The Marshall Plan

(Excerpts from an interview with General George C. Marshall October 30, 1952.)

Marshall: The Marshall Plan was an outgrowth of the disillusionment over the Moscow Conference which proved conclusively that the Soviet Union was negotiating in good faith and could not be induced to cooperate in achieving European recovery. Consideration was given to inaugurating the European Recovery Plan at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference but I vetoed this suggestion because I did not want it to appear that the eastern allies had come to Moscow Conference with a prior agreement to go ahead without Soviet cooperation. Further, differences with Britain over reparations etc., and the necessity for working out details of the plan prevented disclosure at this time.

Marshall: I took only a few intimate advisors into my confidence during the preparation of the European Recovery Program plan. I asked Kennan and Bohlen to present separate memoranda concerning means of meeting the European crisis. Kennan’s was the most succinct and useful—this was during the embryo period of State’s policy planning staff. I also drafted a paper reflecting my own view on this subject. Other than Bohlen and Kennan I consulted only Acheson and Lovett for fear that my deliberations would be “leaked”. The June 5th speech was not completed until after I had left Washington for Cambridge (to give a speech at Harvard and receive a degree). Keenan and others took exception to certain parts of my speech, particularly my statement that the U.S. proposal was aimed at hunger, poverty, and chaos and not against any group and my inclusion of all Europe including the Soviet Union and her satellites. Despite their opposition I insisted on formulating the speech as it was finally delivered.

Marshall: Senator Vandenberg was not consulted prior to the Harvard speech. He soon became a full partner in the adventure, however, and we consulted together twice weekly at the Blair House. Those meetings were kept secret and this secrecy resulted in charges that I was not enlisting bipartisan support. I worked closely with Senator Vandenberg on the Vandenberg resolution—in fact, the first draft of this resolution was prepared by Lovett at my request. Senator Vandenberg took the Lovett draft and “improved it on his own typewriter. I feel that Vandenberg has never received full credit for his monumental efforts on behalf of the European Recovery Program. Vandenberg was my right-hand man and at times I was his right-hand man.