Oral History Interview with
Charles S. Murphy
Former staff member in the office of the legislative counsel
of the U.S. Senate, 1934-46; Administrative Assistant to the President
of the United States, 1947-50; and Special Counsel to the President, 1950-53.
Subsequent to the Truman Administration Murphy served as Under Secretary
of Agriculture, 1960-65; and chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
1965-68.
Washington, DC
Jerry N. Hess
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NOTICE
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry
S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee
but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember
that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written
word.
As an electronic publication of the Truman Library, users should note
that features of the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview,
such as pagination and indexing, could not be replicated for the online
version of the Murphy transcript.
RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced
for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission
of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened May, 1971
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri
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Oral History Interview with
Charles S. Murphy
Washington, DC
July 25, 1969
Jerry N. Hess
HESS: All right, we’re recording, sir. You have shown me a couple of
memoranda here that I believe that we should discuss. They bear on what
we were talking about last time. The first says, "written in longhand
April the 16th of 1950," which is a statement by Mr. Truman. And
the second that you showed me is a memorandum to the President from yourself
dated...
MURPHY: It’s a letter.
HESS: A letter, from yourself to Mr. Truman dated November the 23rd,
1951. Could you tell me about those two?
MURPHY: Yes, this has to do with President Truman’s decision not to run,
not to be available, for reelection in 1952. The first is a typewritten
copy of a memorandum which he wrote in longhand dated April the
16th, 1950, saying that he is not a candidate for nomination by the Democratic
convention and going on telling something about why. Then in November
1951 he read this memorandum to those of us on his staff who were with
him at Key West. The text of his memorandum is included in his Memoirs,
and his Memoirs tell about his reading this memorandum to his staff
at Key West.
I think perhaps, I’m not sure, about the date in his Memoirs,
the date on which he says the memorandum was read to the staff, I think
that may be in error. But actually it was read to the staff in November
1951. And the other paper to which you referred is a copy of a letter
that I wrote to the President on November 23rd, 1951, telling him some
of my thoughts about the memorandum he had read to us and about his telling
us in effect that he would not run for reelection. I wrote the letter
in longhand and I made a copy for my files, which is also in longhand,
and this is what I am giving you now, a photostatic copy of my longhand
file copy. [See appendix]
HESS: Fine. We’ll include these in the appendix to our transcript.
One question on the date that it states that the President wrote this,
April the 16th, 1950. Do you know between that date and the occasion in
Key West in November of ‘51 that the President had made up his mind not
to run?
MURPHY: I did not.
HESS: Is it a little surprising to you, or is it--it is to me, to note
that he had made up his mind so far in advance.
MURPHY: Well, it’s somewhat surprising but it’s not uncharacteristic.
And the reasons he gives I think are very revealing reasons, revealing
just what kind of man he was, his character and his beliefs about the
Government. I think when you put the whole thing in character and keeping
with his attitude and beliefs, that it all fits together quite well.
HESS: At the conclusion of our last interview, of course, we were discussing
the events of 1952 and one question on that. What do you recall about
the meeting at the White House in August of that year that is referred
to by Cabell Phillips on page 425 of his book The Truman Presidency?
I’ll read just a little bit here of what he has to say about it:
In August Stevenson paid a visit to the President in the White House
in the hope of working out a modus vivendi by which the
President would remain in the background until the last couple of weeks
of the campaign, while Stevenson created a public image and program
of his own. The conference was held in the Cabinet room with the President
and key members of his staff lined up on one side of the vast coffin
shaped table and, on the other side, Stevenson and picked members of
‘the Springfield crowd’--like representatives of sovereign powers at
a treaty conference. It was stiff, painfully uncomfortable, and largely
inconclusive.
MURPHY: Well, there was such a meeting. I don’t remember a great deal
about the details. I would have been there, and I am sure that I was there.
I think, perhaps, Mr. Phillips overstates it a little when he talks about
the crowd being drawn up like representatives of sovereign powers at a
treaty conference. Other than that, why, and when he says it was stiff
and painfully uncomfortable, perhaps that is something of an overstatement.
But, other than that, I think his statement is probably about right. President
Truman and Governor Stevenson never did develop a really cordial, personal
relationship. They acted quite friendly toward each other but they were
just not particularly compatible. The members of their respective staffs,
there was some prior acquaintance between them. The relationship between
the staffs was good, on the whole. It was not intimate but there was nothing
painfully stiff and uncomfortable.
HESS: Did you feel that Governor Stevenson’s visit was in the nature
of trying to get the President to remain in the background as Phillips
has stated?
MURPHY: I wouldn’t think of it as primarily for that purpose. It was
shortly after the Democratic National Convention where Stevenson was nominated
and the normal and natural thing for him to do was to be to pay a visit
to the President and talk about the campaign. I think it is true, Stevenson
did hope that President Truman would remain in the background,
and this was a sensitive, difficult kind of question for him to bring
up. And, so while this would have been one of the things that he would
have liked to accomplish, and this meeting would have had something to
do with it, I think to talk about that as being the primary, or sole purpose
of the meeting, again is out of balance.
HESS: Did he infer, or imply, in any way that he would like the President
to hold down his participation?
MURPHY: Whether he did at that meeting, I don’t know. I know that that
was his general attitude.
HESS: All right.
What were your functions during the 1952 campaign?
MURPHY: Well, I had my regular functions as the President’s Special Counsel
having to deal with staff assistance to him in running the Government
and there were some problems and some activities the President had to
continue to work on and handle, during the campaign, in addition to the
campaign itself.
HESS: What comes to mind?
MURPHY: Oh, well, nothing comes to mind. But anybody, I think, with a
little research can look back and see what the United States was involved
in during the fall of 1952 and whatever it was involved in, the President
was involved in too. In addition to that he did take a very active part
in the campaign. He did a lot of speaking. And I was in charge of the
staff work in connection with the preparation of his speeches, the research
for them, and helping him in drafting speeches.
HESS: Were the procedures in ‘52 any different than they were in ‘48?
MURPHY: Well, they were basically the same, I guess. They were much better
organized in ‘52 than they were in 1948. We had, by that time, an experienced
and very capable group at the White House that had worked with President
Truman for a number of years by then in connection with his speeches and
other activities and they were quite familiar with his manner of speech
as well as his thoughts on various and sundry subjects and had a lot of
experience in the mechanical side of preparing speeches and so it was
a much more smoothly functioning operation than in 1948.
HESS: Were most, or all, of the speeches written on the train in 1952?
As I recall, in 1948 you were back there in the White House.
MURPHY: Well, that is true. A much larger part of it was done on the
train in 1952. Now, the regular pattern was to try to get a draft of a
speech on different subjects from experts in the field, including people
both inside and outside of the Government, Government departments and
agencies. I’m sure that practice was followed in 1952 in an effort to
get first drafts and to get some substantive material and content within
speeches. The drafting that was done by the President’s staff was done
mainly wherever he was in 1952. If he was at the White House, the
whole group was at the White House, and if he was on the train, the whole
group was on the train. Jim Sundquist was with us, Dave Lloyd, Ken Hechler,
and I expect Dick Neustadt. Among us, we were quite capable of giving
the President such assistance as he wanted with almost any number of speeches
that he wanted to make.
HESS: Were you in charge of the speechwriting team in ‘52?
MURPHY: I was, yes.
HESS: Who else was aboard the train in ‘52 who might not have been as
instrumental in working on the speeches as the men you have mentioned,
but who had other duties?
MURPHY: Well, Matt Connelly would have been there and I think Dave Stowe
was there. I just don’t remember the others. I expect Donald Dawson was
on the train at least part of the time.
HESS: What were their duties?
MURPHY: David Stowe and Donald Dawson’s duties would have been mostly
to handle the distinguished visitors who boarded the train and frequently
rode for some distance on the train.
HESS: How was it decided who should come aboard the train and
who should ride from one stop to the next, sort of the high priority people,
as opposed to the walk across kind or type of invitation that was given
out to people who just walked across the back platform?
MURPHY: Well, I don’t know a great deal about that. It was not in my
area of responsibility. Dave Stowe could probably tell you more about
that than I can. But it was done, I expect, mainly by the local people
following guidelines which were given to them by the Democratic National
Committee advance man. Now, there would have been advance men who go to
places before the President and his group get there and work with the
local people in making the arrangements and this was part of the thing
that they are supposed to do, is to sort these people out for this kind
of purpose.
HESS: Do you recall who acted as advance man or men in ‘52?
MURPHY: No, I expect Marty [Martin L.] Friedman did some of this. He
is in this building by the way. If you haven’t talked to Marty, why, you
might be interested in doing that.
HESS: I believe he’s been interviewed. Now whether this particular subject
came up, it slips my mind right now.
MURPHY: Oscar Chapman was the, I suppose, the principal advance man in
1948. I have no clear recollection, I would guess he was likely an advance
man for Stevenson in ‘52. He was quite expert in this field, very, very
good.
HESS: How were the itineraries for the President’s trips determined?
MURPHY: I don’t know. He and Matt Connelly did that very largely I guess.
This relates to the question you’ve raised earlier, I guess, about Governor
Stevenson wanting President Truman to stay in the background. President
Truman made a trip of several days, Labor Day 1952, and he, and certainly
his staff, did not make particular efforts to avoid attention. It was
quite the contrary. And the trip attracted a good deal of attention, and
this did give Governor Stevenson some concern.
I heard from some member of his staff after that, I don’t remember at
the moment who it was, but some member of his staff told me that Governor
Stevenson was concerned about the question of how prominent a part President
Truman was going to play in the campaign, and whether he would attract
too much attention away from Governor Stevenson. As the fall passed, and
the campaign developed, I expect that President Truman and those of us
who worked for him had the feeling that Governor Stevenson was not campaigning
as vigorously as he might and not attracting as much attention as would
be desirable. And President Truman, in his eagerness to be helpful, worked
at it pretty hard. And I think, quite probably, that in general, during
the fall, he did do more speaking and spoke in somewhat more vigorous
terms than Governor Stevenson would have wished him to. And, on the other
hand, I’m quite sure that Governor Stevenson spoke in somewhat less vigorous
terms than President Truman would have wished him to. And there was that
element all during the fall.
HESS: Did you convey the message to President Truman that you had heard
from a staff member of Governor Stevenson’s in the nature that the President
was a little too active than what Governor Stevenson would have liked?
MURPHY: I don’t have any actual recollection but, I assume that I did.
It’s the kind of thing that I would have told him about just...
HESS: Do you recall his reaction when being told this?
MURPHY: No, since I don’t remember telling him, I don’t remember his
reaction.
HESS: I thought one would lead to the other.
MURPHY: No. I know of his attitude generally during the fall and it was
shared by his staff, shared by me as a matter of fact. That the campaign
was developing so that he had ought to speak frequently and vigorously
even though Governor Stevenson was not urging him to.
HESS: Did you feel that there was a need for improving liaison or relations
between the two staffs? Between your staff and Governor Stevenson’s?
MURPHY: Well, I suppose there was always a need for improving liaison
and relations. I don’t have any recollection of having a particularly
acute feeling about that. Now one thing that was done and this was done
at my suggestion as I recall. David Bell, who was an Administrative Assistant
to the President, an extremely able man, was assigned to Governor Stevenson’s
staff and went out to Springfield. Now the principal thing that he was
to do out there was to provide just general expertise and knowledge about
the Government, and he had a vast store of expertise and knowledge about
the Government. He had been quite largely responsible for the preparation
of budget messages for several years before that, and that’s the best
way to learn about the Government of the United States. He had been on
the White House staff since 1947, I guess, and he did do a great deal
of very valuable work at Springfield. Those of us who were left on the
White House staff did not keep particularly close touch with him. My recollection
is that the man that I called, usually on Governor Stevenson’s staff at
that time was Willard Wirtz, who has since then been Secretary of Labor
under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
HESS: I understand that Clayton Fritchey also went to Springfield about
that time. Is that right?
MURPHY: I think that’s true. Clayton Fritchey, I guess, was technically
an Administrative Assistant to the President. He was never a part of the
regular White House staff,
HESS: What was his role?
MURPHY: I don’t think he ever had any role except to be assigned to Stevenson.
HESS: Was he brought into and placed as an Administrative Assistant on
the White House staff with this in mind?
MURPHY: I don’t know about that. I don’t think I participated in that.
I think that’s the way it worked out. He never performed any substantial
function on the White House staff of President Truman to the best of my
recollection about it. I had actually forgotten he was there.
HESS: What did he do? Do you recall?
MURPHY: No. Except that he was with Governor Stevenson.
HESS: Do you know what he did in Springfield?
MURPHY: No. I probably did know at the time, in a general way, but I
don’t know now.
HESS: When David Bell was assigned to Springfield, was this at the direction
of the White House or was his presence requested by Governor Stevenson?
MURPHY: My recollection is that I suggested it to Governor Stevenson
and the President and they both agreed.
HESS: At about what time did you suggest this? It wasn’t the meeting
in August was it?
MURPHY: It would have been about that time.
HESS: Do you recall if itineraries between the President’s trips and
the Governor’s trips were coordinated?
MURPHY: There was some degree of coordination, yes. This might very well
have been through the Democratic National Committee. President Truman’s
general practice has always been, at least his statement of his general
practice, in political campaigns, to do whatever the Democratic National
Committee tells him to do and I think that has relevance to your earlier
question about how itineraries were worked out also. I’m sure that the
Democratic National Committee would have been involved in that.
The normal way for this to work is for people in cities who want speakers
to make their wishes known to the Democratic National Committee and the
Democratic National Committee does what it can about arranging for speakers
to go to different cities and to avoid conflicts between different speakers.
So, this should have been, and I expect was, by and large, the central
coordinating mechanism for the itineraries of Governor Stevenson and President
Truman in the campaign. And I also expect that the--well, now I started
to say that the national committee would have been encouraging President
Truman to speak. I have a second thought about that.
The chairman of the Democratic National Committee at that time was Steve
Mitchell.
Before the convention the chairman had been Frank McKinney. President
Truman thought that Frank McKinney was an extremely able and efficient
chairman and did a very good job as chairman of the national committee
and he has always thought that Governor Stevenson made a mistake to replace
him as chairman of the committee with Steve Mitchell. And I think his
view has been, that there was enough difference so if it had not happened
Stevenson would have won the election. I’m sure that he felt very strongly
that it was a serious mistake.
Now, Steve Mitchell came to see President Truman and was most courteous
and polite and there was no friction between them. They were not particularly
compatible and the relationship was not very cordial because, partly I
suppose, maybe largely, because of President Truman’s strong feeling that
Steve Mitchell shouldn’t be there in the first place. Not that he had
anything against him, but he just thought it should have been Frank McKinney.
But notwithstanding that, he would have worked through the Democratic
National Committee, because he thought that was the way these things should
be done.
HESS: In your opinion, why was that change made. Why was Mitchell brought
in and McKinney replaced?
MURPHY: Oh, I have no opinion about that. I suppose it was part of Stevenson’s
feeling that he wanted to create a different image, which I think just
from the standpoint of political tactics, was a mistake.
HESS: They had been law partners had they not?
MURPHY: I think they had. I have always believed and believe until this
day that if Stevenson had run on the Truman record he might have very
well have been elected. But he didn’t, he ran away from the Truman record
and he just didn’t have a chance on that basis.
HESS: Why, in your opinion, did Governor Stevenson leave his principal
headquarters in Springfield?
MURPHY: Well, again this is something that I would not know a great deal
about. Certainly a part of it was that he was still Governor of Illinois,
and he thought he should continue to perform the duties of the Governor
of Illinois and this he could do best if he had his campaign headquarters
at the same place he had his gubernatorial headquarters. And, in addition
to that, he had his staff arrangements and working arrangements there.
And, I would guess, that part of it was a matter of wanting to create
in the public mind the picture and the image of a man coming from the
Middle West. After all that’s where Abraham Lincoln came from. The people
in Illinois very properly make a great deal of being Abraham Lincoln’s
State and in a political campaign this would be a very timely thing to
do.
HESS: One question back on the itineraries and where President Truman
made his speech. As I recall, the southernmost point in the President’s
trip was West Virginia. Is there any significance in that that there were
no trips taken into the South on speaking trips in ‘52?
MURPHY: I don’t recall anything about it. In fact I’m a little surprised
to hear you say that. I don’t have a definite recollection to the contrary.
I remember southern speeches in the 1948 and 1960 and in other years.
I just don’t happen to remember any in 1952.
HESS: They were rather scarce in 1948 even. What do you recall about
these that were made in ‘48 in the South?
MURPHY: I remember he made two, three, I think in Raleigh, North Carolina
one day.
HESS: What was the occasion?
MURPHY: He made one in the Capital Square, where the State Capitol Building
was located, dedicating a statue as I recall of three North Carolinians,
Andrew Johnson, and I don’t remember who else and then on the same day
he made a speech at the North Carolina State Fair at the State Fair Grounds
outside of Raleigh and at that one he talked about Hoovercarts. This was
an idea that I brought up, a subject I brought up, and I found that Hoovercarts
seemed to be a phenomenon that was peculiar to North Carolina. Nobody
else knew about them. But the people in North Carolina knew about them
and as soon as President Truman said something about Hoovercarts at the
State Fair, why, this was very well received.
HESS: For the record, what is a Hoovercart?
MURPHY: This is a cart made out of parts of an automobile chassis converted
to a cart or a wagon. This was done by a good many people in North Carolina
in the depression and they, not being able to keep their automobiles operating,
and buy gas for them, why, they converted them into carts.
HESS: Towed by mules?
MURPHY: Towed by mules or horses. They would have a parade. They would
have Hoovercart parades.
HESS: Competition to see who had done the best job?
MURPHY: That’s right.
HESS: All right.
Well, we have discussed the staff on President Truman and Governor Stevenson’s
staffs? Do you feel that there was a workable relationship between the
staffs?
MURPHY: There was not a very close relationship. There was...
HESS: Even after Dave Bell and Clayton Fritchey went to Springfield?
MURPHY: Yes. I think you think of them, at least I would think of them
as, for that time and for that purpose, as being part of Governor Stevenson’s
staff or operating as if they were part of his staff, and there was no
particular reason for us to have, us on President Truman’s staff, to have
a great deal of communication with Dave Bell. We had whatever was felt
necessary from either end. I’m sure that if he wanted help or information
from us he would call for it and if we had anything to say to him, we
would have said it. But, he was, by and large, quite capable of operating
his independent, fully contained, self contained unit. There were times
when it seemed to be desirable to communicate with Dave. Stevenson’s staff
had traveled with him. Dave Bell did not travel with Stevenson, as I recall.
He always stayed in Springfield, I think, all the time. I did call the
people on Stevenson’s staff and as I remember, the man that I called the
most was Willard Wirtz, as I said earlier.
HESS: Did you have pretty good contact with him? Pretty good liaison
relationship with him?
MURPHY: Yes. And this was true again in 1956 I guess, to the extent that
I was involved in the campaign in ‘56, and I was involved in it to some
extent, and so was President Truman.
HESS: Was Mr. Wirtz still helping Governor Stevenson at that time?
MURPHY: He was, yes, it was still or again.
HESS: We have mentioned two of the men who have held the position of
chairman of the Democratic National Committee but just what was the relationship
between Mr. Truman and the other men who held that position at an earlier
date? The first: Robert Hannegan. What was his relationship between President
Truman and Robert Hannegan?
MURPHY: I don’t know much about that. He inherited Robert Hannegan, and
Hannegan was involved in the nomination for Vice President in 1944 and
I just have no personal knowledge about the relationship between Hannegan
and President Truman.
HESS: How about the next gentleman, J. Howard McGrath?
MURPHY: Well, he was, I think, actually selected by President Truman
to be chairman of the national committee. The relationship between them
was very good. At that time McGrath was in the Senate I guess, Senator
from Rhode Island, and he was chairman of the national committee in 1948
and he was an extremely able person. There was some question, I think,
about how hard he worked at some of his jobs sometimes, but certainly
President Truman’s relationship to him was very close and very good.
In 1948 Bill Boyle, who later became chairman of the national committee,
was, I suppose, on the staff of the Democratic National Committee. At
any rate, he was involved in a major way in the campaign and was assigned
especially to President Truman. He traveled a good deal on the train with
President Truman. He and I were roommates on the train. We had the same
bedroom, or compartment, whatever you have on trains. He kept in close
touch with political leaders in the states throughout the country by telephone.
He knew more about what was going on than anyone else, to my knowledge,
before or since. He knew more what was going on in that campaign. He was
one of those who said President Truman was going to win, and his information
and forecasts were very close and relatively accurate in detail state
by state. And I’m sure that he also, in that connection, was involved
in President Truman’s itinerary and determining who he would meet with
at different places and things of that kind. It was largely because of
that working experience, I guess, that he was made chairman of the national
committee later on. My recollection is that after that election in 1948
President Truman did appoint McGrath as Attorney General and I believe
they both had the feeling that it would not be appropriate for the Attorney
General to also be chairman of the Democratic National Committee. And
having the need for a new chairman, I’m sure that Bill Boyle was chosen
at President Truman’s suggestion. He came from Missouri, Kansas City as
I recall. Bill Boyle was a grand person and so that relationship was very
close indeed all the time that he was chairman of the national committee.
I think Bill Boyle resigned as chairman of the national committee because
of some--well, I don’t know that it was because of, but certainly
it was partly because of, some questions that were raised about the propriety
of his practicing law as a Washington lawyer and being chairman of the
Democratic National Committee. That was not the kind of thing which, according
to my best recollection had been thought of as improper before. I think
that this was a new invention, that it was not proper for a Washington
lawyer to be chairman of the national committee, and it was largely the
work of the Republicans, I suppose, and you can’t fault them for that.
If they could do that and get away with it, I suppose, they are entitled
to but they were aided and abetted, I’m sure by some Democrats in that
connection. One of my favorite recollections is Bill Boyle being invited
to testify before some Senate committee, on that subject, at that time,
and one member of the committee asked him, "Mr. Boyle, what kind
of law do you practice?"
And he sputtered for a little bit and said, "Well, well, legal law,
of course."
HESS: The best kind of law.
MURPHY: Yes. And along about the same time I guess there was a question
raised about someone else, whose name I don’t remember, that had been
thought of as more or less a protege of Bill Boyle’s whose name was in
the news.
Frank McKinney. I said something earlier as to what President Truman
thought about Frank McKinney as chairman of the national committee. How
he ever selected Frank McKinney as chairman of the committee I haven’t
the faintest idea. I just don’t know how he got to know Frank McKinney
or got to know about him. I assume that he was the man who selected him,
because it is a practical matter that the President in office can, and
normally does, actually make the selection of the chairman of the national
political committee, although, technically he is elected by the committee.
Frank McKinney’s a very able business man, a very orderly person and he
organized the national committee in a very orderly fashion and did a great
deal of preliminary work for the 1952 campaign, very little of which was
used, as I recall.
The relationship between McKinney and President Truman continued to be
close and friendly after that and is up till this day I guess. McKinney
is not in very good health now but he is still active in business in Indianapolis.
He’s chairman of the board of a bank, Fletcher Trust Company, or something
of that sort in Indianapolis. A member of the board of directors of the
Indianapolis Power and Light Company. I don’t know what other activities
he is in, a capitalist in general I guess. At an earlier time you mentioned
his coming to Key West and he came I think just as a part of a boat trip.
He came on his yacht which had come down, I’m not sure that he made the
whole trip, came down the Mississippi River as I understand, around to
Key West. And he left on his yacht coming on up the Atlantic coast. A
Chris-Craft of, oh, sixty-odd feet, I suppose.
HESS: He sounds like a pretty good capitalist. Doesn’t he?
MURPHY: Yep, yep. Yep, fine fellow, Frank.
HESS: Well, taking the men who held that job into consideration, Hannegan,
McGrath, Boyle, McKinney and Mitchell, who would you rate as the best
politician?
MURPHY: Oh, I don’t know. I wouldn’t rate Hannegan, I just didn’t know
enough about him. I don’t think Steve Mitchell was a very good politician.
Steve was a good lawyer and a fine fellow but I don’t think he was a very
good politician. I think McGrath, Boyle, McKinney were all good politicians.
I think McGrath and Boyle I would think of as really professional politicians,
and I would think of Frank McKinney as a businessman who did quite well
in his stint in politics.
HESS: At the time that they were head of the Democratic National Committee,
did you personally have very much business with them?
MURPHY: Yes, as a matter of fact Steven Mitchell continued to be chairman
of the national committee for two years after that and I was his special
assistant, or special counsel. I was retained by the national committee
and worked with him and for him. Not full-time. I was practicing law and
one of my regular jobs, clients as it were, was the Democratic National
Committee. I worked with and for Steve Mitchell and, as I say, he was
a fine fellow. I was very fond of him. A very able lawyer. I don’t think
he was particularly a natural politician. Also I arranged for him to employ
as his full-time assistant Jim Sundquist. My relationships with Frank
McKinney were not very close. My relationships with Bill Boyle were pretty
close on a personal basis although I did not do a great deal of work with
him. I had some dealings with Howard McGrath while he was chairman of
the national committee and later, of course, when he was Attorney General,
and was present, but not involved, in the considerations relating to his
resignation as Attorney General.
HESS: What do you recall about that?
MURPHY: Well, this will need to be sealed I guess.
HESS: All right.
MURPHY: President Truman eventually requested McGrath’s resignation as
Attorney General. There was a lot of talk, public comment about scandal
in the Truman administration. This involved Lamar Caudle, about whom we
have spoken sometime earlier, I guess, who was then an Assistant Attorney
General. It involved some several collectors of Internal Revenue. Some
of whom turned out quite badly. My recollection is, that every one of
them was appointed by President Roosevelt, and not one of them by President
Truman. However, this rubbed off on him and his administration and there
were some other things that were not terribly bad, but on the other hand
they were, I think, subject to some adverse criticism. Well, at any rate,
this led President Truman to feel that it would be necessary and appropriate
to have some independent investigation made of this problem in the executive
branch of the Government and to do something about it, find out what needed
to be done about it. And he tried, undertook to set up a group, I think
a commission to--at any rate, at one point he tried--I know he tried--there
was a Federal Judge in New York State named Murphy--still there I think.
President Truman asked him to take charge of this activity and Judge Murphy
came down to see him about it. And I remember this because he came to
see him at the White House and the President had left his office and had
gone over to Blair House and I took Judge Murphy over to Blair House to
see the President. And at that time Judge Murphy told him he would
do it. Then he went back to New York and changed his mind and called up
and said he wouldn’t do it. My recollection is, and this is not
just clear, that he also asked the then Dean of the Harvard Law School
to do this. A man who is now the Solicitor General of the United States,
what’s his name? I think he asked him to do it and he declined. But at
any rate, he finally did ask the man from New York City whose name was
Newbold Morris, a Republican who had acquired quite a reputation as clean-up
man in New York City to come down and work on this and by this time the
setup for the project, I think, had changed somewhat from the original
concept.
HESS: Who first mentioned Mr. Morris as a prospect?
MURPHY: Now, that I don’t know. I don’t think it would have been me because
I don’t think I’d ever heard of him before. Quite possibly Howard McGrath.
I won’t say Howard; frankly I don’t know, let’s stick with that. But,
at any rate he was brought down here and physically put into the Department
of Justice Building and I think named Special Assistant to the Attorney
General. But one of the ground rules was that he was to be completely
independent of everybody except the President and to report directly to
the President. And in this connection, he worked some with me as a member
of the President’s staff and did some of his reporting to the President
through me. He had done something of this same kind in New York City as
I recall, and working with him was a man in the Bureau of the Budget whose
name I don’t remember. It may have been Harold Seidman, I’m not sure,
who had had experience in this same kind of thing possibly working with
Newbold Morris. But between them they developed a questionnaire that all
Government officials were supposed to fill out and sign. This questionnaire
was personally approved by President Truman. I don’t think you’ll find
this in the records anywhere. It was personally approved by President
Truman. I was the man who carried it to him and he did it. Now, after
it was approved by President Truman, Howard McGrath took strong and violent
exceptions to it and, as a result of that, why, President Truman finally,
I think, decided two things, one, not to use the questionnaire and two
to get rid of Newbold Morris. But in this whole tangled business there
for some time the question was raised as to whether or not Howard McGrath,
as Attorney General, was vigorous enough in pursuing matters of this kind.
And at one point, President Truman decided, without my participation,
that he would like for McGrath to resign and would like to replace him.
And it arrived at this point before he or anyone had said anything to
me about it. And at that point they were looking for someone to replace
him and asked me if I had any suggestions and I did have a suggestion.
My suggestion was Justin Miller who had been the Dean of my law school
when I was in law school, and left there and came up here as Special Assistant
to the Attorney General in the Department of Justice. Then he had been
made Judge of the Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia where
he served some years and resigned from that to become president of the
National Association of Broadcasters, which position he held at the time
in question. And President Truman was interested in him and inquired about
him from me as well as others, and said that he would like to talk to
him about this and asked me to get him to come in and I called him. He
had gone to California for his Christmas vacation--Justin Miller had.
He had come from California originally. I called him and told him President
Truman would like to talk to him and he cut short his Christmas vacation
and came back for that purpose. He went to see President Truman and President
Truman asked him if he would accept the position of Attorney General and
Miller said that he would and they reached a firm agreement on it. And
Miller said he would like to have a little time quietly to make arrangements
to leave his present job where he had contractual obligations. And he
went to the executive committee, or the appropriate body, governing body,
of the National Association of Broadcasters and got permission from them
to leave that job before termination of his contract and when it was in
that stage and state somebody persuaded President Truman to change his
mind and...
HESS: Who persuaded him?
MURPHY: Howard McGrath was involved. Let’s see, Theodore Francis Green
was involved in it I guess, the Senator from Rhode Island, and J. Edgar
Hoover, in some fashion. At some earlier time Justin Miller had made a
speech, a public statement, the exact words of which I don’t recall, but
the general sense of it was, as I recall that after all the FBI was a
law enforcement agency and they should be regarded as such, as a policeman.
This apparently was offensive to J. Edgar Hoover and somehow Hoover’s
view on this was transmitted to President Truman. I don’t know how. He
called me, President Truman called me, not to discuss the question but
to tell me he was not going to appoint that man and he couldn’t appoint
a man that had made a statement like that. It seemed to me to be a quite
reasonable statement as a matter of fact. The thing that he had said about
the FBI, I couldn’t see anything wrong in it. But at any rate, the President
did withdraw the appointment, or the offer to appoint, and I got the assignment
of breaking the news to Justin Miller and he took it very gracefully.
He says, "Charlie, don’t you worry about it, these things happen
all the time. I know just how it is. You just go and forget it."
That, I think was the only time that I ever seriously considered just
quitting. I thought I was very badly treated about that, as well as Justin
Miller being badly treated.
I felt pretty badly about it, I must say. Well, at any rate, he did not
at that time replace Howard McGrath and sometime, not very long after
that, a few weeks, or maybe a few months, this question never did die
down. It just kept simmering and I don’t remember now just what brought
it to a point. But, I do remember when he made the decision, he was in
his office with his staff and I think it was perhaps his regular staff
meeting and when this question was discussed I said nothing on the subject
one way or another. He decided then and there that he would ask for McGrath’s
resignation and called him up on the telephone and asked him right then.
I think McGrath always felt that I was one of those who was responsible
for the President asking for his resignation but I must say I never did.
I was involved in a good many of these dealings with McGrath in conversations
with him about this problem in general, about the Newbold Morris matter
and so, I think it more or less natural that he might infer from that
that I was recommending to the President that he should be asked to resign.
HESS: Well, back in 1952 and the events of the campaign. What brought
about the break between President Truman and General Eisenhower?
MURPHY: Well, the particular thing was General Eisenhower’s what would
you say, abandonment, desertion, of General Marshall. I think, naturally,
the setting was such that General Eisenhower was presidential candidate
for the Republican Party, which sort of lent itself to a cooling or deterioration
of relations. But President Truman did have a great deal of respect and
I think a real affection for General Eisenhower. But during the campaign,
and it must have been fairly early in the campaign, General Eisenhower
went somewhere to make a speech and Senator Bill Jenner from Indiana was
involved in this somehow and I guess Senator McCarthy from Wisconsin.
And I think it was Jenner who, at that time, or just before that, had
flatly accused General Marshall of being a traitor. Well, President Truman
greatly admired General Marshall. He just thought that General Eisenhower
should have taken strong exception to this but instead of taking strong
exception to this, General Eisenhower went and appeared in public with
Bill Jenner and threw his arms around him. And in addition to that, in
the prepared text of one of General Eisenhower’s speeches, as I recall,
there had been some complimentary remarks about General Marshall either
by way of defense or otherwise, but anyhow nice statements about General
Marshall, and it appeared from this that he deliberately made a decision
not to stand up for General Marshall. I think this made President Truman
as mad as anything that I know of ever. And I think the more he
thought of that the madder he got and the less he thought of General Eisenhower.
HESS: In reading the speeches it seems to me that President Truman spoke
out far more often, and in stronger tones, against General Eisenhower
than did Governor Stevenson. Do you think...
MURPHY: That’s my recollection.
HESS: Okay.
One other point on this. On October the 3rd the President led off the
day with the regular prepared address which he delivered at 9 o’clock
in the morning at Kalamath Falls, Oregon. In writing about that address,
and others given later in the day, Anthony Leviero said in the New
York Times, "President Truman softened up his anti-Ike crusade
yesterday." Was that so-called softening up on Eisenhower a result
of a decision between the President and his advisers?
MURPHY: Well, I don’t know that there was any softening up. That’s what
Tony Leviero said, I don’t know whether it happened that way or not.
HESS: Do you recall anything of this nature?
MURPHY: No. I don’t remember the dates and places. The principal speech--I’d
have to say again my recollection is not clear, it’s very hazy. But, such
as it is, my recollection is that his itinerary carried him in a westward
direction across the northern tier of states and south and then back through
Colorado. But the principal speech he made on this subject was in Colorado
and at Colorado Springs, as I recall. And if that was after Kalamath Falls,
why, I think you will find that there was no softening up. There was certainly
no change in President Truman’s feelings about this. There may have been
a change in the amount that he talked about it in public speeches. I think
you talk about these things, it’s just natural you talk about them less
as time went on. But I would not recall that there was any decision to
soften up.
HESS: In my research on this question I noticed that there was a prepared
address early in the morning, which was sort of unusual because usually
at that time of the morning they normally just had the whistlestop speeches
and then the prepared address later on in the day. But this particular
one was the first thing in the morning, and it did seem to be a softening
of what he had been saying up to that point.
MURPHY: Well, I’d have to check the different speeches and the itinerary
and so forth to comment about this more intelligently, I guess. But, I
have a fairly definite recollection that the major speech he made on this
subject was at Colorado Springs. If you haven’t checked that one, you
might.
HESS: That’s right, and that was after this period in time because they
went down through Oregon into California and then eastward and back through
Colorado. That was after his address in Kalamath Falls.
Do you recall anything said to the President or any of his staff members
on the train in response to General Eisenhower’s "I will go to Korea"
statement?
MURPHY: Not specifically or definitely, no. I do recall the telegram
he sent to General Eisenhower after the election. It was if you still
want to go to Korea, the Independence is available.
HESS: Did he get an answer to that?
MURPHY: Yes, I think so. But it was not a very cordial answer and General
Eisenhower said he’d rather go in some other airplane. And did
go in some other airplane.
HESS: There are those that have said that Mr. Stevenson’s speeches were
too intellectual and not aimed at the understanding of the average voter.
What would you say about that?
MURPHY: I don’t know, I guess I would have a tendency to agree. I think
the average voter enjoyed Governor Stevenson’s speeches and admired them
greatly. I’m not sure how effective they were in leaving ideas and thoughts
in their minds. I am not sure that my views on this subject are right,
generally speaking, but I have some, and my views are you are in the business
of persuading people and not entertaining them or amazing them, you want
to leave them thinking something, I believe.
HESS: Is that a policy that you tried to follow when you were writing
speeches for Mr. Truman?
MURPHY: Yes, sir. And one that he tried to follow when he was making
speeches and one that he told us to try to follow when we were writing
speeches.
HESS: Where were you on election night?
MURPHY: I don’t remember. This was in 1952?
HESS: 1952.
MURPHY: I remember where I was in 1948. In the Stevens Hotel in Chicago
trying to get--no, on election night I was at home. It was the night before
election I was at the Stevens Hotel. I suppose that I was at home on election
night in Silver Spring, Maryland.
HESS: Did you think that the Governor was going to win in 1952?
MURPHY: Yes, I did. Just before election, I don’t remember, either Sunday
or Monday night, I was in Kansas City and had a meal, breakfast or possibly
dinner, with Congressman Richard Bolling of Kansas City and I remember
our conversation. This is why I remember the views we had. That we both
felt quite definitely that Governor Stevenson was going to win. I remember
our saying this to each other and I’m certain he was sincere and certain
that I was sincere, mistaken though it turned out to be.
HESS: After he lost in ‘52 did you think that he would win when he ran
in ‘56?
MURPHY: I don’t much think so. I don’t have a clear recollection of my
views at that time. I think I would have been much less optimistic in
‘56.
HESS: Do you have any other thoughts dealing with 1952, the events in
1952 before we move on?
Dealing with the convention, campaign, Governor Stevenson in general?
MURPHY: No.
HESS: Okay.
Now, I’d like for you to help me and clarify one aspect of the staffing
pattern of the White House if you would, and that deals with Dr. John
R. Steelman. Just what was your official relationship to Dr. Steelman,
who, as you know, held the title The Assistant to the President.
Was your position as Special Counsel considered to be equal to his rank
or standing?
MURPHY: It was considered to be equal in rank or standing but the second
among equals, I guess. Just as the Secretary of Commerce is equal in rank
or standing as the Secretary of Agriculture but he comes after, when you
line up, because the Department of Agriculture is older. But these were
two jobs of equal rank and standing and equal salary. But as between the
two, the one that was considered to have seniority, was the job of The
Assistant to the President.
HESS: Would you describe your working relationship to Dr. Steelman?
MURPHY: Well, my working relationship with him was rather cordial. When
I first went to the White House as Administrative Assistant, Dr.
Steelman had just become The Assistant to the President and he
had, at that time, a fairly sizeable professional staff. This was a phasing
out of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. I believe that
Dr. Steelman had been the last director of that office. And the Office
of War Mobilization and Reconversion, as such, was terminated or abolished
and Dr. Steelman inherited to a considerable extent, the functions of
that office and some of the staff. He had regular daily staff meetings
attended by six or eight or ten people on the professional level. When
I went to the White House as an Administrative Assistant in 1947 I learned
about these staff meetings and I learned that they talked about things
that I was interested in and that they did things that I was interested
in and I asked Dr. Steelman if I could come to his staff meetings and
he said that he would be very glad to have me. I did go to the staff meetings
and I think out of that there developed a close working relationship with
Dr. Steelman personally, and with members of his staff which continued
as long as I stayed at the White House. And after I became a Special Counsel
why I did a great deal of work with members of his staff. I never had
formal staff meetings, but I had a good many conferences in my office
with staff people and on a free and easy basis and Dr. Steelman’s staff
people came over there as freely as my own assistants and with his complete
approval.
HESS: Who were some of his assistants that worked with you more often?
MURPHY: Dave Stowe was an assistant to Dr. Steelman before he was Administrative
Assistant to the President. John Thurston was on Steelman’s staff, Don
Kingsley. They left fairly early along and went over to Federal Security
Agency with Oscar Ewing. I’m afraid I’d have to refresh my--Bob Turner
was one who later was made a member of the Council of Economic Advisers
and after that taught economics out at the University of Indiana and in
the Kennedy administration, came back here as Deputy Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, I guess.
And I’d have to refresh my recollection on some of the others.
HESS: Just what were the duties that Dr. Steelman’s office and his assistants
performed? What was their job?
MURPHY: Well, I think it would be hard to say this with any precision
and certainly I might not be the one most competent to say. But I think
of it as generally the President’s principal staff man in connection with
the regular on-going operations of the Government. And with particular
specialization in the field of labor relations and labor disputes. Dr.
Steelman’s background and experience was as a labor mediator where he’d
done very well. And I don’t mean done very well in a financial sense.
He was a Government servant, the head of the Mediation Service where he
accomplished a great deal. People on both the management and the labor
side knew him and had a lot of confidence in him and so he was personally,
I think, particularly well suited to be helpful to the President in the
field, and fairly frequently in major labor disputes, became directly
involved in them. At that time I was rather doubtful as to whether it
was wise for the White House staff, and in turn the President, to be so
deeply involved in labor disputes, whether it wouldn’t be best handled
through the Department of Labor.
Since that time, to the extent I have observed it, I haven’t seen anything
else that worked as well. Maybe I should say everything else since seems
to have been even worse. So, looking back on it, I think that was as good
a way to approach that problem as any. So, I think of those two things,
the day to day operation of the Government, and particularly in connection
with labor disputes.
HESS: Did there appear to be any undue friction or competition perhaps
between Dr. Steelman and the Department of Labor?
MURPHY: I don’t think so. I think their relationships were good and that
the then Secretary of Labor understood what the relationships were and
I think we got along very well. Most of the time, as I recall, during
this period, the Secretary of Labor was Maurice Tobin from Massachusetts.
HESS: Were there times when Dr. Steelman might have tried to assert his
authority as The Assistant to the President and encroach upon areas
of responsibility that you felt were properly assigned to you?
MURPHY: No. On the contrary I would say that he had something of a tendency
to let his business drift over my way. I ended up with more and more of
it as time went on.
HESS: What duties would those be?
MURPHY: The only one that I remember particularly was the matter of quotas,
I guess, on watches and clocks, and tariff matters normally were handled
in Dr. Steelman’s office. This particular one was highly controversial
and for some reason it got assigned to me.
HESS: Why? Did you ever find out?
MURPHY: No. I didn’t duck it though.
HESS: What was the general nature of his personal and working relationship
with your predecessor, Mr. Clifford?
MURPHY: Oh, they were, I suppose the words formal and correct occur to
me.
HESS: Not quite as cordial as they were between you and Dr. Steelman?
MURPHY: That’s true. That’s true they were not so cordial.
HESS: Why?
MURPHY: I don’t know. No particular reason, they just didn’t start out
the same way I guess.
HESS: Where did he get the title The Assistant to the President?
MURPHY: Well, technically the President gave it to him. I think, actually,
it came from the Bureau of the Budget. I think that was part of the arrangement,
understanding, for terminating the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
I think the Bureau of the Budget took the initiative in getting that office
terminated. This happened just before I got there to go to work as I recall.
But it was recent enough so that I heard some comments about that, some
feeling the attitude and my feeling--oh, I think the record is quite clear
that the Bureau of the Budget recommended and persuaded the President
to terminate the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. After that
it’s not as clear. I just sort of have the feeling that perhaps they regarded
that office as something of a competitor or a rival in connection with
some of the work they thought should better be done in the Bureau of the
Budget and they’d like to cut it down to size.
This was not, I’m sure, not aimed at Dr. Steelman personally. But, as
I said earlier, he had a fairly sizeable professional staff at that point
and the things that they would be concerned with would include Government
organization and reorganization and these are things that the Bureau of
the Budget is concerned with and I guess they don’t like people messing
around in that field.
HESS: On the subject of the sizes of the staff. How large did your staff
ever get? And would you name them, who was on your staff when it was probably
the largest?
MURPHY: Well, David Bell, and David Lloyd and Dick Neustadt and Ken Hechler
and Don Hansen, I guess. I don’t suppose that it ever got beyond five
people. In the latter part of the Truman administration Dave Bell and
Dave Lloyd were made Administrative Assistants to the President so that,
technically, they were no longer on my staff but we continued to have
a very close working relationship, which was essentially the same that
it had been when they were my assistants. Jim Sundquist came over to the
White House staff in the fall of 1952, about the time Dave Bell went to
Springfield, or a little bit later. So, I think it would be about five
people. Now, in addition to that I did a good deal of work regularly with
Philleo Nash who had been an assistant to David Niles and remained on
the White House staff after Dave Niles was gone and just informally he
worked with and through me quite a lot. I did quite a lot of work with
Milton Kayle, who, I guess, was on Dr. Steelman’s staff and did quite
a lot of work with Marty Friedman who was on Donald Dawson’s staff.
HESS: Do you remember any of the particular chores that came up when
you were working on these men?
Take Dr. Nash first. He was the first one that you mentioned. Do you
remember anything in particular that you worked on with him?
MURPHY: Not in particular and in the case of Philleo Nash it normally
and naturally would have been in the field of civil rights and minority
problems. I’m sure it was.
HESS: How effective was he in his endeavors?
MURPHY: I thought he was very effective, and very sensible, and very
knowledgeable.
HESS: You mentioned the gentlemen that worked for you for a period of
time and then were made Administrative Assistants. Just what was your
official relationship with the Administrative Assistants on the staff?
MURPHY: Well, we both worked for President Truman.
HESS: Did you feel at times that they should report to you or not? Or
did they just report directly to the President?
MURPHY: Well, those particular ones usually reported--well in both ways.
Actually our relationship was so close, and so good, the question, as
such, never came up. I suppose that normally I would report to the President
for all of us. By that time I expect it was standard practice for Administrative
Assistants to attend the President’s staff meetings so they had an opportunity
to report to him each day, and when we had a speech conference, a full-dress
speech conference, they both normally would have gone to the speech conferences.
I frequently would go in to talk with the President about speeches or
something else, alone. In these cases I would, frequently, I would have
then reflected work that was being done by all three of us together but
nobody ever raised any objection to communicating with the President in
that fashion, through me. At least these two people didn’t. I suppose
I must have said in one of these interviews earlier that when I first
went to the White House, Administrative Assistants did not attend
the President’s staff meetings and the practice at that time was to come
only by invitation. And the invitation would be usually issued when the
Administrative Assistant would tell Matt Connelly that he had something
that he wanted to bring up at a staff meeting. And Matt would say come
on over. As time went on, after I first went there, why, I had more and
more business to take up in more and more staff meetings and Matt finally
said, "Well, you come to so many of them you might as well come regularly."
And so I began to go regularly to the staff meetings. Well, that raised
the question about other Administrative Assistants and so other Administrative
Assistants came to staff meetings too. That time there were not very many,
I guess Donald Dawson was just coming on. He came in shortly after I did
as Administrative Assistant in the personnel field. Dave Niles was there.
Dave never did come to staff meetings regularly, though I think that was
a matter of personal preference after the rule got established that it
was appropriate that Administrative Assistants come to any and all staff
meetings. I think he just preferred not to come, and I don’t remember
if there were other Administrative Assistants at that particular time.
Now later on there were others. I think there were five, six, at the end
of the Truman administration. There was Dave Bell and Dave Lloyd, Donald
Dawson and Joe Feeney and Charley Maylon and for a time as you pointed
out, Clayton Fritchey. The staff meetings got a little larger as time
went on.
I suppose there was a tendency for that kind of thing to happen. In the
beginning the Press Secretary came regularly, and while Joe Short was
the Press Secretary, he began to bring one and finally both of his personal
assistants to the regular...
HESS: Roger Tubby and Irving Perlmeter?
MURPHY: Right.
HESS: At the time that you were Administrative Assistant and Mr. Clifford
was Special Counsel, did you feel that it was incumbent on you to report
to him or, at this time, did you feel that you could report direct to
the President?
MURPHY: Well, I knew I could report directly to the President.
That happens to be the one question I asked when he asked me about coming
up there to work. I said, "Who would I report to?"
And he says, "To me."
So, that was the basis on which I began my work at the White House. So,
I was always able to report to the President directly whenever I wanted
to. And, since I was able to do that whenever I wanted to, why, it was
frequently more convenient not to. This is--I’m rather a firm believer
in the--I don’t know that this was the principle in operation, but this
is the relationship that should exist between the President and the members
of his Cabinet for example. They had ought to have an absolute right to
report directly and when they have that right I think most of them will
find that they prefer to do most of their business through staff people.
And so, since I had the right to report to the President directly whenever
I wanted to, I was very happy to work with Clifford voluntarily.
I was a volunteer in working with Clifford.
He never undertook to give me any instructions or directions or anything
of that kind, and he was, I guess, quite meticulous about this. This I
suppose was a relationship more like that of a junior and senior partner
than anything else, and a very close relationship.
Clifford and I got along just fine, George Elsey was Clifford’s assistant.
We worked very intimately all together. I enjoyed the work and I liked
the kind of work that Clifford was engaged in. I was glad to have an opportunity
to participate in it and he was apparently quite willing to have me participate
in it and we had no problems about the division of our functions and so
on.
HESS: Did the other Administrative Assistants, at the time that you were
Administrative Assistant, also work with Mr. Clifford in this voluntary
unofficial manner?
MURPHY: No, not nearly to the same extent because they were in other
fields.
Donald Dawson, for example, had quite a clearly defined field in personnel
policies and in connection with the appointments to office by the President,
the selection and screening of appointees and, for the most part, he reported
directly to the President. He reported some through Matt Connelly and
some through Dr. Steelman. As I recall not at all through Clifford. So,
Dawson worked some through Steelman and some through Connelly and some
directly. I think directly whenever he wanted to. And I think that he
was the man who really reorganized that office and pretty much created
the machinery and an orderly system for screening, checking persons under
consideration for appointment by the President and while the processes
have been, I think, perfected some since then, I don’t think there’s been
any basic change since then.
HESS: On what Donald Dawson did?
MURPHY: All on what Donald Dawson did.
HESS: Was he pretty effective?
MURPHY: I think he was very effective. And my recollection is that after
he got the system started, there was not a bad one that got through. I
don’t think that he could--you know we were talking earlier about the
people who were involved in scandals and things of that kind? I don’t
think that there was ever one that, when Donald Dawson set up this screening
process which involved personnel investigations, FBI investigations, I
guess, I don’t think any man who was ever appointed after he had been
through the screening process turned out badly in the sense of misbehaving.
I’m not sure about that, but that’s my recollection. I think that only
a very few of President Truman’s appointees turned out bad and I don’t
think that there were any who did of those who were appointed, selected,
after that was set up by Donald Dawson.
HESS: While we are still on the subject of the White House staff what
was your relationship with the people that held the position of Secretaries?
The Appointments, Correspondence and Press?
MURPHY: Well, this again, the official relationship was that we both
worked for the President on his staff. In terms of the seniority on the
White House staff, the Secretaries came after The Assistant to
the President and the Special Counsel and before the Administrative Assistants.
The staff operated rather informally, and it was a grand bunch of people,
and there was extremely, almost unbelievably small amount of palace politics--there
was some, but considering the place and the opportunities, the temptations,
the amount was almost unbelievably small.
But, there were times and purposes for which an order had to be established.
In particular at Key West when we ate with the President at the table,
the Navy had place-cards set out in proper order, protocol-wise. Of course,
when I went down there as junior Administrative Assistant, I always sat
at the foot of the table below the Secretaries. And then when I was appointed
Special Counsel, well, then I moved up, you see, ahead of everybody on
the staff except John Steelman for this purpose. And I really felt kind
of bad because some of these gentlemen were older than I and certainly
far wiser and more distinguished; Charlie Ross and Bill Hassett in particular,
but they were all grand people. And if I needed help in their field, why,
I would ask for it and they always responded generously and gladly and
vice versa. And they did--incidentally, in connection with speech conferences,
the President’s Press Secretary was a regular participant and Bill Hassett
was a regular participant. And Matt Connelly was sort of in and out. These
were the more formal conferences that involved the last, or almost the
last, draft. The President would have a meeting of the group that met
on the speeches. This would include Dr. Steelman and the--Bill Hassett
and Charlie Ross and later Joe Short, and Matt Connelly if he cared to
attend, then Clifford and his group and later my group and as many as
we saw fit to bring. If the speech or message under consideration involved
particularly the work of some department or agency, why, the head of that
department or agency would have been there.
HESS: What type of assistance did Charles Ross and William Hassett offer
at this particular stage when the speech was this far along? Was it mainly
editing?
MURPHY: Mainly editing, yes. And if they had major problems, why, the
major problems maybe would be brought up. Sometimes it would require major
revisions.
I don’t think I’ve told you, I told Bill Hopkins’ son who is interested
particularly in speeches about one experience that this brings to mind.
This was in 1948, the campaign train, the last part of the campaign and
had to do with a speech that the President made in Madison Square Garden
in New York City that last week before election. And we came into New
York from Boston and those of us that had been working on speeches had,
from time to time, included some material and suggestions that we thought
were humorous. And we thought this would be effective. We thought people
would enjoy this. And the problem we had was that the press would pay
no attention to them and these little choice tidbits that we thought would
be so nice to get into the paper and that people would like it and that
they would like President Truman who talked about things of this kind.
Well, we hatched up a plan that we would prepare for him, a draft of
a speech that did not include anything else and if they were going to
write about it at all they would have to put in some of it. And this was
the speech that we put together for Madison Square Garden. And on the
train coming from Boston to New York the day before, I guess, the speech
was to be delivered, the speech was mimeographed and distributed to the
press and a good many of the reporters began to come to Charlie Ross,
and later to Matt Connelly and, just as friends, advise very strongly
against the President making this kind of speech and so they were concerned
about it and so the President called a staff meeting. We had a big powwow
on the subject and serious consideration was given to pulling this speech
back and not using it. But the President did decide not to pull it back
and did decide to use it and I think it was a great success.
There was one little couplet in there that I guess that they took out
that was kind of a favorite of mine and I fussed about it until he finally
used it in an off-the-cuff speech somewhere in New York City later on,
and he came back home and dutifully reported that I could relax.
HESS: What was that?
MURPHY: I don’t remember precisely. I remember the original you know,
"Yesterday upon the stair, I saw a man who wasn't there. He wasn't there
again today, I wish to gosh he'd go away."
HESS: But he finally did use that a little later on?
MURPHY: Yes, yes, he, off-the-cuff, when not many people would hear it,
you see, where it would not be formally written.
HESS: It's a little after 12 and we're about out of the reel of tape.
Shall we quit for the day?
MURPHY: Yes, sir.
HESS: Okay.
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