Oral History Interview with
Francis O. Wilcox
Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1955.
June 13, 1984
by Donald A. Ritchie
Senate
Historical Office, Washington, DC
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Oral History Interview with
Francis O. Wilcox
June 13, 1984
by Donald A. Ritchie
Senate
Historical Office, Washington, DC
[223]
WILCOX: Don, it occurred to me that there were several things that I
might have commented on in the course of our discussions, but then again
I may have overlooked them. One of them had to do with the problem of
bipartisanship. As you know, there is very little of real substance or
real importance that gets through the House and Senate without support
from both political parties. So that in effect we do have a great deal
of bipartisan cooperation as things stand, because the wingspread of the
two parties is so great and there's so much overlapping that the president
can't ever get anything of importance through unless he gets some conservative
support from the Republicans, or some moderate -- or conservative -- support
from the Democrats, or vice versa depending on who is in the White House.
Some of President Johnson's strongest opponents were Democrats, and some
of President Nixon's toughest critics were Republicans. So there is, and
I think the last two administrations have shown this quite clearly, a
need on Capitol Hill for greater party unity and greater party discipline.
The president ought to be able to count upon his party supporters in the
Senate to help him with his program.
I also wanted to say something about the transition period, because it
seems to me that the presidents that come and go tend to
[224]
make the same mistakes. If you look at President Carter's tenure, his
tour of duty here in Washington, he brought in some nine Georgia supporters
who were with him in the White House and they made a good many mistakes
because they didn't know very much about Washington, they didn't know
very much about the White House or the Congress, and how the Executive
Branch functioned. During the campaign the Carter forces boasted of the
fact that they were from outside of Washington, as though that were a
great asset. It might have been in the course of the election -- it had
some appeal in the country -- but it certainly wasn't after they got here
in Washington to begin their job in the White House. President Reagan
made the same mistake when he brought in a number of people who had no
experience really in government, or at least in the Federal government.
They didn't know the Washington bureaucracy, they didn't know very much
about Congress or how the government machinery operates, and furthermore
they didn't know very much about foreign policy. So you have the two presidents
coming into office making almost the same kind of mistake, as though one
wouldn't learn from the other. It takes far too long for an administration
to get underway, before the appointments can be completed, before plans
can be laid, a year is lost before any real progress can be made on the
substance of foreign policy. That applies to domestic policy too, to a
certain extent.
[225]
To go back, for a moment, to the question of bipartisanship. There were,
I think, probably three major foreign policy victories for President Carter:
the Panama Canal treaties, the sale of jet planes to Arab countries, and
the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo. These were three of the most
important victories that he achieved during his tenure in the White House,
and these were all made possible by Republican votes. Without fairly strong
Republican support they would have been defeated, there's not question
about it. So, as we emphasize the importance of getting support from the
other side of the aisle in the House and Senate, it's apparent that that
is done all the time.
Now, when you look at the role of Congress in foreign policy and you
look at the instances where Congress has had a very substantial influence,
you have to ask the question: who is right and who is wrong? In the case
of Angola, Congress made clear that we should not be involved in Angola,
and this gave to the Soviet Union a green light to proceed to do anything
they wanted to do there, with the realization that the United States would
not intervene. The same is true of Senator Henry Jackson's amendment on
trade relations with the Soviet Union, when he specified -- the amendment
that he sponsored specified -- that we should not take certain steps to
improve trade relations unless the Soviet Union would agree to permit
a certain number of Jewish emigrants to come to the United States or to
Israel, or at least to leave the Soviet Union. Now, he argued that this
was
[226]
an important aspect of our negotiations with the Soviet Union in that
it put pressure on the U.S.S.R. to move in the right direction. The administration
argued that it prevented any reasonable negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Who was right and who was wrong? Clearly in these cases, and in other
similar cases, Congress was not doing anything illegal. They thought they
were doing something that would help our foreign policy. That was their
best judgment. But the administration, I think, felt that they were meddling
needlessly in our foreign policy. This question of whether Congress is
meddling or whether it isn't meddling will be discussed, I'm sure, for
many years to come.
RITCHIE: Do you think the Congress should take an independent role on
an issue where they differ strongly from an administration, or should
they allow an administration to design foreign policy and try to check
what they disagree with?
WILCOX: Well, clearly they have a constitutional right to express their
opinion and to do what they think is in the interest of the Republic.
I think in the case of Angola, it was wrong to signal to the world that
the United States would not interfere, or not play any role in Angola,
because you really need to keep your enemy guessing a little more than
that. It gave the Soviets in effect, a green light to go ahead and do
what they wanted to do.
[227]
RITCHIE: Is that one of the real drawbacks of the Congress role in foreign
policy, that it's hard for the Congress to do anything covertly, that
everything the Congress does is overt?
WILCOX: It has to be, and of course the changes that have taken place
in the 1970s have provided for a more open Congress and a more open foreign
policy. Whether you like it or not, this is what's going to happen. I've
been interested though, to see -- I've been reading some material about
the parliamentary democracies in Western Europe. In every case, I think,
including the United Kingdom, France, Western Germany, Italy, the foreign
affairs committees don't have the same stature, the same power and authority
that our congressional committees have. It's the executive that conducts
foreign policy, traditionally, without very much interference from the
legislative branch. Of course, there they don't have the separation of
powers principle. They have a parliamentary system and the executive leaders
are members of the parliamentary body, so the situation is quite different.
But the problem of the Turkish embargo is another case in point, where
Congress specified that we couldn't sell arms to Turkey that we had promised
her unless real progress was made on the Cyprus question. Well, who is
best equipped to determine this problem? The administration felt that
Turkey was terribly important to the southern flank of NATO, and that
the Turks had made clear that they were
[228]
not going to do anything about Cyprus until the arms embargo was repealed.
Whether Congress is in a better position to judge that question is certainly
open to consideration. I think what we need to do in cases like that is
of course to try and reconcile the differences between the executive and
legislative branches, and not let these differences impede the conduct
of foreign policy. Congress ought not to obstruct any more than is absolutely
essential. You don't want to destroy the efficiency of the executive branch,
but on the other hand Congress has a proper role to play. The problem
is how to bring these two things together.
I might have said something, too, about the importance of Congress as
an educator. Senator Fulbright had an article recently in Foreign Affairs
in which he emphasizes this point. Josh Billings once said that "it ain't
ignorance that causes all the trouble, it's the fact that people know
so much that just ain't so!" One of the roles of Congress in looking at
our foreign policy problems is to do its share in informing the people
of the country about recent develpments, about problems that exist, and
about options that are available because we clearly need an informed electorate.
We clearly need an informed public if we're going to have a foreign policy
that's worth a hoot. The task of making the people more aware of foreign
policy problems, I think, falls to the Congress, maybe in two ways: through
hearings conducted by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees,
and they can do this in a very effective way as
[229]
they did some years ago in connection with our policy towards China.
I think they helped open up new avenues of thought with respect to that
problem. Then the trips back home that the members of Congress make, and
the meetings they have with their constituents are important. They can
do a great deal to help keep the people back home informed of our foreign
policy problems.
RITCHIE: Part of getting publicity requires the cooperation of the press.
Did you feel when you worked for the Foreign Relations Committee that
the press accurately reflected and reported what was going on? Were they
giving enough attention to what the committee was doing, or were they
focusing their attention on the president and the State Department?
WILCOX: Well, on the whole, I think the press does a very good job. Certainly
the Washington press corps is made up of some of the best informed people
in the country. It's a remarkably sharp, intelligent group of people.
They do tend to emphasize conflict. They do tend to emphasize differences
between the executive and legislative branches, differences of opinion
and that sort of thing, rather than emphasizing the positive. But I think
in general they do a very good job. They make some mistakes, of course,
but on the whole I think they are pretty accurate.
RITCHIE: Did you have to deal with the press much when you were chief
of staff?
[230]
WILCOX: Oh, yes. The press would come to see me and other members of
the staff for background information and for any thoughts that we had
about important developments that might have taken place in the committee.
They, as you know, go around and pick up pieces of information here and
there and the first thing you know, they put together a logical, reasonable
story. They do turn to the staff quite a bit for information.
With respect to this problem of public opinion, I remember the response
of the public to the announcement about the appointment of an ambassador
to the Vatican, when Mark Clark's name was put forth early after the war
as a possible ambassador to the Vatican. I never saw such a stream of
mail that came into Capitol Hill, protests from the Protestant denomination
churches and other opponents to the appointment. This led me to feel strongly
that the people of the country hadn't really been at all informed about
the importance of having a representative at the Vatican at this high
level. The Vatican has a great deal of influence in the world. The question
isn't whether we approve of Catholicism or whether we are supporting the
Pope, the question is whether we have a representative at the Vatican
and at other important centers who can be helpful to our foreign policy
and who can report back to Washington developments that occur in connection
with their particular missions. In this case, the separation of church
and state concept was so strongly supported by the Protestant groups that
the president simply had to
[231]
withdraw the nomination of Mark Clark. I'm glad to see that the nomination
was recently approved and we do have an ambassador now, because it's a
very useful thing to do.
Another case in point, of course, was SALT II. It got all tied up in
politics and was never brought to a vote in the Senate. But there was
a great emotional content in the arguments against the Soviet Union. It
illustrated once again how important public opinion can be in the evolution
of our foreign policy. The mail was very heavy on that point. I think
that SALT II could have served as a useful stepping stone to continued
negotiations with the Soviet Union in the arms control field. It should
have been approved.
Then one other point related to that, Don, and I'm through, has to do
with what I call open diplomacy. With foreign leaders beating a path to
Capitol Hill in order to be where the action is. With the Congress assuming
a more and more important role, diplomats and leaders from other countries
realize this and come to Capitol Hill to talk to legislative leaders and
to the Foreign Relations and other committees. I was in a meeting in Toronto
not long ago, where a professor announced that Canada henceforth was going
to bypass the State Department in order to take many of its problems directly
to Capitol Hill. They have been unhappy because we haven't done very much
about acid rain, and we haven't done very much about the fisheries treaty,
and whether they can get sufficient action through the executive
[232]
branch has I think been a question in Canadian minds. They apparently
have decided to bypass the State Department on several issues and see
if they can't get some satisfactory action from Capitol Hill. Now, if
this is done by a good many other countries it can revolutionize the conduct
of our foreign policy, because if Congress gets involved in these negotiations
and discussions more and more, what's going to happen to the State Department
and executive branch?
RITCHIE: That could be the reason why the Canadians are going to build
their Chancellory at the base of Capitol Hill.
WILCOX: Yes. Well, they'll be closely situated there next to the center
of power.
RITCHIE: Well, how would you think Congress would respond to individual
countries bringing their cases to them?
WILCOX: For quite some time members of Congress have invited visiting
dignitaries, prime ministers and so on who come to Washington. It's appropriate
to have them on Capitol Hill for a luncheon or to have them visit the
Foreign Relations Committee. The Chancellor of Germany came after the
war on a number of occasions as did a number of other top people. But
it's a little different now. I recall when, I think it was the foreign
minister of Israel came and gathered together on Capitol Hill, without
any intervention from the
[233]
executive branch, fifty or sixty senators to talk with him about Israel
and our relations with Israel. This is the sort of thing that can really
complicate the conduct of foreign policy and make the executive branch's
job much more difficult. I think though, given the increasingly important
role of Congress, it's almost inevitable that we will have more and more
people going to Capitol Hill seeking out members to help them with particular
foreign policy questions. Of course, they've always had members of the
Senate and House to embassies for dinner and things of that sort, hoping
to influence them one way or another. But this move, if it's continued
and developed, could revolutionize the whole problem of the conduct of
foreign policy and diplomacy in the modern world. If they deliberately
bypass the executive branch to get to Congress, it has some objectionable
features certainly.
RITCHIE: There has also been some criticism recently of ten House members
who signed a letter to the Nicaraguan government, trying to make suggestions
as to how to better relations between Nicaragua and the United States.
Jim Wright, the Democratic leader in the House, was one of the signers,
and the Republicans in the House have been criticizing that as a violation
of the Logan Act, arguing that members of the House have no right to interject
themselves into American relations with another nation. But you are indicating
that this goes on all the time and may increase.
[234]
WILCOX: Well, it's easy enough to violate the Logan Act, but when a number
of members of the House or the Senate are involved it's difficult for
the administration to say very much or to do very much. When it's just
one congressman or one senator that's a little different, but when a group
is involved that's a horse of a different color. You remember the group,
I think it was some seven congressmen who went to Grenada after the Grenada
incident took place. They came back and supported the position of President
Reagan and the Congress dropped the whole matter of opposing our action
in Grenada. In some cases these trips can be helpful to the administration
as they were in the case of the Panama Canal. So the executive branch
has to be very careful in its dealing with Congress as to whether they
smile upon that kind of intervention or whether they frown upon it.
RITCHIE: I suppose the most notable example when you were with the committee
was when Joe McCarthy tried to negotiate a treaty with the Greek shipping
lines to get them to stop transporting goods to Communist nations, around
1953.
WILCOX: Well, you've jarred my memory a bit there, Don. I don't recall
that particular incident. But the point is you simply can't have five
hundred and thirty-five Secretaries of State. You can't have foreign policy
by committee. One of the things that is quite clear in the business world
is that you can't do business through a committee. I think the same thing
is true to a certain
[235]
extent in the government. You need to have somebody in charge, and there
isn't anybody in charge on Capitol Hill. When you have five hundred and
thirty-five people looking at a problem from differing points of view
it's very hard to get a consensus on some of these matters. So while the
Congress has a great deal to offer, and there are many advantages in having
Congress involved in foreign policy, nevertheless it has to recognize
that the principal responsibility lies with the executive branch and with
the President of the United States.
But the main thing is to make sure that the two branches work together.
Otherwise we can't expect the Constitution to function effectively. The
question is not whether the president is more important than the Congress
or vice versa. The real question remains -- how can we develop the kind
of teamwork and cooperation between the two branches that is essential
in our check and balance system of government.
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