Before we left Washington I had gone to [Press Secretary] Charlie Ross and asked him about communications facilities. Charlie had assured me that the Navy had "adequate" communications facilities on Wake Island . . . . I had my doubts. I told Charlie that in view of the importance of the meeting and the large volume of news that would come out of it, that I would appreciate very much if he would run another check. I had learned fast how inadequate Navy or any other kind of communications could be thousands of miles away from normal facilities. I also asked Charlie if additional communications facilities couldn't be made available. These were readily available through the Army Signal Corps or the Navy. . . . Either Ross was assured by the Navy that the communications were adequate, or he was too busy thinking of other things and just didn't take any action. . . . International News White House Correspondent Robert Nixon Oral history interview, November 4, 1970

A number of Secret Service agents also arrived via the Press plane to augment the advance party which reached Wake Island the day before. The CONSTELLATION landed at Wake Island at 6:10 AM The INDEPENDENCE passed over Wake Island twelve minutes ahead of schedule and put down at the Civil Aeronautics Administration air terminal, Wake Island, at exactly 6:30 AM. Assistant Naval Aide to the President Lieutenant Commander William Rigdon Log of President Truman's Trip to Wake Island: October 11-18, 1950

I was MacArthur's guest on that plane trip to Wake Island and back again. In fact, I had spent the night in the same bungalow with him on Wake Island because the accommodations there were so limited. His plane arrived about six o'clock the night before. Merle Miller's book [Merle Miller. Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman. New York, Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973] is completely wrong on that. There was no jockeying in the air as to which plane [MacArthur's or Truman's] would come down first. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975 The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)

Again at Wake we landed just ahead of the President. General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio had arrived the evening before, and were on the field awaiting the President in the early morning sunlight. As we looked out the plane window I asked Ambassador Jessup, "Is there anyone on the ground we know other than the ubiquitous press?" He replied, "There's an Air Force Colonel who I don't think is waiting for his Commander-in-Chief." He was referring, of course, to Colonel [Anthony] Story, the General's pilot, who had flown us when we were last in the Orient. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Source: Truman Library

On landing at Wake Island, I walked toward General MacArthur's quarters to talk with him. He met me halfway. He asked me, "What is this meeting about?" I told him the president wanted to discuss with him how political victory in Korea could be attained, now that MacArthur had won the brilliant military victory. Also the Japanese peace treaty, and all matters affecting the Far East. He seemed relieved, saying, "Good, then the president wants my views?" I said, "Yes." After a word or two of greeting to General [Omar] Bradley and Secretary [of the Army Frank] Pace, who then had come up, I had a further talk. He [MacArthur] took my arm and walked towards the President's incoming plane. I explained to him the strong support the President had given to him in the operation. MacArthur said that though the action was now successful, he, MacArthur, had taken a grave responsibility. I pointed out perhaps the President, at least equally, had taken a grave responsibility in backing him. Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman Truman Library Institute conference comment based on contemporaneous note, May 1975 The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)

General MacArthur strode to the foot of the landing ramp and, with hand outstretched, greeted the President. The President shook hands and remarked, "How are you, General? I'm glad you are here." There were no military honors or ceremony. General MacArthur and the officers of his staff were all tie-less in open throated khaki shirts. While the photographers were making their pictures the President remarked to General MacArthur, "I have been a long time meeting you, General. General MacArthur replied: "I hope it won't be so long next time, Mr. President. Assistant Naval Aide to the President Lieutenant Commander William Rigdon Log of President Truman's Trip to Wake Island: October 11-18, 1950

President Truman and General MacArthur on Wake Island, October 14, 1950. Photo: Department of State Source: Truman Library

We arrived at dawn. Gen. MacArthur was at the Airport with his shirt unbuttoned wearing a greasy ham and eggs cap that evidently had been in use for twenty years. He greeted the President cordially and after the photographers had finished their usual picture orgy the President and the General boarded an [old] two door sedan and drove to the quarters of the Airline manager on the Island. President Harry S. Truman Handwritten note, November 25, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

Well. I think the part that so far as I know nobody knows except for the President, is what went on in his personal conversations with MacArthur. He had two rather long private sessions with MacArthur, with no other person present, and I've always felt that MacArthur relied on what was said in those confidential tete a tete sessions . . . because no else was there except the President. . . . Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson

There was a 1937 Chevrolet, the only car on the island. And there was a little home, a little spot, about a mile, less than a mile, because the whole island wasn't a hell of a lot bigger than that. Maybe it was 700 or 800 yards away. So MacArthur got in the car, and so did the President. . . . And he [Truman] always just talked in front of us; everybody did. . . . Well he said, "Listen, you know I'm President, and you're the general, you're working for me." This was about the tone of it. All right, "You don't make any political decisions; I make the political decisions. You don't make any kind of a decision at all. Otherwise, I'm going to call you back, and get you out of there. If you make one more move, I'm going to get you out of there." . . . Secret Service Agent Floyd Boring Oral history interview, September 21, 1988

I do not recall ever having heard a briefing from President Truman or seeing a Memorandum of Conversation about the private exchange which Truman and MacArthur had before our group meeting. . . . I would be inclined to value rather heavily what was said by each nearer the time than accounts which appeared many years later . . . . There is one aspect of General MacArthur which one should keep in mind. He was an extraordinarily able person and . . . did a brilliant job with the occupation of Japan. Further, when he wished to do so, he could charm the beard off a billy goat. . . . Subject to a Memorandum of Conversation which you might find about the private meeting between Truman and MacArthur at Wake Island, it would be my guess that MacArthur went out of his way to pay his respect to his Commander in Chief and showed the deference due by a General to his President. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Dean Rusk to John Wiltz, January 12, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

That's the sort of lethal thing in which Chiefs of State get into. MacArthur was practically a Chief of State at this time--he was the Mikado of Japan and Korea. Several times when the President gets together with [British Prime Minister Clement] Attlee or [Winston] Churchill or someone, a great tendency is to have these fellow go off by themselves; this is just sheer murder and never ought to occur to a dog. It is a terrible thing to have happen, because you have no idea of what is said, and the President can tell you what he thinks was said; the other fellow is quite as sure that something different was said, and there is no way of resolving this thing. You can get into terrible trouble with it. Secretary of State Dean Acheson "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson

For more than an hour they [President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur] discussed the Japanese and Korean situation. The General assured the President that the victory was won in Korea, that Japan was ready for a peace treaty and that the Chinese Communists would not attack. A general discussion was carried on about Formosa. The General brought up his statement [of August 25, 1950] to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which had been ordered withdrawn by the President. The General said he was sorry for any embarrassment he'd caused, that he was not in politics at the time and that the politicians had made a "chump" (his word) out of him in 1948 and that it would not happen again. He assured the President that he had no political ambitions. He again said the Chinese Commies would not attack, that we had won the war and that we could send a Division to Europe from Korea in January 1951. President Harry S. Truman Handwritten note, November 25, 1950 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

The "Dressing Down" allegations [regarding the private meeting between MacArthur and the President] I discount. . . . During the open session, MacArthur was impeccably correct and his whole bearing was most MacArthurish (even tie less); he had conquered all! MacArthur, always the consum[m]ate actor; more so than John Barrymore. But even so, he could not have been so flawless at the conference and for seven hours so good humored on the return flight had he been "slapped down" by the President at their only private session. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio John Muccio to John Wiltz, February 18, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

Colonel Matthews, who was my executive officer, said that before this conference started, before any notes were taken at the conference, in other words, during the hour we were waiting for General MacArthur and the President to join us, that General MacArthur's aide, Colonel Storey, and his adviser, General Whitney, both saw Miss Anderson there and talked to her. In fact, it seems that Miss Anderson had been in Japan in connection with the Japanese peace treaty once before and so they were both talking to her before this thing started, and they apparently knew she was in the building. . He remembered their talking, and remembered the fact that Colonel Storey and Miss Anderson were on a first-name basis, and in fact they had been in contact before, apparently, in Japan. She was there a considerable time with Mr. Jessup; so, even if General MacArthur didn't know she was there, I don't know whether he did, or not, certainly General Whitney and Colonel Storey knew she was in this building. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Congressional testimony May 22, 1951

Civil Aeronautics Administration building on Wake Island where President Truman held a conference with General MacArthur, October 14, 1950. Photo: Papers of William Rigdon Source: Truman Library

The rest of us were transported in an antiquated Pan Am bus, perhaps half a mile, to what was the isolated control building at the end of a very long runway. While waiting for the President and the General, we inspected the facilities, unpacked our documents, and prepared for the historic conference that was about to begin. I soon discovered my typewriter had not been unloaded and had to ask the bus driver to return to the plane to fetch it. The building where the conference was held was a small wooden one, freshly painted green, with two entrances. The single medium-sized room had been cleared out or was new. It also had been freshly painted. Five small folding tables had been pushed together to form a long oblong conference table surrounded, I believe, by folding chairs. These represented the sole furniture in the room. Off this room was a small bathroom and at the rear exit a small porch area separated from the main room by a swinging half door. On this porch area, which was about the size of a small closet, were a few chairs and two small tables on which we happily found cold fruit juices, water, and fresh fruit. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

When the General and the President arrived, about 7:45 a.m., there was a flurry of confusion as to who was to sit where. Since no one instructed me where to sit, I simply receded into the background into the small rear anteroom where the refreshments were and where the gentlemen had earlier taken my typewriter on which the communiqué was to be typed. Mr. Ross had announced earlier that immediately after the conclusion of the meeting we would prepare the communiqué at that site, he would then secure the approval of the President and the General, and then he would go to the press headquarters in one of the hangars and would read it to the press corps. I assumed the small anteroom was where I was to work later, so I simply sat down awaiting my next assignment. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

Since we did not wish "juniors" sitting around the room during the conference, we asked Miss [Vernice] Anderson to withdraw to this anteroom (there was no other place for her to wait except in an automobile outside). . . . Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Dean Rusk to John Wiltz, January 12, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

Some of the senior members of the President's group participated in the discussion. This would have included Averell Harriman, I expect, and maybe General Bradley. General MacArthur did most of the talking. It was still very early in the morning . . . Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy Oral history interview, May 21, 1969

I asked [Press Secretary to the President] Mr. [Charles] Ross, who was in charge of public relations, whether there should be stenographic notes taken, because I wished to take them myself, but he said that no notes would be taken, and there was no stenographer present. . . . [A]pparently a stenographer in an adjacent room took down some notes, but I have no knowledge of it. . . . I think it was a small table and a dozen men were around it-the ordinary conversational tone of voice. There would have to have been a lot of eavesdropping to get any report by anyone that wasn't in that room. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Congressional testimony, May 3, 1951

. . . I took notes during the conference. My executive Colonel Matthews, took notes. . . . Various people took notes, around the table, because this was a historic and important conference and I had to report back to the Joint Chiefs. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Congressional testimony May 22, 1951

After the conference got underway, I looked out the door with the naive notion of taking a stroll on the coral reef, only to find Marine MP's with carbines and walkie-talkies posted every six feet around the building as well as Secret Service men stationed at strategic points. Then I knew I could not escape for even a short walk, although it would indeed have been welcome after our long journey. So I sat down on one of the three chairs in the small anteroom. With my secretarial training and experience, the most normal and logical thing for me to do to pass the time was to record what I heard. Such action was in no way intended to be without the knowledge of those present. I thought everyone knew I was there. I knew all the participants, members of both the President's and the General's parties. I had greeted most of them earlier and had been very much in evidence just prior to the formal portion of the meeting. I did not start the very instant the meeting began. There were some general introductory remarks on both sides. But when I realized that I could not leave the premises, that we were settled in for some time, and since I was there with pad, pencil, and typewriter ready to assist with the communiqué, the natural thing for me to do was to write down what I heard. And that is what I did. In attending United Nations and other international meetings with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Jessup for many years, it had been my experience that every piece of information was useful to someone, though unanticipated at the time. In our reporting back to the Department while abroad or at the U.N. in New York, we were frequently surprised to find that the most insignificant bit of information turned out to be an important missing link to the responsible Departmental desk officer. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

The President had something of an agenda . . . and General MacArthur talked about the course of the war. That was the first time I had ever seen him. He spoke very persuasively, very plainly, very understandably. He just laid it out cold. And when he explained why and how we had [already] won the war and why it was impossible for the other side to do anything about it, why, I understood precisely what he was saying, and I was convinced completely. And the question came up about the possible intervention by the [Communist] Chinese and he said they could not intervene effectively. Not that they would not, but that they could not, as a military matter. That while they had large numbers of ground troops, they had no air support of their own and the ground troops could not operate effectively without air support, while the Russians, even if they came into it, they had air strength, that they couldn't work closely enough, well enough, with the Chinese ground troops to be effective and if those poor Chinese tried to invade Korea, the part of Korea that we were undertaking to defend, it just made him sick to think of the way that they would be slaughtered and piled up. . . . He [General MacArthur] did not [know Vernice Anderson was taking notes]. None of us knew that she was there. None of us knew that she was taking notes. . . . Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy Oral history interview, May 21, 1969

The meeting itself moved easily and with complete courtesy as between Truman and MacArthur. The only evidence I had of any sense of tension comes from the following little story . . . . President Truman had in front of him a considerable list of items which served as an agenda. We met at approximately 6:00 A.M. Truman and MacArthur began to go through the items with great speed. [Secretary of the Army] Frank Pace and I became somewhat concerned that if the meeting ended so abruptly, it would tend to confirm the current press speculations that the entire meeting was aphony. We passed a note to President Truman suggesting that we take more time on the matters under discussion. Whether his reply was whispered to Frank Pace, who was sitting just to his left, or jotted down in a note I do not recall. But his reply was, in effect, "No, I want to get out of here before we get in trouble." Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Dean Rusk to John Wiltz, January 12, 1976 Truman Library Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection

Our meeting was primarily on the total military situation. The President wanted to be very sure that General MacArthur was being properly supported. I think that he could see that if there were some problem that would arise, the allegation could arise, "It happened because we hadn't done our job back in Washington." I believe the President wanted to nail down the fact that our support was adequate. You'll notice that the thrust of all my remarks and questions really addressed themselves to insuring that General MacArthur had whatever he wanted or needed to do the job. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview February 17, 1972

Of course, the thing that really stands out in my mind about it was the fact that General MacArthur said that the war would be over by Thanksgiving and that the men would be home by Christmas. It made a very deep and abiding impression on me. . . . As far as our relationship, the relationship between General MacArthur and the Army, our relationship was excellent. I think that, well, my own chief of staff felt that General MacArthur proceeded in too arbitrary a fashion from time to time, and I'm sure that's true, but you've got to remember that General MacArthur was a very senior man with a high success ratio and a high level of ego, and I never thought that was particularly unusual. I did think it was important that General MacArthur thought he was going fully supported. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview February 17, 1972

In addition to that, I believe it was on this occasion, that he talked about his intelligence sources, and his intelligence operation which was bringing in reports somewhat different from the intelligence reports that the departments were receiving here in Washington and he said that he believed his and not those of the departments. But they did agree . . . one of the divisions then in Korea would be sent to Europe by Christmas. . . . Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy Oral history interview, May 21, 1969

You must understand . . . that that was made on the basis of the North Korean War. We expected to close that war out very definitely and when the war was closed out, we anticipated that the majority of the occupation forces in Japan would be returned to Japan. The Second and Third Divisions, which had come from the continental United States, I was prepared under those conditions to return to the controls of the central authority. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Congressional testimony, May 4, 1951

I did not [know that Miss Vernice Anderson was seated in the next room taking shorthand notes], no. . . . [I]f it was generally known, nobody told me. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview February 17, 1972

I sat in an entrance area, as I said, with a swinging slatted door. It was only a half door opening in the middle. While at this location, I had spoken to General MacArthur and members of his staff: General Whitney, Tony Story, and the General's personal physician, Colonel C. C. Canada. . . . Both Generals MacArthur and Whitney were quite aware of the fact that I was there. Personal Secretary to the Ambassador at Large Vernice Anderson Oral history interview, February 2, 1971

I might add one or two general impressions. The first was that General MacArthur was completely confident of the military situation and saw no reason to worry short of an intervention by the Soviet Union itself. This came out in connection with the possibility of Chinese intervention, General MacArthur shared with us what turned out to be a wrong political estimate, namely that the Chinese would not come in. But more importantly, he also felt that Chinese intervention caused him no anxiety from a military point of view. As I recall it, he said that not more than 60,000 Chinese could be pushed across the Yalu [River] and that they would be decimated before reaching the battle line. He referred to "one of the greatest slaughters in history". This military judgment was of greatest importance because it had a bearing upon the degree of risk which could be accepted on the political question of Chinese intentions. . . . In fairness to General MacArthur, it was not clear at Wake Island that his military estimate assumed that the "sanctuary" restriction would be lifted in the event of Chinese intervention. He would now undoubtedly say that it was inconceivable to him that he would not be permitted to attack Manchuria if the Chinese intervened. . . . A second general impression was that General MacArthur was, at Wake Island, entirely happy about his existing directives and the support he was getting from Washington. He was friendly and cordial, appreciative of the support he had from the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the State Department, and was looking forward to a satisfactory conclusion to the Korean affair. If he had complaints, he could only have given them to you in private, he expressed none in the presence of others. I'm sure that others have told you the story of Miss [Vernice] Anderson and the "eavesdropping". . . . Her presence there was no secret; certainly MacArthur's staff knew she was there. . . . Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk Dean Rusk to Harry Truman, December 21, 1953 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files

There was very, very little mystery about her [Vernice Anderson's] presence because the door was wide open and all--at least all on one side of the conference table could see her at all times. . . . I was trying to recall exactly where General MacArthur sat at the table. Whitney did not sit at the table, and he roamed around there for quite a bit, so I don't see that it could have been in any way an underhanded maneuver or tactic [for Anderson to have taken the notes]. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio Oral history interview, February 18, 1971

In the general meetings, the discussion was somewhat perfunctory in the first instance but then a lot of detailed questioning by Bradley and various others about details and military disposition and his estimate of the North Korean action and what our forces were and what we could do, and so forth . . . . Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup "Princeton Seminar" comment, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson

Well, basically, we talked specifically again about the nature of supplies. I again raised the question with him about the end of the war, because, see, that had a great many implications as far as I was concerned, because if General MacArthur was right, and quite frankly, I was thoroughly prepared to believe he was right, (because everything I had seen had led me to believe that he was indeed a military genius), then there were a great many steps that ought to be taken in preparation for the war's end. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Oral history interview February 17, 1972

There were two rooms in the building. The door was open between the two rooms. True, the building was guarded. It was a building set way out on the island, nowhere near any other building. Miss Anderson was part of the party. She was Mr. Jessup's secretary and accompanied him to help on stenographic work while they were on the trip, and no one ever questioned her being in the building because she was a Government employee, and a trusted one and, I suppose, cleared for very top secret matters, otherwise she wouldn't be working in Mr. Jessup's office. . . . It doesn't strike me as being too unusual that she was there. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Congressional testimony May 22, 1951

The president said, "It's been a most satisfactory meeting, we've covered a great deal of ground." Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman Truman Library Institute conference comment, May 1975 The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976)

It certainly is remarkable how misinformation can spread. I never discussed any stenographic notes with General MacArthur. I did not know there was a stenographer within ten miles of the place where we were holding the conference. . . . President Harry S. Truman Harry Truman to Edward Martin, July 27, 1951 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's File

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