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Winter Campaign
Chapter section from:
Airbridge to Berlin --- The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath
By D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin
© 1988
(Used with permission)
During October 1948, the 100th day of the airlift was celebrated with speeches, statements, and a special Berlin postal cancellation on mail. The initial stage of the airlift had been very successful, but the Soviets showed no signs of ending the blockade and the big test of winter was approaching. Would the Western Powers be able to continue the pace during the normal bad weather of late fall and winter in northern Europe? Would the Berliners continue to support the Western Powers if food and coal ran out? The Soviets were still betting the airlift could be not sustained during the winter and continually publicized the forthcoming withdrawal of the Western Powers from Berlin.
One of the problems still existing which thwarted maximum airlift efficiency was divided command. General William H. Tunner headed up the American effort which had been designated the 1st Airlift Task Force with headquarters in Wiesbaden under the USAFE commanded by General Curtis LeMay. The British effort was headed by Air Commodore J.W.F. Merer, commanding the No. 46 Group, under Air Marshal Sir Arthur P.M. Saunders, commander in chief of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO). Some aspects of the airlift were coordinated, but if schedules could be consolidated at all participating airfields, smoother and more efficient operations could result. Tunner had already sent C-54s to the British airfield at Fassberg in August and desired to send more to take advantage of the short central air corridor.
At Tunner's suggestion, LeMay approached Saunders about establishing combined US-British airlift operations. The British, realizing the Americans would get the top post because the US airlift effort was much larger than theirs, were reluctant, but finally in the interest of a more efficient operation, the British agreed. On October 15, the British and Americans announced the establishment of the Combined Air Lift Task Force (CALTF) with Tunner commanding and Merer as deputy commander.
The central and northern Berlin air corridors into the British Zone of Germany were not only shorter, but over flatter terrain than the southern corridor leading into the US Zone. By October the airlift was utilizing six British Zone airfields -- Fassberg, Wunsdorf, Bueckeberg, Fuhlsbuettel, Luebeck, and Schleswig-Land -with a seventh nearing completion near Celle plus the seaplane base at Finkenwereder. Only Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main from the US Zone were being used.
The British, who had a very mixed fleet of military and civilian contract planes, could not fully use their better situated airfields. The Americans, who had by October 1 standardized their fleet with the larger C-54s, capable of delivering a ten ton load per plane, were supplying more than 3,000 tons per day versus the 1,500 tons per day by the British. It made sense to station even more C-54s at the British fields where two planes could do the work for three from Wiesbaden or Rhein-Main and Tunner moved additional C-54s there when Celle was completed in December.
It also made sense to use the large C-54s for the basics, such as coal and foodstuffs, and use the British mixed fleet for more specialized cargos. Liquid fuels were supplied largely by a British civilian tanker fleet operating out of Wunsdorf. Prior to the arrival of the British tankers, liquid fuel had been hauled into Berlin in 55 gallon drums which were clumsy, space consuming, and had to be steam-cleaned in Berlin and lifted back out.
Another difficult commodity was salt and Berlin required 38 tons per day. Salt is difficult to transport because it eats through alloys and cables causing severe damage to airplane control systems. At first, the British Sunderland flying boats, which were treated to resist the corrosive action of salt water, were used. They operated out of the Finkenwerder seaplane base near Hamburg and landed on the Havel Lake in Berlin. However, when winter came and ice formed on the lake, the use of the Sunderlands had to be terminated. Thereafter, the British assigned Halifax bombers to haul salt. The salt was carried in special basketlike containers slung in the bomb-bay section.(1)
To build the new airfield at Tegel in Berlin, heavy construction equipment was necessary. In addition to the US C-82s and one C-74 Globemaster available to transport such heavy equipment, the British Bristol freighters were used for these awkward loads. Luebeck airfield became the receiving station for some 68,000 persons, mainly children and elder persons, evacuated from Berlin while Bueckeburg airfield operated a passenger shuttle system to and from the city.
The establishment of CALTF also changed the concept of the airbridge. Previously, the airlift's mission was to assure the minimum daily required tonnage arrived in Berlin. Thereafter, the effort would be to increase tonnage from daily quotas to unlimited tonnage. In other words, if there was congestion in the Berlin air corridors and operations had to be slowed down, a US C-54 with ten tons of cargo took precedence over a Royal Air Force Dakota with three tons.
Of all the difficulties facing the airlift, one of the greatest single problems was weather. Low clouds, fog, freezing rain, turbulence, and ice were daily contingencies that had to met and overcome. With these facts in mind, airlift planners throughout the early days of the operation prepared flight procedures, traffic control measures, and landing aid installations that enabled the airlift crews to operate in weather conditions well below the established Air Force minimums.
Germany, with the latitude of Labrador and the temperature of the US mid-Atlantic coast, presents one of the most difficult forecasting areas in the world. During the winter the proximity of the warm Gulf Stream and the cold North Sea causes the inter-mixture of air masses of widely varying temperatures and humidity, and frequent frontal passages with inconsistent rates of movement made accurate forecasting a major problem. Newspaper reports such as these were not uncommon in November and December 1948:
- Berlin, November 3, 1948, Der Kurier: "Although rain and fog during the last 24 hours greatly hampered operations, 412 US and British flights moved more than 4,000 tons of supplies to Berlin."
- Berlin, November 4, 1948, Der Kurier: "During the past 24 hours, 315 US and British flights carried more than 3,000 tons of supplies to Berlin. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, flying operations at the Gatow airfield had to be interrupted for ten hours. . . ."
- Berlin, November 8, 1948, (AP): "During the night to Monday, a dense fog over Frankfurt and Wiesbaden greatly obstructed airlift operations."
- Berlin, November 18, 1948, Der Kurier: "Due to overcast conditions prevailing in Western Germany, only 25 airplanes were able to take off from Frankfurt. All of the crews had reported for duty voluntarily. . . ."
By the end of October 1948, the airlift operational techniques were established. The necessary planes and personnel were in place. However, the question remained: Could the Airlift Task Force supply a city of more than two million people totally by air during the poor flying weather season from November through January? Many historians have wondered what the outcome of the Berlin Airlift would have been had the Soviets instituted the blockade in October instead of June.
The minimum conditions for the airlift airfields were 200 feet ceiling and one-half mile visibility, except Tempelhof (because of the apartment buildings) which was 400 feet ceiling and one mile visibility. The US Air Force, which before the airlift had a single weather squadron in Europe, did everything it could to beef up its weather forecasting. A B-29 squadron in England was assigned to conduct weather observation. A squadron of B-17s was operated out of Wiesbaden on weather observation missions. Airlift pilot reports were used extensively, but a change of 1 degree in temperature or a few knots change in wind force could mean a variation of visibility and ceiling that could mean the difference between a successful landing or a pass over and return to base without landing the necessary supplies for Berlin.
Pilot Jeff Warren recalls several landings at Tempelhof when his altimeter read 100 feet and he could not see the landing strip. As Warren stated it would have been easy to refuse landing under such conditions and turn around for home. Why did pilots, who had three years earlier been bombing this same city, now risk their lives to feed and support it? Several pilots have stated it was a simple matter of pride. They had a mission to accomplish and they set out to prove to everybody and anybody they could fulfill that mission under any condition.
From July to October 1948, the tonnage delivered to Berlin increased each month. In July, 69,000 tons were delivered; in August, 119,002; in September, 139,623; and in October, 147,581. In November, the first month of the bad weather period, the tonnage delivered declined to 113,588. What would happen in December, January, and February?
Several events occurred in November and December 1948 which turned things around for the airlift. The new Tegel airfield in Berlin and another new airport in the British Zone at Celle-Wietzenruch became operational. The US Air Force increased the total number of C-54s assigned to the airlift to 225. The number of British Royal Air Force planes was also increased and the number of chartered planes from private airlines increased.
The significance of the two airfields in the British Zone at Fassberg and Celle was immense. Because of their close location in two of the three air corridors, flying time between these two airports and Berlin was only about half that of Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden to Berlin. Celle and Fassberg were also close to the Ruhr which supplied coal, the most important and most carried commodity into Berlin. In December 1948, delivered tonnage to Berlin dramatically increased to 141,468 on 16,487 flights. This was 2,300 fewer flights than were required to carry almost the same tonnage in September when the C-47s were still being used. In January 1949, a new record monthly tonnage of 171,959 was delivered.
The initial minimum requirement to feed and maintain Berlin was set at 4,500 tons daily, but during the fall of 1948 this was revised upwards to a minimum comfort level of 5,620 tons per day. After January 1949, this minimum comfort level was exceeded every day and the excess went for stockpiling. To demonstrate this success to the Soviets, the world, and especially to the people of Berlin, East and West, in January the daily food ration for West Berliners was raised from 1,600 to 1,880 calories a day.(2)
The French, because of a lack of transport planes, were unable to do much to support the airlift, but, in December 1948, they demonstrated they too could contribute. The new Tegel airport in Berlin, located in the French sector, was completed on Friday, November 5, almost two months ahead of schedule and test flights began immediately. Before the new airfield could become fully operational, however, something had to be done about a large 200 foot radio tower sticking up in the approach path. The tower was owned by the Soviet controlled Radio Berlin and numerous French requests to the Soviets to move it or dismantle it had been ignored.
Finally, in December when Tegel was to become fully operational and the tower still stood presenting an obvious danger to aircraft, the French attached explosives to its base and blew it down. The next day, Kotikov, the Soviet Berlin Commander, stormed into French General Jean Ganeval's headquarters protesting and threatening dire consequences for the French. Ganeval politely, but firmly, told Kotikov that the Soviets had had ample time to solve the problem, had ignored his requests, and, therefore, he had had no other alternative to insure planes and lives were not threatened.
This courageous action by the French commander won the support of his British and American colleagues and the admiration and praise of the Berliners. A few days later, the French further endeared themselves to the Berlin populace when General Pierre Koenig, the French military governor, made his private plane available to transport Christmas gifts for Berlin children.
By the end of January 1949, the airlift had proven that it could supply Berlin indefinitely in any kind of weather. It became obvious, even to the Soviets, that, short of war, the blockade had been broken. The Western Powers had demonstrated their continued will to remain in Berlin. The propaganda defeat suffered by the Soviets was inescapable. News media coverage described the daily successes of the airlift and "world opinion," as demonstrated by the United Nations resolutions, was massively on the side of the West Berliners and the Western Powers. In addition, a counter-blockade begun in mid-1948 was beginning to have an adverse economic effect on the Soviet Zone. The only question left was how long did the Soviet Union want to continue this failed operation, but the Western Powers would have to be alert to any Soviet signal and permit some graceful way out.
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