Last night we heard three excellent presentations. They form part of a larger texture. I wish to say a few words about their presentations and then add to the tapestry.

Bruce Cumings focused on the indigenous roots of the Korean conflict; on the importance of understanding Korean nationalism as a source of the conflict.

Vlad Zubok focused on Stalin's role and the importance of his decision to offer assistance to Kim.

Chen Jian examined the role of Mao and his concerns with security, tradition, national pride, and communist ideology - a complicated mix.

These comments raise interesting questions about contingency, agency, and structure in the unfolding of historical events.

Kim's decision was deeply embedded in the structures of Korean history and in the configuration of the international system after World War II. Virulent nationalism was embedded in the structure of the international system because of the defeat of Japan (which had ruled Korea for almost 40 years) and because of the erosion of the British, French, and Dutch power.

Within this larger context of postwar nationalism and decolonization, many of the decisions that we talked about last night seem more contingent: The contingency of the decisions of Mao and Stalin help to illuminate the contingency of Truman's decisions as well.

Zubok stressed that Stalin changed his mind and decided to support Kim's desire to unify all of Korea under Communist rule. Stalin was affected by the success of the Chinese revolution, the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb. In short, Stalin, often a cautious man when it came to diplomacy, felt forces of history were now marching inexorably forward. This meant, in Stalin's view, that the United States would not intervene. Stalin was betting that the march of events would cast shadows that would constrain the U. S. reaction.

Chen stressed that Mao decided to intervene in the Fall of 1950 because Mao believed in the resurgence of China's pride of place in the international system and because he believed in the march of history along Marxist-Leninist lines. The future, Mao thought, belonged to Communism. If he did not intervene, Chen described how Mao feared it would setback the course of history, repudiate the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and, most of all, inspire his opponents at home and abroad. Mao, by the way, definitely believed in dominos; and in bandwagons - notwithstanding his parallel belief in Marxism-Leninism and the inevitability of history.

People always hold clashing beliefs. Which beliefs dictate policy are often contingent -determined by exogenous factors.

Such was the case with U. S. actions once the North Korean attack occurred in June 1950. Like Stalin and like Mao, most U.S. officials saw Korea in larger context; much was at stake. They felt a tremendous sense of vulnerability. Looking at the world scene, they were very aware of the forces of nationalism everywhere, often led by immature leaders in strange countries; immature leaders who could easily be duped by the treacherous men in the Kremlin. Hence Truman and his advisors felt a need to act, to stymie, to thwart the march of history.

Why did the United States cross the 38th parallel in September 1950? Truman and Acheson made this fateful decision precisely for the reasons that Mao feared: to rollback Communism not only in North Korea, but elsewhere as well; to demonstrate that the tide of history was reversible; that dominos could fall in other directions; that there could be a bandwagon effect against the Communists.

At the same time, Truman felt that his domestic critics could be quieted if they witnessed that the Democratic Party and democratic capitalism had the wherewithal to defeat Communism. They were inspired by the desire to move forward and create a Wilsonian world order. To do so, they needed support at home and victories abroad.

Once in the war, the Truman administration conducted its military strategy and its diplomacy to establish a configuration of power that would allow the United States to triumph eventually in the larger struggle of freedom v. slavery, or democratic capitalism v. totalitarian socialism. The United States exercised self-restraint militarily once the Chinese intervened. But Truman, Acheson, Marshall, Lovett, Nitze, and their aides were vexed by the military self-restraint. Nonetheless, they believed they had to act prudently in Korea while they gathered the power and cemented the alliances to wage a wider war, if necessary, when they were prepared to do so. Even more importantly, they exercised military self-restraint in order to make the diplomatic and geopolitical moves that would enable the United States to establish the power to win the Cold War and reverse the tide of history without a major hot war with the Soviet Union. U. S. officials grasped that waging the Cold War might be even more expensive than a hot war. But they were willing to pay the financial price of the Cold War, even though they knew it would be fraught with risks.

Hence, the limited war in Korea was accompanied by a staggering build-up of U. S. military capabilities. Very little of these capabilities were used in Korea. The military capabilities were developed to cast the shadows essential for the United States to take the risks to forge a configuration of power in the international system that would reverse the seemingly inevitable tide of Communist victories.

The envisioned military build-up was vast: from 10-21 Army divisions; from 48 to 143 air wings; from 21 to 37 strategic air wings; from 237 to 408 major combatant ships, including 12 aircraft carriers. The numbers of atomic weapons proliferated and steps were taken to accrue an enormous storehouse of atomic and nuclear weapons. The CIA grew from about 300 people in 1949 to about 6,000 in 1952. Military expenditures rose from about 12-15 billion dollars a year to 45-50 billion dollars. Only about $5 billion was spent per year in Korea; the rest was to prepare for a major military conflict and to cast the shadows to support a risk-taking diplomacy aimed at establishing a preponderance of power in the international system. The military program was designed to produce 50,000 modern military aircraft per year and 35,000 tanks. The projected rate of increase exceeded World War II.

The increment in military capabilities was not simply to prepare for a major war; the increment was designed to support a risk-taking diplomacy. Our relative preparedness for war, said Paul Nitze, "must be taken into account in deciding what initiatives we can take, when we can take them, and how far we can afford to pursue them."

What were the risks?

Strengthening NATO and establishing a unified command

Deploying U. S. troops to Europe

Building up German military capabilities

Forming the European Defense Community

Providing military aid to Tito in Yugoslavia

Incorporating Greece and Turkey into NATO

Negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty (without the Russians)

Forming the ANZUS alliance

Ringing the Soviet Union with military bases

Each of these steps incurred enormous risks. How the Soviets would react was uncertain. Our allies - the British, French, Norwegians, and Danes, for example - constantly warned us about proceeding too far and provoking the Kremlin into a wider war that nobody wanted. But these risks, according to Truman, Acheson, Marshall, Lovett, and Nitze had to be taken. The United States had to regain the initiative and establish a configuration of power in the international system that would safeguard democratic capitalism at home and abroad.

The great military buildup that I outlined a few minutes ago was designed to support these risks. Keep in mind again how little of the money was actually used to wage war in Korea; most military expenditures were allocated to prepare for a wider war that could occur as a result of the bold diplomatic initiatives that were being launched. The Truman administration's risk-taking was deemed essential to thwart the seemingly inevitable march of history during an historical epoch of revolutionary nationalism. Truman, Acheson, and Nitze believed that men, acting in a determined way, could shape history. Dominos could fall in different directions than those anticipated by Stalin and Mao; bandwagons could favor the United States.

Policymakers were agents of history. Stalin and Mao knew this. So did Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Lovett.

There was structure and contingency. Agents - human beings - shape the structure and move it in meaningful directions. Their ability to do so depends on power, including the power of ideas. But without military capabilities, strong alliances, and the economic wherewithal to build military capabilities and shape military alliances, ideas do not suffice. Mao, Stalin, and Truman all understood these truths.

In the larger context of U. S. history and world history, the limited war in Korea was a time when U.S. officials mobilized the military power, forged the political and military alliances, and established the economic base to make their ideas triumph in the wider Cold War. This victory was not scripted in the Heavens; it was designed by people acting in contingent ways and taking large but prudent risks in a turbulent and threatening international system.