement of June 29, 1945.

  Both Clay and Robertson were determined to challenge the Soviet orders, but Clay first cabled General Omar Bradley, the US Army Chief of Staff, concerning his intentions. After considering several courses of action, Clay was authorized to reject the new Soviet regulations and to send US military passenger trains through the Soviet checkpoints. The guards were instructed to prevent Soviet military personnel from entering the trains, but not to fire unless first fired upon. This was basically what Clay had proposed with some modifications. He was not happy with the modifications, though, which did not allow him to increase the train guard. Clay was convinced the Soviets were bluffing and would not risk war, but agreed to proceed as ordered.⁽¹⁶⁾

  On the evening of Monday, March 31, three US military trains entered the Soviet Zone. One train commander evidently lost his nerve and permitted Soviet representatives to board the train. This train was allowed to pass through to Berlin. The other two trains were stopped, but the train commanders denied Soviet entry. The Soviets, however, did not attempt to force access. Since they had complete control of the railroad signals in their zone, they merely had the trains shunted to a siding. The trains remained there until morning when they were backed out to the US Zone. Two British military trains were treated similarly to the latter two US trains.⁽¹⁷⁾

  So as not to acquiesce to the Soviet orders, Clay cancelled all US military trains to and from Berlin and laid on an airlift. This became known as the "Little Lift" and lasted only about ten days. The US Air Force Europe (USAFE) flew in about 300 tons of supplies total for the military garrison, but there was no provisions for the civilian populace of Berlin or even a thought of attempting such an operation at that time. The Soviets eased their restrictions on Allied military trains on April 10, but continued to periodically interrupt rail and road traffic during the next 75 days.

  Clay, smarting under the humiliation of the "Soviet victory," proposed to Bradley on April 1 to send a

Civilians milling about in Anhalter station on 1 April. The Soviets delayed, but did not completely stop civilian rail traffic during this period.

military truck convoy through to Berlin to force the issue and determine Soviet intentions. Clay still felt the Soviets were bluffing and that they would back down if forcefully confronted. Bradley advised Clay not to proceed with this plan without further consultation.

  Clay attempted to enlist Robertson to support his truck convoy plan, but Robertson, just as Bradley, realized a truck convoy could be hindered as easily as a train shunted to a siding by detours, roadblocks, and destroyed bridges. A miscalculation by either side could lead to a "shooting war" or, if unsuccessful in getting through, in being forced to withdraw under further humiliation.

  Then on April 5, a major incident occurred when a Soviet fighter plane first buzzed and then collided with a British transport plane approaching the Berlin-Gatow airfield in the British Sector. Both aircraft crashed, killing the Soviet pilot and fourteen passengers and crew, including two Americans. Robertson demanded an inquiry and advised Sokolovsky he had ordered fighter escort for his unarmed planes until Sokolovsky could insure the safety of his aircraft. Although Sokolovsky expressed

Supplies for the US garrison in Berlin being unloaded from C-47 aircraft at Tempelhof during the emergency air movement later dubbed the "Little Lift," 2 April 1948.

regret and denied he had directed molestation of British aircraft in the Berlin corridor, he claimed the British plane had violated air safety regulations and was to blame for the accident.

  The unfavorable publicity the Soviets received over the incident and the potential for further dangerous confrontations appeared to dissuade the Soviets from further interference in the Berlin air corridors. The Western powers' response indicated they would not tolerate Soviet attempts at intimidation. Just as most Western military leaders seemed to understand the potential of a war situation developing by attempting to force an armed convoy through to Berlin, the Soviet military chiefs appeared to understand the same could be true if they attempted to force the issue in the air over Berlin.

  In an April 10, 1948, teleconference, Bradley asked Clay for an estimate of the situation in Berlin. Clay replied:

  I do not believe that we should plan on leaving Berlin short of a Soviet ultimatum to drive us out by force if we do not leave. At that time we must resolve the question as to our reply to such an ultimatum. The exception which could force us out would be the Soviet stoppage of all food supplies to German population in western sectors. I doubt that Soviets will make such a move because it would alienate the Germans almost completely, unless they were prepared to supply food for more (than) two million people.

  Clay then went on about his actions in reducing the Berlin garrison before making a prophecy and an emotional appeal.

May Day demonstrations in Berlin, 1948. Part of the crowd is turning left to the Reichstag rendezvous of anti-communists while others continue to a Soviet demonstration. This photo was taken from the border of the British and Soviet Sectors at a point where the Berlin wall would later be constructed.

 

  You will understand, of course, that our separate currency reform in the near future followed by partial German government in Frankfurt will develop the real crisis. Present show probably designed by Soviets to scare us away from these moves.

  Why are we in Europe? We have lost Czechoslovakia. We have lost Finland. Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. We can take it by reducing our personnel with only airlift until we are moved out by force. There is no saving of prestige by setting up at Frankfurt that is not already discounted. After Berlin, will come western Germany and our strength there, relatively, is no greater and our position no more tenable than Berlin.

  If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge. We can take humiliation and pressure short of war in Berlin without losing face. If we move, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not know this, does not believe the issue is cast now, then it never will and communism will run rampant. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay here until forced out. God knows this is not heroic pose because there will be nothing heroic in having to take humiliation without retaliation.⁽¹⁸⁾

  A few days later, Clay again proposed to Bradley his armed truck convoy plan, but this time it was enlarged to an entire US infantry division plus a combined Anglo-French division. Bradley let Clay down easily by stating the plan was not desirable at this time.⁽¹⁹⁾     

Rail and barge traffic begins to stack up as the blockage begins in earnest. Before the currency reform, black-market activity was common throughout Germany.

  From April 10 to the announcement of the currency reform on June 18, 1948, the Soviets intermittently interfered with rail, road, and barge traffic. These efforts appeared to be designed to dissuade the Western powers from their plans regarding a provisional west German government and a currency reform by illustrating the vulnerability of Berlin.

  When the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London during November and December 1947, produced no agreement on German economic problems, the Americans and British decided to go forward with plans for the creation of a West German government. Before this should become a reality, they decided that, among other things, a central bank had to be established and a currency reform had to be implemented. In early 1948, the Bank Deutscher Laender (which became the Bundesbank in 1958) was established to serve as the central bank for the three Western zones. The bank was given authority, among other things, to issue money and control foreign exchange, but it remained temporarily under the supervision of the Allied Bank Commission, consisting of the Financial Advisors of the US, British, and French Military Governors.

US troops check identification cards and search for unauthorized goods during a "search and seizure" operation.