Sir Roger Makins (Lord Sherfield) Oral History Interview, June 15, 1964

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened January 1966
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

NOTE BY INTERVIEWER:
Sir Roger was a person I was eager to interview because he was actually in Bevin's office at the time of the Marshall speech, and saw the immediate reaction. My interview took place in the Cabinet Office Building on Whitehall.

Just two or three days before the interview, his name appeared on the Queen's Honours List as being made a Lord. He has since taken the name of Lord Sherfield.

[1]

DR. PHILIP BROOKS: What I'm particularly interested in, Sir Roger, is your statement that you were, I believe, here when Prime Minister Bevin decided to move very rapidly on the basis of the Marshall speech of June 5, 1947. And it's this particular event that I'm most interested in, though I would be glad to have any observations you may have. But may I ask you first please to clarify one point. I believe you were in Washington in the Embassy and you came back some time in 1947.

[2]

SIR ROGER MAKINS: I came back in February, 1947, and was then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I recall very clearly, as a matter of fact, the circumstances in which we heard the news of General Marshall's speech, because I remember seeing Mr. Bevin on that morning. He was very much excited about it and with that curious intuitive mind which he had, I think he had been half expecting it.

BROOKS: This is precisely one of my questions.

MAKINS: Perhaps it was not entirely intuition. Mr. Dean Acheson had made a speech earlier in Cleveland, Mississippi, in which he referred to the urgent problem of European Reconstruction, and to the need for emergency assistance to certain areas. This has been noted in London, and the Embassy in Washington had had one or two hints that this proposal would be carried

[3]

forward, or might be carried forward, by General Marshall. The people in London were aware that the United States Government was thinking along these lines and were also aware that the Mr. Dean Acheson's speech was a carefully thought out speech which represented a new trend in American policy. But as far as I know there was no formal communication of any kind, nor was there any negotiation.

BROOKS: Every bit of evidence seems to indicate that that's correct. Now, you said that Mr. Bevin called a meeting, I believe, the next day, or discussed this matter with you?

MAKINS: Yes, as I recall.

BROOKS: Do you remember under exactly what terms, or how this went on?

MAKINS: No, except that he felt that this was a very

[4]

significant event: something which was entirely in line with his own thought. He'd been waiting for something of this sort to occur, and he believed that it must be immediately exploited, in the sense that it was up to the Europeans to respond to it and to pick it up.

BROOKS: This is one of the key points, of course, that the Europeans were asked to pick this up themselves. There was not much precedent for that degree of economic cooperation, was there, at that time, two years after the war?

MAKINS: No, the nature of the response to General Marshall's proposal was in a sense, a new departure.

BROOKS: Did you feel that that degree of economic cooperation was possible at that time, two years after the war?

[5]

MAKINS: There had been some thinking about the nature of the economic cooperation that might take place, both in France and in this country. The feeling was that it was something which should be tried and that there was a much greater need for cooperation in economic policy, than had existed hitherto. I don't remember that any of us were thinking in terms of more than collaboration on a national basis, on a governmental basis -- a greater pooling of information, the establishment of common rules of conduct and of economic policy. We were not contemplating any extension to super-national organizations or anything of that kind. That came later.

BROOKS: Yes, although there were some people at the time who were strongly for super national organization -- Monnet, Paul Hoffman

[6]

and so forth. The reference to cooperation among European nations in Marshall's speech was very vague, but I got from people on the Continent, the feeling that they thought the United States was expecting a further degree of economic union at that time. Now they may be reading back their later experiences. But I think that some of this must have represented the advocacy of individual American representatives over here.

MAKINS: I don't think it represented the policy of the United States government. I think that the idea of super-national planning crystallized later.

BROOKS: At that time, was the Greek-Turkish Aid program of the United States something of considerable concern here and were the two thought of as part of the same policy, or

[7]

did most people think of them as quite separate?

MAKINS: Well, I find it hard to put myself back in time, but I would say that, insofar as they were connected, they were taken as different aspects of the same policy. There was a growing awareness in the United States of some of the issues involved; of the threat from the East at that period and the realization that the collaboration of the Russians could not be relied upon. This was the period in which the idea of containment was being developed, and there was a growing realization that the United States should take a much more active part in this. They became aware of the economic weakness in Western Europe -- that for example, the United Kingdom was not able to shoulder the burden of foreign aid and foreign subsidy and so on to the extent that they had

[8]

shouldered it in the past; and that it was necessary, if the policy of containment was to be made a reality, that the United States should take a more active part and take some of the burden off, in particular, the shoulders of the United Kingdom. So far from resenting this change of attitude, I think we, at that time, welcomed it.

BROOKS: How did it happen that Bevin turned to Bidault first thing? Was it just a natural matter of course that France was looked on as the potential leader on the Continent, and that this was the natural way to turn?

MAKINS: Naturally, his first reaction would be to consult the French. You see, Germany was under occupation, the Italians were very weak. The first step in Mr. Bevin's progress towards the realization of his concept, which was

[9]

essentially that of an Atlantic community -- he always had that in his mind -- was to make a treaty with France, the Treaty of Dunkirk, and that preceded General Marshall's speech. So a special relationship with France was already established, and it was natural that Mr. Bevin should first consult the French government.

BROOKS: So the first thing he did was to consult Bidault. Then they consulted the Russians. I've had many varying opinions on whether this was wise and whether there was any real possibility that the Russians would participate; and if they had, would it have worked. Do you have any reaction on that?

MAKINS: Yes, I have always thought that in the context of the relationships at that time, it was probably right and perhaps inevitable that

[10]

the Russians should be consulted. The Russians lost a great opportunity by refusing to collaborate in the Marshall Plan, and by obliging the Czechs, who originally were very much attracted by the idea of participating in the Marshall Plan, to withdraw from it. I have always believed that this was essentially a doctrinal decision, because on grounds of expediency and immediate advantage, it must surely have been to their benefit to come in and either to share in whatever benefits there were or to ensure that the plan was not a success. Instead of that, they seem to have taken the attitude that this was, at it were, taking money from the infidel, and that the communist countries must be free from the taint of receiving Western aid. Now, I don't know whether this is true or not, but this is the idea that I had at the time. I very much doubt whether the operations of Franks' committee

[11]

in Paris would have been possible if the Russians had been in it. Certainly, it would have been impossible to act with the speed with which the preparatory committee acted.

BROOKS: About this time, Sir Roger, there was some discussion as to whether or not to turn to the United Nations and to have the preparatory work or even part of the administration of the program handled by the United Nations or by its unit, the ECE. Would you have thought this practical or desirable?

MAKINS: I don't remember that having been suggested, and I would have thought the objection would have been that the Soviet Union and the Poles and the Czechs -- certainly the Poles and the Czechs -- were in ECE at that time, and that therefore the progress, if any, would have been very slow.

[12]

BROOKS: Some people, particularly the Norwegians, were very eager to have the United Nations in the picture as much as possible. Well, Sir, at the same time, I think perhaps the other larger question was what to do with Germany. Do you remember any particular reaction as to the "level of industry" controversy in relations to Germany, and to what extent Germany should be brought into the Marshall Plan organization? Among many countries on the Continent, there was evidently then a dilemma between the emotional antagonism toward Germany resulting from the war on one hand, and on the other hand the realization that Germany had to be brought into the European community for the benefit of the whole community.

MAKINS: What I remember about that is mainly the controversy, which continued for a longish

[13]

period, about the level of steel production which should be permitted to the Germans. There the British position remained fairly consistent. We picked a figure somewhere between eight and eleven million tons, and more or less stuck to that through thick and thin. The Americans, as I remember, started with very much lower figures, and thought that our own figures were much too high. Therefore the argument proceeded on figures between ten and something much less. Then, as a result of various investigations, there was a sharp change in the American attitude. They pressed for something much more than ten million tons, and we resisted the increase as much as we had resisted the lower figures.

BROOKS: This is quite true but the actual German production didn't come up to either one of those

[14]

figures in a long time. Now, on this issue, do you remember any particular difficulty in getting into an agreement with the French? The French, I think were more reluctant to see the German recovery than some other countries.

MAKINS: I don't remember any particular issue, or whether the French took any particularly strong line on this subject.

BROOKS: They were for internationalization as a rule. Incidentally, the Germans that I talked to, including Dr. Adenauer, were very enthusiastic in their praise of the Marshall Plan and he especially emphasized the political and moral as well as the economic importance of it. They look on this as the first opportunity that they were given to get back into international cooperation and to join an international organization.

[15]

MAKINS: It's difficult now to put oneself back to the situation which existed in Europe in 1947. I remember coming back from the United States in February. It was a particularly hard winter in which there was a coal shortage, and the conditions appeared to me to be worse, in many respects, as far as living conditions and the general economic situation was concerned, than they were in the latter part of the war. Of course one of the critical points in all this was the sudden termination of Lend-Lease. This was really a fearful blow, and in a way, the first time that the consequences of this were realized and understood, was when the Marshall proposal was promulgated.

BROOKS: What would be your guess or statement as to an evaluation of the American motivation? Was the American Government moving primarily

[16]

for the benefit of American industry and for markets, or was it primarily an idealistic step? What do you think was the most important of the various influences?

MAKINS: Well, personally I think the basic point was the realization that collaboration with Russia, on which the Roosevelt policy was fundamentally based -- that there could be an understanding between the Americans and the Russians which would mean that they would be able to manage the affairs of Europe -- wasn't going to work out; that there were various disquieting features in Russian policy which were threatening the United States position in the world, and therefore, that a different policy must be evolved. This developed into the policy of containment. With the change of policy came the realization that the economies

[17]

of the allies of the United States were in serious difficulty; that there was a danger of some forms of social unrest; that this might be exploited from the East; and that therefore their economies ought to be supported. I think that there has always been, in American policy, a very strong feeling for greater unity in Europe, a belief that European unity must be promoted and that this could be done as a counterpart, so to speak, of American assistance. I think these strands of thought were all present in 1947. I wouldn't like to say (no doubt the documents show or will show) how these strands were interwoven and which were uppermost at one time or the other.

But I think all these elements were there. There was the urge to promote European unity; there was the realization of the threat from the East and the need to counteract it. This

[18]

could be done in various ways, but the European Recovery Program appeared to be a way of pursuing both objectives at the same time.

BROOKS: Do you think that this American interest in the unity of Europe began before this?

MAKINS: Yes, almost as long as I have known the United States there has been this feeling among many Americans. "Why are there all these countries in Europe?", "Why do we have to show our passports in going from one to another?", "Why do they have these customs barriers?", "Why can't they be like us?". This has been an element in American thought for as long as I can remember.

BROOKS: The question is, when did they become a major influence?

MAKINS: Well, I think it became a major influence

[19]

after the war, in about 1947, to be precise. Because it was at that time that the defects in what you might call "the Roosevelt policy" became apparent, and it was felt that something else was needed.

BROOKS: Historians in the United States are now having fun arguing about who was responsible for the Marshall Plan, and who in the United States was responsible for the speech. And there are protagonists of Acheson, Clayton, Marshall, and various other people. Probably no one of them had an exclusive influence, and this is one reason why I think it's going to be difficult even with documents to work out exactly what happened.

MAKINS: Well, I suppose you might say that the first step, or the first public indication of this changing thought, was Dean Acheson's

[20]

speech at Cleveland. But I imagine that this policy was carefully worked out, in consultation between Acheson and Clayton and Kennan and all of them, and that it was a product of all their minds, rather than a product of one of their minds. But that's only a guess.

BROOKS: I wonder if I could take a little different slant, Sir Roger, since you were in Washington from, I believe, 1945 to 1947, and again after 1953. I would be interested in your picture of the position of President Truman in European opinion. Let me put it this way, what events during the Truman Administration do you think most affected his reputation in Europe?

MAKINS: Well, first of all, the European Recovery Program; secondly his action in Greece and Turkey and the policy which that represented; and thirdly, of course, the way he handled

[21]

the Far Eastern situation in Korea.

BROOKS: Did you have any personal dealings with him or observation of him when you were there right after the war?

MAKINS: Oh yes, I often saw him. I had to deal with him within a few weeks of his succeeding to the Presidency, and when I went there as Ambassador in January of 1953, I presented my credentials to him, and immediately afterwards entertained him at the Embassy during a visit by Sir Winston Churchill. I was in close touch with American affairs throughout the Truman regime.

BROOKS: If you remember any incidents, any conversations, anything that you think would be significant in demonstrating Mr. Truman's character or how he went about his business,

[22]

this would be of great interest.

MAKINS: Well, this is very much off-the-cuff, because I haven't thought about this, at least not recently. I was enormously impressed by President Truman, and found him an extremely charming and attractive person, first of all. Secondly, one couldn't help but be impressed with him and the way he conducted his business. I remember going over with Attlee one time in, I suppose, January 1951, and again with Eden for some discussions. In both cases, we had the usual talks at the White House and on one occasion on the yacht, the Williamsburg. I was very much impressed by the way that Mr. Truman always made his ministers, his secretaries of state, do the talking, yet kept control of the proceedings -- rather like Mr. Attlee in that respect. Another thing I remember is a curiosity

[23]

more than anything else. We had some talks, I think it was with Sir Anthony Eden at that time and I suppose that it must have been in 1952. During these talks the episode of the music critic occurred. We were waiting to see the result of a communiqué which we were going to issue. It was rather more than a communiqué; it was a declaration of policy, and we were rather expecting to see it on the front pages of the newspapers. But instead it was relegated to a back page and the whole of the front page was taken up with Mr. Truman's letter to the music critic. At some point, you see, during this conference, Mr. Truman must have gone off and written this letter.

BROOKS: Probably early one morning. I don't remember when he wrote it exactly. Do you remember -- you said you had dealings with

[24]

him very shortly after he became President, do you remember what the occasion was?

MAKINS: Yes, it was at the time of the conference on atomic energy between Attlee and McKenzie-King and Truman. Mr. Attlee as he then was, came over -- he was very much concerned, as indeed we all were, with the international control of the bomb. This was in November 1945. They had a conference about international control, which was the starting point for the negotiations which later took place on the Baruch plan; and they also discussed the continuance of the collaboration in the atomic energy field between the United States and this country. Indeed it was thought that Mr. Truman had agreed to continue collaboration, but it finally broke down in the following year with the passage on the McMahon Act. There

[25]

is quite a lot of documentation on this, in particular in Lord Attlee's book.

BROOKS: A good many people have said that in the first year or two that Mr. Truman was President, he didn't present the vigor and determination that he did later on in his administration. Do you notice that he changed through the years...

MAKINS: I don't know that I noticed it particularly. I suppose you might say that he gained confidence as he went along, but he certainly didn't change in any way. He was the same, frank, friendly, and charming personality at the end as he was in the beginning.

BROOKS: And well-informed as to the issues?

MAKINS: He had a good grasp of them, I would say. I don't think he did grasp the atomic energy

[26]

point about collaboration. I don't think he quite realized what the underlying issue was there, but then he'd only been in office for a week or so -- a very short time.

BROOKS: Are there any other persons that you dealt with at the time whose roles you think particularly deserves attention?

MAKINS: Well, I dealt with a number of people, particularly Dean Acheson and Will Clayton, in the State Department, and with Harvey Bundy, in the War Department, over atomic energy. Those were the ones I saw the most of.

BROOKS: Your own special interest in atomic energy carried back this far, did it?

MAKINS: Yes, although I was described as Economic Minister and I did a certain amount of economic

[27]

work, particularly in coordinating the work of the British Missions in Washington, my main task was to deal, under the Ambassador, Lord Halifax, with the problems of collaboration in the atomic energy field between the two countries, with particularly reference to the development of the atomic weapon. This was really my principal function at that time.

BROOKS: A most important function, certainly.

I'm curious about one thing relating to the Marshall speech. There is a story about that Bevin, not having received any official communication of it through the State Department or the Embassy in Washington, heard this on the radio on a BBC broadcast.

Do you remember...

MAKINS: Oh, certainly. He heard it on the radio on a BBC broadcast, because he came into the

[28]

Foreign Office, and said something like "It's happened. I heard it on the radio this morning."

BROOKS: So in a way, this BBC thing was the channel of communications?

MAKINS: That was the channel of communication through which he actually heard of it, although as I have said, we had some intimation that something of this sort was coming, quite apart from the Acheson speech.

BROOKS: Do you remember any particular evidence of communication there? How were those intimations made?

MAKINS: I think informal communications from the Embassy.

As I recall, that story, about the BBC is a true story, but there's no doubt in my

[29]

mind that Mr. Bevin was expecting something of this kind and was ready to act on it and did act on it with great speed.

BROOKS: Could you tell me, sir, when did Sir Oliver Franks come into the picture, and who is responsible for getting him in there?

MAKINS: He was then the provost of Queens College of Oxford. He had been the head of the Ministry of Supply in the war, and made a great success in that very important administrative job. He was known for his capacity, particularly in what you might call politico-economic matters. He was invited by Mr. Bevin to come and head up the work of the organization on the European side of the Marshall Plan, and was subsequently asked by Mr. Bevin to go to Washington as British Ambassador.

BROOKS: So that his selection to go to Paris was

[30]

Bevin's own choice?

MAKINS: As I recall, it was, yes.

BROOKS: It was a key appointment, because one of the things that stands out in this whole business is what a fine job Franks did on that committee.

MAKINS: But it was a full-time job for somebody, and therefore, none of the permanent officials, either in the Foreign Office, the Treasury Office or the Board of Trade could do it. They already had a wealth of problems of postwar economic reconstruction. It was clearly a wise move to bring somebody from outside who could put a fresh mind and give his whole time to this particular job.

Well, have I given you, roughly speaking, what you want?

[31]

BROOKS: Yes, yes, you certainly have. And I think I told you when I was here before that Mr. Truman asked me to give you his regards. He remembered you with pleasure and respect.

MAKINS: That's very kind. Actually, I did talk to Mr. Truman when I was Ambassador after he left the White House. When I was in Kansas City I went to call on him in the office which he had in the Federal Reserve Bank. I wanted to see him anyway, so it was more or less a social call, but there was also a question of his coming to England to get an honorary degree at Oxford, and I discussed that with him. I remember that he was in very robust form.

Acheson, Dean, 2, 3, 19-20, 26
Adenauer, Konrad, 14
Atomic energy, 24, 25-27
Attlee, Clement Richard, 22, 24, 25

Baruch plan, 24
Bevin, Ernest, 1, 2, 3-4, 8-9, 29, 30

• • and the Marshall plan, 27-29, 31
• Bidault, Georges, 8, 9
  British Broadcasting Corporation, 27, 28
  Bundy, Harvey, 26

  Churchill, Sir Winston, 21
  Clayton, William C., 19, 20, 26
  Cleveland, Mississippi, 2, 20
  Containment, 7-8, 16
  Czechoslovakia, 10, 11

  Eden, Sir Anthony, 22, 23
  European Recovery Program, 18, 20
  European unity, 17-18

  France, 5, 8, 9, 14
  Franks, Sir Oliver, 29-30
  Franks Committee, 10-11

  Germany, 8

  • recovery of, 12-14
  Greece, 6-7, 20

  Halifax, Lord (Edward Frederick Lindley Wood), 27
  Hoffman, Paul G., 5

  Italy, 8

  Kansas City, Missouri, 31
  Kennan, George F., 20
  King, W. L. MacKenzie, 24
  Korea, 21

  Lend-lease, 15
  London, England, 2, 3
  Lord Sherfield. See Makins, Sir Roger

  McMahon Act, 24
  Makins, Sir Roger, 1

  • as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 2
    German recovery recalled by, 12, 14
    and the Marshall plan, 1-5, 6
    Truman, Harry S., commented on by, 20-26
    the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as viewed by, 7, 9-11, 16
  Marshall, General George C., 3, 19
  Marshall plan, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19
  • and Bevin, Ernest, 27-29
    and Makins, Sir Roger, 1-5, 6
    and United States motivation, 15-19
  Monnet, Jean, 5

  Norwegians, 12

  Oxford University, 29, 31

  Paris, France, 11
  Poland, 11

  Queens College, Oxford University, 29

  Roosevelt, Franklin D., 16, 24

  State Department, 26, 27

  Treaty of Dunkirk, 9
  Truman, Harry S., as viewed by Six Roger Makins, 20-26, 31
  Turkey, 6-7, 20

  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as viewed by Six Roger Makins, 7, 9-11, 16
  United Kingdom, 7-8
  United Nations, 11-12
  United States of America:

  • containment, as a policy of, 7-8, 16
    and motivations for the Marshall plan, 15-19

  War Department, 26
  Williamsburg, U.S.S., 22