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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 OCTOBER 1951

FROM: [REDACTED] EO 12958 3.4 (b)(1)

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION



(IT IS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE MADE OUTSIDE OF THE AGENCY.)

1. BACKGROUND.

A. XENOPHOBIA. IRAN NOW IS ANTI-WESTERN BUT IS VIOLENT ONLY IN ITS MANIFESTATION AGAINST THE BRITISH BECAUSE THEIR PRESENCE IN IRAN UP TO THIS TIME HAS BEEN MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN THE PRESENCE OF ANY OTHER WESTERNERS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, BRITISH BANK AND BUSINESS FIRMS BACKED BY A LONG HISTORY OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAN). MOSSADEQ CAME TO POWER ON A WAVE OF XENOPHOBIA, THE FORERUNNER OF WHICH WAS THE ANTI-RAZMARA AND ANTI-COURT MOVEMENT (RAZMARA AND THE SHAH DESCRIBED AS SERVANTS OF THE BRITISH). IF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SIDE SPECTACULARLY WITH THE BRITISH (FOR EXAMPLE, HARRIMAN'S REFUSAL TO PASS TO THE BRITISH MOSSADEQ'S "ULTIMATUM," AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE \$25,000,000 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN), THE BRUNT OF ANTI-WESTERN FEELING COULD EASILY COVER THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS GREAT BRITAIN.

B. DICTATORSHIP OF THE STREETS. THE MOSSADEQ GOVERNMENT IS THE PRISONER OF THE "STREETS." THE "STREETS" ARE COMPOSED OF TWO MAIN GROUPS: THE FOLLOWERS OF MULLAH KASHANI AND THE TUDEH PARTY (WITH SATELLITE FRONTS), BOTH OF WHICH ARE EXPLOITING TO THE FULLEST A WAVE OF GENUINE NATIONALISTIC FEELINGS OF A BROAD SECTION OF THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS. ALTHOUGH KASHANI'S FOLLOWING IS POSSIBLY MORE NUMEROUS THAN THAT OF THE TUDEH, THE FORMER HAS NEITHER THE ORGANIZATION, DISCIPLINE, NOR REVOLUTIONARY AND CONSPIRATORIAL TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF THE LATTER. ACCORDINGLY, OF THE TWO THE MORE POWERFUL IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE TUDEH PARTY.

C. THE TRADITIONAL IRANIAN POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND GREAT BRITAIN. THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PENDULUM IS NOW SWINGING DANGEROUSLY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BUT GIVEN OPPORTUNITIES THE IRANIAN SHOULD REACT AND TURN TOWARD THE WEST FOR SUPPORT (PROVIDING THE WEST IS NOT REPRESENTED BY GREAT BRITAIN ALONE).

2. MOSSADEQ'S GOVERNMENT HAS POWERFUL POPULAR SUPPORT.

A. MAJLIS OPPOSITION TO MOSSADEQ COLLAPSED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1951. ABDUL RAHMAN FARAMARZI ANNOUNCED THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD CEASE TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS THE OIL DISPUTE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SOURCES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THIS OPPOSITION IS FINAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IS A FACE-SAVING EXCUSE. THE OPPOSITION HAS GOTTEN "OUT ON A LIMB," DEPENDING UPON BRITISH POWER AND ROYAL COURT SUPPORT. BOTH FAILED TO COME THROUGH WITH THEIR SUPPORT AND THE OPPOSITION DEPUTIES FEAR FOR THEIR VERY LIVES.

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B. MOSLEM RELIGIOUS GROUPS, WHO AT ONE TIME MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM KASHANI AND FROM HIS PRO-MOSSADEQ STAND, HAVE NOW RALLIED TO THE NATIONAL FRONT BANNER. IN A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 1951 NAVAB SAFAVI, LEADER OF THE FEDAYAN-I-ISLAM, MADE PEACE WITH KASHANI; A LETTER FROM BURUJURDI OF QUM (THE OUTSTANDING SPIRITUAL LEADER OF IRAN) TO THE SHAH URGED HIM TO SUPPORT MOSSADEQ.

C. KASHANI'S ENORMOUS INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1951 BY THE GENERAL CLOSING OF THE BAZAARS THROUGHOUT THE NATION AT HIS REQUEST AND BY THE ORDERLINESS OF THE PARADES HE SPONSORED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE SAME DAY.

D. THE SHAH HAS TAKEN A STAND IN FAVOR OF MOSSADEQ AND AT LEAST SINCE 17 SEPTEMBER HAS REFUSED TO LISTEN TO BRITISH ENTREATIES TO RALLY OPPOSITION IN FAVOR OF SEYYED ZIA TABATABAI. AT MOSSADEQ'S REQUEST THE SHAH HAS ORDERED THE PRINCESS ASHRAF OUT OF THE COUNTRY (SHE LEFT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1951), THEREBY SHOWING THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER (THAT IS, FOR THE TIME BEING) CONDONE COURT INTRIGUES IN POLITICAL MATTERS.

E. THE TUDEH PARTY AND PEACE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS ARE BACKING MOSSADEQ, ALBEIT ONLY ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. AS LONG AS MOSSADEQ'S POLICY REMAINS INTRANSIGENT AGAINST THE BRITISH, THE TUDEH IS BEHIND MOSSADEQ. THE TUDEH DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN THE MOOD AT THIS TIME TO MAKE LIFE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE TUDEH APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THE POLICE ORDER NOT TO CELEBRATE PUBLICLY THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE PARTY (3 - 7 OCTOBER 1951).

3. THE BRITISH POSITION IN IRAN HAS COLLAPSED.

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A.



B. THE INFLUENCE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY UPON THE SHAH AND HIS COURTIER HAS PRACTICALLY CEASED TO EXIST, MAINLY BECAUSE THE SHAH IS INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE "STREETS", AND FEARS THE "STREETS" AT PRESENT MORE THAN HE FEARS THE BRITISH. NO OTHER PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO MOSSADEQ COULD CLAIM SUCH SPONSORSHIP. THE SHAH DARES NOT TALK BACK OR STEP OUT OF LINE. HE IS FULLY AWARE NOW THAT THE POLITICAL WAVE WHICH BROUGHT MOSSADEQ INTO POWER WAS IN GREAT PART AN ANTI-COURT WAVE.

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C. THE CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION SUPPORTED BY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND CONDONED BY MULLAH KASHANI (BUT NOT CONDONED BY MOSSADEQ) HAS CONTRIBUTED TOWARD CURRENT ELIMINATION OF BRITISH-SPONSORED OPPOSITION. (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 2 A ABOVE).

4. THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION TO REAP ADVANTAGES.

A. THE TUDEH PARTY HAS GREAT POTENTIALITIES. ALTHOUGH INSIDE INFORMATION IS INADEQUATE, THE FOLLOWING CLUES ARE IMPORTANT:

(1) AS EARLY AS 1946 THE TUDEH HAD ORGANIZED WORKERS IN ABADAN TO A POINT WHERE THEY SUCCESSFULLY STAGED A GENERAL STRIKE.

(2) SINCE THE RAZMARA CABINET, THE TUDEH HAS ENJOYED GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION WITH CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED EFFICIENCY.

(3) IN 1950 THE TUDEH ORGANIZED PEACE FRONT GROUPS.

(4) IN DECEMBER 1950 THE TUDEH WAS IN A POSITION TO STAGE THE ESCAPE OF TEN OF ITS LEADERS FROM THE TEHRAN JAIL.

(5) IN APRIL 1951 THE TUDEH QUICKLY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE INEPTITUDE OF BRITISH LABOR RELATIONS IN ABADAN TO STAGE ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL GENERAL STRIKE.

(6) IN JULY 1951 THE TUDEH WAS ABLE TO MASS TEN THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS IN THE STREETS OF TEHRAN AND ORGANIZE THEM IN SEMI-MILITARY ORDER.

(7) IN THE PAST YEAR THE TUDEH HAS BEEN SIGNALLY SUCCESSFUL IN CONDUCTING LARGER SCALE PROPAGANDA.

(8) AN ESTIMATE OF TUDEH AND FRONT GROUPS FOR THE TEHRAN AREA IN SEPTEMBER 1951 WAS A MAXIMUM OF THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OVER A YEAR AGO.

(9) THE ECONOMIC SITUATION STANDS TO DETERIORATE FURTHER, WHICH PAVES THE WAY FOR FURTHER INCREASE IN THE POWER OF THE TUDEH PARTY.

B. THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AT THIS TIME PLAYS DIRECTLY INTO SOVIET HANDS.

(1) IT HAS CAUSED MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN LONDON AND WASHINGTON. THE BREACH COULD BE MADE TO WIDEN FURTHER.

(2) IT CALLS FOR THE PHYSICAL EXPULSION OF THE BRITISH FROM IRAN.

(3) IT HAS UNDERMINED THE PRESTIGE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON POWERS IN THE NEAR EAST.

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(4) IT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A COMMON FRONT OF NATIONALISTS IN THE NEAR EAST AGAINST ANGLO-SAXON "IMPERIALISTS." (THIS POLICY, FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, CAN BE CARRIED OUT MUCH MORE SMOOTHLY BY THE MOSSADEQ GOVERNMENT, A BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT, THAN BY A TUDEH GOVERNMENT.)



(5) THE SOVIET "SIDING" WITH IRAN AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN EARLY OCTOBER 1951 HAS INCREASED SYMPATHY FOR THE SOVIETS EVEN IN THE RANKS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

C. NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN HAS TO CONTEND WITH:

(1) THE ARMY, POLICE, AND GENDARMERIE WHICH REPRESENT IN THE HANDS OF THE SHAH AND THE GOVERNMENT COMPARATIVELY WELL-ORGANIZED, CENTRALIZED, AND MASSIVE REPRESSIVE FORCES, WITH NOTEWORTHY SHORTCOMING SUCH AS PENETRATION IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, CORRUPTION, AND SO FORTH.

(2) POPULAR RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM WHICH STEMS FROM RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS AND A REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM.

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Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States

CIA 1

26 September 1947

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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

26 September 1947

S U M M A R Y

1. Among foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security of the United States.
2. The U.S.S.R. is presently incapable of military aggression outside of Europe and Asia, but is capable of overrunning most of continental Europe, the Near East, northern China, and Korea.
3. The U.S.S.R. is unlikely to resort to open military aggression in present circumstances. Its policy is to avoid war, to build up its war potential, and to extend its influence and control by political, economic, and psychological methods. In this it is deliberately conducting political, economic, and psychological warfare against the United States.
4. The greatest danger to the security of the United States is the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements.
5. Stabilization and recovery in Europe and Asia would tend to redress the balance of power and thereby to restrain the U.S.S.R.
6. From the point of view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually redressing the balance of power the order of priority among the major regions of Europe and Asia is:
 - a. Western Europe.
 - b. The Near and Middle East (but within the region the situation in Greece is of great importance and the utmost urgency, while the situation with respect to Palestine is extremely dangerous).
 - c. The Far East (but within the region Japan is important as the only area capable of relatively early development as a power center counterbalancing the Soviet Far East).

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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Among foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security of the United States. Even the U.S.S.R., lacking the requisite naval and air forces, is incapable of direct attack upon the United States * or of major military operations anywhere outside of Europe and Asia. The preponderance of readily available Soviet ground strength is such, however, that the U.S.S.R., at will, could speedily overrun most of continental Europe, the Near East, northern China, and Korea. If the U.S.S.R. were to exercise this capability, the ultimate danger to the United States would be even greater than that threatened by Germany and Japan, to avert which the United States incurred the risk of war.

2. Soviet predominance in Eurasia is, for the present, less a matter of absolute strength than of relative immediately available strength. The Soviet industrial war potential is considered to be approximately equal to that of 1939; it is almost certainly no greater. Since 1939, however, the power of Germany and of Japan has been obliterated, that of France and of Italy severely curtailed, and that of Great Britain seriously impaired. China also, no great power in 1937, is even more weak and disorganized in 1947. Thus the balance of power which restrained the U.S.S.R. from 1921 to 1941 has ceased to exist. The only effective counterpoise to the power of the Soviet Union is that of the United States, which is both latent and remote. Consequently the U.S.S.R., despite its present weaknesses, enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power at every point within logistical reach of its land forces.

3. Despite this initial advantage, the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to resort to overt military aggression in present circumstances, primarily for the following reasons:

a. Forcible occupation of extensive additional territory, particularly in Western Europe, would impose upon the U.S.S.R. the additional burden of holding in subjection large hostile populations, a task vastly greater than that assumed in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and one likely to overtax the attenuated resources of the Soviet Union.

b. Open aggression would entail risk of a war with the United States ultimately disastrous for the U.S.S.R. Unable to strike directly at the United States, the U.S.S.R. would be exposed to early long range air bombardment with conventional and atomic bombs and to eventual amphibious attack. Moreover, Soviet industrial

* The U.S.S.R. is capable of a considerable number of one-way bomber sorties against targets in the U.S. Such attacks, using conventional bombs, could be no more than harassing in effect, but, with atomic bombs, would be extremely dangerous. Whether the U.S.S.R. now possesses a usable atomic bomb can be neither proved nor disproved, but it is considered improbable that the U.S.S.R. has such a bomb or that it can develop one before 1950.

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capabilities for the support of large scale, highly developed warfare are and must long remain greatly inferior to those of the United States. The U.S.S.R. would be unable to win a quick decision in such a conflict and could not support a protracted struggle with a determined and resourceful antagonist far beyond its own frontiers.

c. Open military aggression would forego favorable prospects for the further extension of Soviet hegemony by political and economic means. By indoctrination, experience, and personal interest the rulers of the U.S.S.R. are predisposed toward the pursuit of their objectives by conspiratorial rather than by military methods. In the economic dislocation, social unrest, political instability, and military weakness prevailing generally in Europe and Asia they have an unprecedented opportunity to extend the Soviet sphere by politico-revolutionary action at less risk than that entailed by military aggression, and with greater prospect of enduring success.

4. Thus the greatest present danger to U.S. security lies, not in the military strength of the U.S.S.R. and the possibility of Soviet armed aggression, but in the possibility of the economic collapse of Western Europe and of the consequent accession to power of elements subservient to the Kremlin. The economic weakness of Western Europe is the result of the simultaneous impact of extensive physical destruction, a breakdown in pre-war economic relationships (supplanted in many countries by rampant illegal or black-market practices), a deterioration in the will and capacity to work and in other driving forces of a virile economy, and a probably irreparable loss of large pre-war claims for goods and services derived from overseas investments and from a dominant position in colonial territories. As a result of these conditions and until indigenous production can be increased considerably beyond the pre-war level, Western Europe is confronted (in the absence of outside aid) with a prolonged period of low standards of living, widespread dissatisfaction, social unrest, and political instability. There are indications that the Kremlin is clearly conscious of this opportunity and that its present plans for the extension of its power are premised upon the assumption of continuing economic crisis in Western Europe and an eventual depression in the United States.

5. The policy of the U.S.S.R. in the foregoing circumstances appears to be:

a. To avoid war with the United States, relying upon the disinclination of the United States to resort to war on its own initiative. (In the actual state of acute tension an accidental outbreak of hostilities is a distinct possibility, but it is probable that the U.S.S.R. would not intend its provocations to lead to armed conflict with the U.S. and will avoid that result insofar as its intelligence provides adequate guidance.)

b. To build up its own strength, in anticipation of eventual war, by:

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(1) An intensive program of reconstruction and industrial expansion with particular reference to war industries.

(2) An intensive program of research and development with particular reference to an atomic bomb, guided missiles, and bacteriological warfare.

(3) The development of naval and strategic air forces.

c. To preserve its existing relative predominance in Eurasia by maintaining overwhelmingly preponderant ground strength and by consolidating control of satellite states and occupied areas.

d. To extend its own power and influence and to undermine those of the United States so far as is possible by political, economic, and psychological means, including action to:

(1) Prevent or retard recovery and stabilization in non-Soviet areas.

(2) Fasten on the United States responsibility for continuing dissatisfactions and distress; identify the United States with political reaction, economic imperialism, and military aggression; and identify the Soviet Union as democratic, anti-imperialistic, and peace-loving.

(3) Exploit the weakness, instability, and confusion prevalent in neighboring countries to bring to power therein Communist or Communist-controlled governments.

6. Although the conditions presently prevailing in European and Asiatic countries surrounding the Soviet sphere constitute a danger to U.S. security, stabilization and recovery in those countries would tend to redress the balance of power, thereby curbing Soviet aggressiveness and stabilizing the international situation.

7. From the point of view of redressing the balance of power the major regions of Europe and Asia, outside the Soviet sphere, are not of equal importance. Western Europe merits first consideration for reasons of both urgency and potential value. The most highly developed of these regions, it is at once the most vulnerable to disorganization and the most favorable for the early development of potential power. It is also most accessible from the center of Soviet power, and conversely, best located for the eventual exertion of restraining pressure upon the Soviet Union. In Western Europe a severe and possibly decisive economic and political crisis now impends. Within the general area the most critical situations exist in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany.

8. The United Kingdom, supported by the British Commonwealth and Empire, was formerly a major stabilizing influence in world economy and the balance of power, but its capabilities in these respects are now greatly reduced. In view of its critical economic position, it must curtail drastically its overseas commitments, with a consequent reduction of its power and influence abroad. Existing British overseas com-

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commitments are so extensive and important that their precipitate liquidation would create conditions prejudicial to security interests of the United States.

9. The immediate French economic situation is even more critical than that of the United Kingdom and the French are less able to cope with it, in large measure because of the instability of the internal political situation. The ineffectiveness of coalition governments increasingly encourages resort to political extremes. The Communists are already the strongest single party in France; a swift economic collapse might well lead to their accession to power. A more gradual decline would probably favor a trend toward an authoritarian solution under the leadership of De Gaulle. It is unlikely that either extreme could establish its authority so effectively as to preclude the outbreak of civil war on its accession to power.

10. The Italian economic situation is desperate and the political situation unstable, for reasons similar to those obtaining in France, with an even greater possibility of Communist accession to power in the event of economic and political collapse. Moreover, the proximity of Yugoslavia makes possible the development of a situation in Italy similar to that in Greece.

11. In Germany acute economic distress has been aggravated by continued partition and by uncertainties regarding the future status of the country and of its industrial establishments. Despite these conditions, Western Germany has shown itself to be more resistant to Communist penetration than France and Italy have been. There are indications that even in the Soviet Zone the political situation is unsatisfactory from the Soviet point of view. The economic rehabilitation of Germany, particularly of the Ruhr, is essential to general European recovery as well as to local stability. Effective steps toward industrial rehabilitation will tend to stabilize the situation in Western Germany, but will require convincing assurances to France against a recurrence of German aggression.

12. Of important concern in relation to Western European recovery is the existing instability in colonial (or former colonial) areas upon the resources of which several European powers (the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) have hitherto been accustomed to depend. From Morocco to Indonesia the situation is disturbed by resurgent native nationalism and communal strife. Armed conflict exists between natives and Europeans in Indonesia, Indochina, and Madagascar, and between native communities in India and Pakistan. Armed communal strife is incipient in Palestine. Between Britain and Egypt the matter is one of international dispute. Unrest is widespread in French North Africa. None of these situations gives promise of early stabilization. The continuance of unsettled conditions hinders economic recovery and causes a diversion of European strength into efforts to maintain or reimpose control by force. In these circumstances the traditional liberal policies of the United States and its interest in early stabilization are in apparent conflict with its interest in supporting

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friendly European governments. There is a consistent tendency to bring these matters before the United Nations, where their effect is to divide the non-Soviet powers. Although the U.S.S.R. is in no position to intervene by force in these situations, it is actively exploiting them to create dissension, to undermine the economic and political stability of European states, and to discredit them and the United States.

13. As a region, the Near and Middle East is of second priority from the point of view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually redressing the balance of power—but within the general area the situation in Greece is of great importance and the utmost urgency, while the situation with respect to Palestine is extremely dangerous. The region differs from both Western Europe and the Far East in that (except in India) its human and material resources are inadequate for the development of a significant power potential. Its great importance, second only to that of Western Europe, lies in its strategic location as a barrier to further Soviet expansion, as an essential link in communications between the West and East, and as a potential base from which power developed elsewhere could be brought to bear on the sources of Soviet power, and in the vital importance of the oil of the Persian Gulf states to the Western powers.

14. In Greece the U.S.S.R., acting indirectly through Communist-led guerrillas supported by the Balkan satellite states, is in actual process of taking over a major portion of the country by force of arms. The Greek Government is unable to cope with this threat without active aid. At any time U.S. armed intervention may be required to prevent its collapse and to restore the situation. The loss of Greece would not only impair the strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, but would also have profound psychological repercussions throughout Western Europe and the Near and Middle East.

15. The Soviet effort to penetrate Iran is still being conducted by political and economic means. Iranian refusal of an oil concession to the USSR, which is still probable, would provoke a strong Soviet reaction, including a renewal of subversive activity, though probably not an overt Soviet intervention. If Iran should grant the concession, Soviet penetration would be facilitated.

16. In contrast to Greece and Iran, Turkey is not susceptible to Soviet penetration. Turkey may be expected to resist Soviet domination in any circumstances, but could not be expected to withstand for long a full-scale attack.

17. The situation with respect to Palestine is fraught with peculiar difficulties and dangers. Zionist leadership, exploiting widespread humanitarian sympathy with the surviving Jews of Europe, has pursued its objectives without regard for the consequences. The Arab reaction is bitter and potentially violent, endangering not only the Jews in Palestine but also the strategic interests of the Western powers in the Near and Middle East, since the Arabs now identify the United States and the United

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Kingdom with Zionism. The partition of Palestine, as proposed to the United Nations, satisfies minimum Zionist demands, but will be bitterly resisted by the Arabs. Its adoption and implementation would precipitate Arab armed resistance possibly assuming the proportions of a Holy War against Europeans and Americans as well as Jews. The Arab governments could not control this popular reaction; they would be coerced by it, or would be supplanted by governments responsive to the popular will. Their principal means of retaliation against the United States and the United Kingdom would be the cancellation of British and American oil concessions. Since the Arabs could not operate the oil properties themselves, and since, in these circumstances, they would be in desperate need of powerful support, it is probable that they would eventually transfer these concessions to the Soviet Union. Soviet control of Arabian oil would be disastrous to Western interests. This course of events, of which there is real and grave danger, would not only wreck the strategic position of the Western powers in the Near and Middle East, but would also have a fatal effect upon the economic recovery of Western Europe and would seriously impair the war potential of the Western powers.

18. Although the situation is critical in both China and Korea, the Far East is of only third priority from the point of view of containing the U.S.S.R. and eventually redressing the balance of power. The proximity of Eastern Siberia to the present perimeter of Soviet and Chinese Communist control in Korea, Manchuria, and North China, the remoteness of the United States, and the weakness of the Chinese National Government, would render any U.S. attempt at containment by directly opposing force to force a most unequal contest. The restraints upon Soviet aggression are political: the undesirability of an open conflict with the United States and the possibility of further penetration of China and Korea by political means. Moreover, the region is vast; an effort extensive in space and time would be required before the U.S.S.R. could gain effective control of objectives strategically important to the United States. From the point of view of power potential, the human and material resources of the region are great, but, with the exception of Japan and of certain areas in Manchuria and North China, they are generally undeveloped and incapable of development, by either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., within any period of present concern. Moreover, in comparison with Western Europe and the Middle East, the accessible Far East is too remote from the vital areas of the Soviet Union to permit the exertion of effective influence therefrom upon Soviet policy. Whatever the course of events in continental Asia, maintenance of effective U.S. control of the Pacific would afford a sufficient safeguard.

19. Despite the low priority accorded to the Far East, as a region, in this reckoning, Japan is important as the only area within the region capable of relatively early development as a power center. Under SCAP control, the political situation in Japan is stable, despite economic difficulties. The Japanese economy is dependent upon

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the availability of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials from overseas. The removal of U.S. control, particularly if the economic problem remains unsolved, would open the way to vigorous Soviet penetration. The rehabilitation of Japan under Soviet influence or control (with provision of essential imports from continental Asia) would jeopardize the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific, as well as any U.S. position in China. The rehabilitation of Japan under U.S. influence or control (with provision of essential imports from Southeastern Asia), while it would tend to alienate China, would create a power tending to counterbalance the Soviet Far East and so to stabilize the regional situation.

20. The stalemate in Korea can be broken only by U.S. acceptance of terms which would in effect surrender that country to the U.S.S.R. as a satellite. United States efforts to make the best of the status quo must be conducted in the face of persistent Soviet subversive activity and propaganda pressure.

21. There is no prospect of an early solution of the political and economic problems of China. The Communists will accept no political solution which does not render their existing territorial control secure while affording them opportunities for further penetration by political means. Such a solution has been the consistent objective of the U.S.S.R. The Kuomintang has been adamant in refusing to consider such terms so long as it has had hope of United States support. Losing such hope, it might reconsider its attitude with a view to salvaging what it could of its position. Consequently, in the absence of large-scale U.S. aid, the prospect in China is for either continuing conflict, with further political and economic disintegration and an expansion of the area of Communist territorial control, or the eventual formation of a coalition government through Soviet mediation and on Communist terms, with a gradual penetration of Communist influence throughout the national administration. In either case acute political and economic disorganization would prevail in China for many years, preventing an effective consolidation of Soviet control.

22. In Latin America local Communists, isolated from direct Soviet support and operating within the power orbit of the United States, cannot seize and hold political control. The U.S.S.R. therefore pursues limited objectives in that area, its major purpose being to attenuate Latin America's capacity and willingness to give aid to the United States in the event of war. This policy has already succeeded to such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can probably count on its undercover organizations and upon Communist-controlled key labor unions to cut off U.S. access to some of Latin America's strategic materials whenever the U.S.S.R. considers such action desirable. The recently concluded defense pact opens the way to marked improvements in cooperative military defense, but does not affect the scope and direction of these Communist activities and purposes.

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C.I.A. letter, Apr 22, 1974

By NLT-HC, NARS Date 4-15-77

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States



CIA 3

17 December 1947

Copy No. 1

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By NLT-H NARS Date 4-15-77

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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

17 December 1947

GENERAL

1. *Political.* Since our last report (CIA 2, 14 November 1947), the Communists, under Soviet direction, have launched a concerted campaign of disorders, strikes, and sabotage in France and Italy. This development is the logical consequence of the Communist reversion from political action to militancy, discussed in CIA 2. The primary Soviet objective is to defeat the European recovery program by bringing about a sufficient degree of economic deterioration: (a) so greatly to increase the cost of the recovery program to the US that the US Congress and the public will reject it; and (b) to cause the collapse of the French and Italian centrist Governments. To obtain this objective, the USSR is risking the political popularity of the Communist Parties in France and Italy and will depend thereafter, if necessary, on a hard core of militants, possibly operating underground.

In France, the strong and effective measures of the Schuman Government have defeated a major Communist effort to wreck the economy of the country by strikes and sabotage. All non-Communist elements rallied behind the Premier, including an increasingly large segment of the General Confederation of Labor which revolted against its Communist leadership. The Communists are clearly not strong enough to stage either a general strike or a successful armed insurrection. The Schuman Government, however, still faces serious difficulties. It must carry through an effective anti-inflation program in the face of the almost certain re-emergence, after the current crisis, of the basic differences between the "controlled" and "liberal" economy elements in the coalition. It must also contend with renewed Communist efforts, although on a reduced scale, to curtail production through strikes and acts of sabotage.

In Italy, on the other hand, the Government has not yet faced a test similar to that from which the Schuman Government has now emerged. The strikes and demonstrations have been largely in the nature of probing operations. Opposed by less effective military and police forces and supported by a hard, well-organized core of former resistance troops, the Communists may attempt a general strike or an armed insurrection prior to the elections in March 1948. The ability of the Government to meet such a contingency is, at the moment, in doubt.

Note: The present text has been prepared after consideration of comments by the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, on a preliminary draft.

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The danger to the European recovery program will not be averted merely by the maintenance in power of the present centrist Governments in France and Italy. The loss of production has already been serious. In both France and Italy, the Governments must prevent a further protracted period of industrial stoppages; otherwise, the rising cost of the recovery program to the US may place the whole program in jeopardy.

The overriding Soviet objective of defeating the European recovery program has contributed strongly to Molotov's recalcitrance and evasions in the CFM. It seems clear that the USSR has had no intention of permitting a settlement of the German and Austrian problems pending the outcome of the struggles in France and Italy and the debates in the US Congress. Hence, no major settlement in the current session of the CFM appears probable. The USSR, however, will seek to avoid a definitive break with the Western Powers.

The Soviet Government appears to be intensifying its propaganda and penetration efforts in the Far and Middle East.

An increase in Soviet activities in the Far East may be motivated in part by the Kremlin's desire to divert world attention from possible Soviet reverses in Europe or perhaps to induce the US to divert part of its efforts and resources from Europe to the East. It would not imply a relaxation of Soviet pressure in the West, but would reflect a logical appreciation of the fact that the highly chaotic and unstable conditions now prevalent in most Asiatic countries offer rewarding opportunities for the eventual expansion of Soviet influence.

While the tempo of the Soviet program in Asia will probably be stepped up, the pattern of that program is not likely to undergo any conspicuous change in the near future. It is doubted, for example, that the USSR has any immediate intention of altering its "correct" attitude toward such established sovereign governments as the National Government of China. The Soviet Union instead will probably give greater support and direction to the indigenous Communist elements in Asiatic countries and exploit to the full, both locally and in all UN bodies, the growing economic and political nationalism of dependent, recently liberated, and underdeveloped areas.

In the Middle East the USSR is resuming its pressure on Iran. It is evidently planning to exploit fully the Palestine situation and to make Palestine itself a base for more extensive subversive activities throughout the whole area. The Middle East, rather than the Far East, probably occupies second priority to Western Europe as an objective of Soviet expansion.

2. *Economic.* Economic conditions in most parts of the world have not improved in recent weeks. Civil disorders and strikes in France, Italy, India, and Pakistan threaten to cause further deterioration in those critical areas. Work stoppages in France have cost 2 million tons of coal, have reduced production in other industries by 25 to 50%, and have slowed the unloading and movement of goods from French ports.

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Overall production figures for France are expected to show a decline of 40% in November as compared with October.

In the United Kingdom and western Germany, however, coal production has shown a substantial increase and year-end targets will be approximated in both countries. This improvement in the coal situation has aided steel production which, in the United Kingdom, is now running slightly ahead of the target. Shipments of high-grade iron ore, now moving again to the Ruhr, as was customary in the prewar period, should increase the production of German blast furnaces.

The 1947 grain harvest in the USSR was better than in any year since the beginning of World War II. Thus far, relatively small quantities of grain have been exported or committed for export. It is probable that the Soviet Union is stockpiling grain for export in the late spring or early summer of 1948 at which time it can be used to better advantage politically than at present. Elsewhere the food situation remains unchanged.

France and Italy are using the last of their foreign-exchange resources, including the credits made available by the US. In the future, they will be dependent upon stop-gap aid to carry them until assistance becomes available under the proposed European recovery program.

PARTICULAR SITUATIONS IN EUROPE

3. *The United Kingdom.* The Labor Party's narrow victory in the recent significant Gravesend Parliamentary by-election confirms earlier evidence of a swing away from Labor, but it also indicates that the swing does not have the landslide proportions suggested by the preceding municipal elections. Among the national electorate, the Labor Party appears to retain a slender majority. The prestige and cohesion of the Government have improved as a result of the recent Cabinet changes and the increase in coal and steel production. Basically, however, the stability of the Labor Government rests on the ability of British industry to fulfill the Cripps export goals, the willingness of the people to accept a reduced standard of living, and the realization of substantial direct or indirect dollar benefits under the European recovery program.

4. *France.* The onset of Communist strikes and violence in France precipitated a Cabinet crisis which proved that no government could be formed on the basis of the Socialist policy of equal and open opposition to both Communism and Gaullism. Leadership thus passed to Robert Schuman of the MRP who, while ignoring the Gaullist issue, offered vigorous resistance to the Communist threat. Schuman received the support of all parties except the Communist in the passage of emergency legislation designed to facilitate the maintenance of order and the escape of French labor from Communist control. The non-Communist Left, however, was uneasy lest this legislation be turned against it in the event of De Gaulle's succession to power. To retain

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the essential support of the Socialists and of non-Communist labor elements, Schuman must exercise his present authority with great discretion.

The rank and file of French workers have shown a lack of enthusiasm for political strikes in which their national, class, and individual interests are sacrificed to Soviet purposes. The Communists were forced to combat a strong back-to-work movement by the use of "goon squads" and by increasing resort to sabotage. The French Army was able and willing to deal with an open Communist insurrection which now appears most unlikely. France has successfully passed its first real test against the economic power inherent in the Communist hold on labor.

As the Communists lose their popular following and their leadership of French labor, they will resort increasingly to violent acts of coercion and sabotage by trained and reliable, militant underground units. In this manner they may be able in some measure to injure the French economy and the European recovery program.

If Schuman can prevent further severe work stoppages, reconcile the divergent economic views in his coalition Government, and carry out an effective anti-inflation program, he may not only defeat the Communists but render unnecessary a Gaullist solution.

5. *Italy.* The first wave of Communist-inspired disorders in Italy has subsided, but the position of the De Gasperi Government is fundamentally weaker than that of the Schuman administration in France. The non-Communist political elements in Italy have been showing reluctance to resolve their differences, and De Gasperi has had no labor representation in his coalition; the Saragat Socialists and the Republicans, after long negotiations with De Gasperi, have only just agreed to enter the Government. The Nenni Socialists remain in alliance with the Communists; consequently, no independent labor organization and leadership are available to Italian workers who might otherwise resist Communist control. The Italian Army is less effective than the French in terms of leadership, and there is a prevailing shortage of arms, equipment, and fuel. As was illustrated in the disturbances at Milan on 28 November, the public is apathetic toward Communist incitement, but the Government may not be able to rely fully on the forces at its disposal to control the Communist militants.

The next phase of Communist operations apparently will be based on a demand for workers' (Communist) control of credit and of industrial production under the slogan "To the workers belong the factories." Such a demand could well be used to prepare the ground for a general strike. The response of the workers is problematical because, although the Italian workers, like the French, are weary of political strikes and demonstrations, the Communist slogan is appealing and there is no alternative labor leadership. The "patriotic front" for this second phase will probably be the numerous and well trained partisan groups which achieved considerable popularity through their war-time resistance activities.

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September 1947 meeting of the Cominform in Poland, which was only recently released in the Soviet press. These implied weaknesses are: lack of material and food reserves, a manpower shortage, serious shortcomings in fulfilling certain phases of the second year of the current Five-Year Plan, dependence upon certain vital imports, and the persistence, even among members of the Party, of capitalist ideology.

9. *The Satellite States.* In view of the strength of the non-Communists in Czechoslovakia, as indicated by their recent victories over the Communists, the Kremlin is not yet willing to risk the political and economic consequences of ordering the Czechoslovak Communists to use the ruthless tactics successfully employed in the other satellite countries. The final destruction of all non-Communist elements is nearing completion in Poland, however, where the Communists have finally wrested control of the country's largest agricultural cooperative from the Socialists and have paved the way for subsequent attacks on the Catholic Church by publicly accusing the two Polish Cardinals of associating with underground leaders. Meanwhile, political and economic coordination among the Soviet Satellites in southeastern Europe is being further developed. The mutual assistance pacts signed by Yugoslavia with Bulgaria and Hungary will soon be followed by a similar pact between Yugoslavia and Rumania and will be supplemented by increased economic coordination, with Yugoslavia gradually emerging as the dominant satellite in southeastern Europe.

10. *Trieste.* The Yugoslavs have intensified their efforts to penetrate the US-UK Zone in Trieste. The current virulent propaganda attacks appear preliminary to a Communist-instigated general strike. Because of the high incidence of unemployment and the generally depressed economy in the US-UK Zone, such a strike will probably receive substantial popular support.

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

11. *Greece.* There is no evidence that the Greek Army's winter offensive will materialize this month as planned, but it is likely that the skirmishing which has characterized military operations during the past few weeks will soon develop into more concerted action. The Army will be forced to make at least local offensives, and the guerrillas, having completed their winter regrouping, are in a position to extend the scope and size of their attacks. Neither side, however, is believed capable of obtaining a decisive victory in the near future.

Satellite and Greek Communist leaders may well feel that more spectacular successes have become necessary, particularly to counter the psychological effect of the announcement that US Army officers are to give tactical advice to the Greek Army. In the satellite states there has been a marked increase in the organization of both overt and covert aid for the guerrillas. Soviet-controlled representatives have arrived at the headquarters of General Markos in Greece; others apparently have assumed

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virtual control of the KKE (Communist) Central Committee. The participation of foreign combat personnel on the guerrilla side appears imminent.

Meanwhile, developing disharmony within the Populist-Liberal Government may eventually result in the downfall of the coalition government. This disharmony, the indecisive military activity, and the slow implementation of AMAG economic measures have induced a general loss of confidence and, in turn, a run on gold which will cause a new and disastrous inflation if not quickly checked.

12. *Palestine.* The "spontaneous rioting" which has characterized the initial Arab reaction to the UN decision to partition Palestine will probably continue through the winter. Concerted military action by the Arabs will probably be delayed until spring when the British withdrawal (scheduled to begin early in 1948) should be well under way. Faced with rapidly increasing anti-US feeling, executives of US oil companies in the Middle East believe that they may be forced to suspend operations. At this juncture, however, King Ibn Saud seems to be seeking some sort of compromise position whereby he may still maintain, along with other Arab States, his opposition to the formation of a Jewish state, yet refrain from undertaking economic reprisals against the US.

The Arabs not only have no intention of establishing a separate government in the Arab-state sections of Palestine marked out by the UN, but they will also boycott all efforts of the projected five-nation commission to take over authority from the British and transfer it to the new Arab and Jewish states.

There is increasing evidence that the USSR intends to utilize Palestine as a base for penetration of the Middle East. The Turks in particular are concerned by this prospect. If the UN decides to send troops to Palestine, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly seek to include elements specially trained in Soviet subversive activities. If the US also sends troops to enforce the partition, the USSR will make every effort to involve the US in embarrassing situations and to increase the anti-US sentiment that is already strong among the Arabs.

13. *Iran.* The USSR is again subjecting Iran to strong pressure. The belated Soviet reaction to Iran's rejection of the proposed oil agreement has been emphatic. Having charged the Iranian Government with hostile action, the USSR now is intensifying its propaganda program and its subversive activities directed against Iran. Direct Soviet action at this time seems unlikely. However, there is the possibility of a drive into Azerbaijan and other northern provinces by dissident Iranian and native elements now in adjacent Soviet territory. If such a move is carried out without material Soviet assistance, it could probably be contained by the Iranian Army.

Dissension and factionalism in the Iranian Government over domestic policies have resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Qavam following his failure to obtain a vote of confidence in the Majlis on 10 December. Qavam still leads the largest

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single bloc in the Majlis. If he can keep his deputies in line, the strong opposition thus formed will be in a position to obstruct the operation of any government inimical to Qavam, and Iran's ability to cope with Soviet subversive activities will be correspondingly weakened.

14. *India-Pakistan.* Although relations between India and Pakistan have improved enough so that the two dominions now appear disposed to settle certain of their differences by arbitration, the basic causes of friction remain unchanged and eventual conflict between the dominions remains a possibility.

A significant shift appears to have occurred recently in India's position with respect to the US and the USSR. Pandit Nehru, who is believed at one time to have favored a pro-Soviet alignment, is now declaring publicly that India for the present will maintain strict neutrality between the US and the USSR. Sentiment apparently is increasing in India that cooperation with the US promises the better protection for Indian interests.

THE FAR EAST

15. *China.* The Chinese National Government faces its most critical period during the coming winter. Its military position has been weakened by an increase of Chinese Communist strength in central China and by the threat that the Communists will be able to expand still farther southward, thus undermining the base of the Nationalist supply system. Moreover, the shifting of the center of military activity to central China has reduced the Government's ability to withstand the Communist offensive in Manchuria which may develop this winter, although probably not until Nationalist-held ports in that area have become ice-bound. The economic position of the Government remains critical. Although the rapid depreciation of the Chinese dollar has recently been checked, a new crisis is likely to develop if substantial US economic assistance is not assured at an early date.

Despite the present precarious position of the National Government, the USSR is probably not ready to abandon its "correct" attitude. The USSR is not likely to give open assistance to the Chinese Communists because it would undoubtedly arouse Chinese antiforeign sentiments and would thus impede Communist progress. The USSR, in fact, has recently made conciliatory gestures toward the National Government at the same time that it was reported putting strong pressure on that Government to support the Soviet position on a Japanese peace treaty.

16. *Japan.* The USSR clearly believes that the US intends to make Japan a strong springboard against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR will not at present attend the prospective Japanese peace treaty conference unless it can retain a veto to insure the defeat of any proposal to which it has serious objections. The Kremlin realizes, however, that insistence upon a veto may lead to a deadlock which would probably

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result in US forces remaining in Japan. Although the USSR counts on the "inevitable" US depression to force an eventual US withdrawal from the Far East, it does not now consider that such a depression is imminent. The Kremlin's only alternative at present is, therefore, to continue to strengthen the USSR's own power center in northern Asia in order to counter the US position in Japan and the Ryukyus.

17. *Korea.* Possibly as a preliminary to a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Korea, the USSR appears to be making preparations to accord full recognition to the North Korean puppet regime. Such a move would be a natural development of the continuing Soviet campaign to compel a US withdrawal from the country. In the US Zone, a strong segment of the extreme Right, led by Rhee Syngman, who apparently doubts his chances of success in a UN-conducted election, continues to clamor for a general election prior to that scheduled to take place under UN observation. At the same time, the earlier optimism of the moderate groups concerning the chances of a definitive UN solution of the Korean problem is beginning to show a marked decline.

18. *Philippines.* Growing disaffection and unrest among right-wing as well as left-wing political groups may lead to widespread disturbances or to an actual attempt to overthrow the Roxas administration by force. Either development would adversely affect US strategic interests in the Philippines.

19. *Southeast Asia.* The instability of Southeast Asia continues to provide opportunity for Soviet exploitation of the growing nationalist and antiwestern sentiment among the native peoples. In Burma, the moderate Communist Party has given up all hope of re-entry into the government and has embarked upon a hostile propaganda campaign which will complicate the tasks of the emergent independent Government of Burma. In Siam, the renewed political influence of army elements may lead to the adoption of ultranationalist, antiforeign policies adversely affecting US commercial interests in the area. In French Indochina, the continued efforts by the French to eliminate by force the Communist-dominated government of the Vietnam Republic has strengthened native loyalty to the Vietnam government and has intensified the already widespread hatred of the French. In Indonesia, negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic under the Good Offices Committee of the UN Security Council have not yet covered the basic issues at stake. The involvement of the US in the dispute through its membership on the GOC exposes it to charges of "imperialism" should a GOC decision fail to satisfy the Republic. Meanwhile, the Dutch are proceeding with the establishment of a United States of Indonesia that will exclude the Republic, further intensifying the latter's suspicions of the west.

LATIN AMERICA

20. The extensive support which the US can now expect from Latin America on important issues with respect to the USSR is indicated by the sentiment favoring coordi-

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By NLT-4

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ADDENDUM

Since CIA 3 went to press the CFM has adjourned sine die. It is not expected that the breakdown of the Conference will result in any immediate change in Soviet policy. The USSR will probably not take any steps in Germany and Austria that would close the door to further East-West consultations--except in retaliation against some move by the Western Powers--until the success or failure of the Communists' actions against the European recovery program has been determined. The USSR will continue its efforts to strengthen its control in the Soviet Zone in Germany and intensify its propaganda efforts to convince the Germans that the Western Powers are responsible for the division of the country and that collaboration with the USSR constitutes the sole hope for the re-establishment of German unity. In Austria, the USSR will increase its efforts to undermine the Austrian Government by strengthening its hold on the Austrian economy and extending its political control in the Soviet Zone. The USSR may also attempt to reach a bilateral agreement with the Austrians on the German asset problem.

In the meantime, Soviet efforts to prevent the implementation of the European recovery program through the Communist offensives in France and Italy will be pressed to the maximum. If, by spring of 1948, these efforts appear to have failed and the US Congress has passed a reasonably promising long-term aid program for Europe, the USSR may be forced to decide upon a new policy. The basic alternatives would then be either a policy tending toward cooperation with the Western Powers with respect to the peace settlement and East-West economic relationships, or a policy tending toward isolationism based upon the indefinite partition of Europe along the line of established Soviet occupation and control. If the efforts to prevent the implementation of the European recovery program succeed, the USSR would then maintain its pressure to control France and Italy with a view to forcing the US to give up its positions in Germany and Austria and to abandon the continent to Soviet domination.

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C. Z. B. 3-29-77
ESP letter, April

NY NLT-140, NARS Date 4-15-77

Source 1

Source Information: George Frost Kennan was an American diplomat and historian. He was known best as an advocate of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War. "Long Telegram" February 22, 1946

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION	DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM	INFORMATION COPY ACTION MUST BE ENDORSED ON ACTION COPY
ACTION: EUR INFO: SECRET S U C A-B A-C A-D SA SPA UNO EUR/X DC/R	PEM-K-M No paraphrase necessary. Secretary of State, Washington.	8968 Moscow via War Dated February 22, 1946 Rec'd 3:52 p.m.
	511, February 22, 9 p.m. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:	
	(One) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook. (Two) Background of this outlook. (Three) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (Four) Its projection on unofficial level. (Five) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.	
	I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. THERE FOLLOWS PART ONE: BASIC FEATURES OF POST WAR SOVIET OUTLOOK, AS PUT FORWARD BY OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA MACHINE, ARE AS FOLLOWS:	
	(A) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:	
107 Russia	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972	"In course

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"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."

(B) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(C) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states; and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(D) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(E) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(F) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (one) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (two) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or

democratic)

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democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR. These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(G) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to serve interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(A) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(B) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(C) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(D) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

PART TWO

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By MLT, NARS Date 12-11-72

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-4- #511, February 22, 9 p.m. from Moscow via War

PART TWO: BACKGROUND OF OUTLOOK

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propoganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--- party, secret police and government---and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been.

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have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of these premises, every one of which pre-dates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself. Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of western world. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aims.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced west, fear of more competent more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned

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to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevik regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which (*) outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This

thesis

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thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question (*) self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth---indeed, their disbelief in its existence---leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers---extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence---this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

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PART THREE:

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PART THREE: PROJECTION OF SOVIET OUTLOOK IN
PRACTICAL POLICY ON OFFICIAL LEVEL

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (one) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (two) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (A) to (D) outlined in part one. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(A) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(B) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under communist control, question of Soviet

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base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(C) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal, to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, and to replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which these nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(D) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power.

Letter motive

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Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken western influence among such peoples.

(E) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(F) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in nineteen-thirtys to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviets own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(G) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with super-abundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(H) Beyond

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(H) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners.

PART FOUR: FOLLOWING MAY BE SAID AS TO WHAT WE MAY EXPECT BY WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC SOVIET POLICIES ON UNOFFICIAL, OR SUBTERRANEAN PLANE, i.e. ON PLANE FOR WHICH SOVIET GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS NO RESPONSIBILITY

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

One. Inner central core of communist parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

Two. Rank and file of communist parties. Note distinction is drawn between these and persons defined in paragraph one. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign communist parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--- no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement---are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial

connection

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connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through (*) organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

Three. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, womens organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

Four. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and womens organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital, importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR.

Five. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

Six. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

Seven. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc.

Not only

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
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1972

Original Retired

Source 1

Source Information: Susan P. Lester to Harry S. Truman, December 6, 1947 with reply from Matthew J. Connelly, Truman's Secretary



PAPERS LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
OFFICIAL FILE

December 13, 1947

1290-B
Mural

My dear Mrs. Lester:

Your letter of December sixth to the President in the interest of Mr. William J. Donovan has been received. For your information, I wish to advise you that there has been established a Central Intelligence Agency, provided for in the National Security Act of 1947. The President has appointed Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter as Director of this Agency.

X 1290-B
Enclosure
Donovan

X 1101

Very sincerely yours,



MATTHEW J. CONNELLY
Secretary to the President

Mrs. M. M. Lester,
The Roosevelt, X
Waco,
Texas.

B

DDB ✓

WU003 GOVT NL PD

WASHINGTON DC MAR 22

PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN

KEY WEST FLO

I HAVE BEEN EXCEEDINGLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM YOUR VACATION HEADQUARTERS IN REGARD TO THE FILES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHOM I HAVE LISTED AS BAD SECURITY RISKS. THE PAPERS CARRY A STORY TO THE EFFECT THAT YOUR SPOKESMAN STATED THAT SOME PORTION OF THE FILES MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO CLEAR INNOCENT PEOPLE. THIS SEEMS DANGEROUSLY IN LINE WITH YOUR ORIGINAL STATEMENT THAT YOU WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE COMMITTEE TO "DISPROVE" MCCARTHY'S

W H File
1950 MAR 23 AM 9 36

filed
MAR 31 1950

419-K

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CHARGES. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE FILES SHOULD BE MADE
AVAILABLE FOR THE MATERIAL THEY CONTAIN REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
IT DISCLOSES DANGEROUS PEOPLE WORKING FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OR CLEARS INNOCENT PEOPLE. YOU INDICATE THAT YOU WOULD BE
ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT BY MAKING ALL OF THE FILES AVAILABLE
ON THESE INDIVIDUALS. AS YOU KNOW, PRIOR TO THE ORDER WHICH
YOU SIGNED DURING THE HISS INVESTIGATION BLACKING OUT ALL
INFORMATION FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON COMMUNISTIC

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. YOU ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WHEN THE SENATE UNANIMOUSLY VOTED FOR THE SUBPOENA OF THESE FILES, IT WAS NOT REQUESTING FROM YOU A FAVOR WHICH YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHHOLD, BUT RATHER DEMANDING THE INFORMATION WHICH THE CONGRESS IS ENTITLED TO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. IT SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANT TO YOU THAT NOT EVEN ONE DEMOCRAT VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE SUBPOENA OF THE FILES. I FEEL THAT YOUR DELAY OF

ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, THE FBI FILES WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI VOTE FRAUD INVESTIGATION, THE COMPLETE FILES WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE. AS YOU ALSO KNOW THE FBI FILES HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE FROM TIME TO TIME. LIKEWISE THE STATE DEPARTMENT FILES PRIOR TO THE ABOVE BLACK-OUT ORDER WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE HOUSE

THIS INVESTIGATION BY YOUR ARROGANT REFUSAL TO RELEASE ALL
THE NECESSARY FILES IS INEXCUSABLE AND IS ENDANGERING THE
SECURITY OF THIS NATION.


JOE MCCARTHY USS WISCONSIN.

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Source 1

Source Information: Top Secret: Organizational Chart proposed to President Truman by Donovan





Timeline of the Cold War

1945 Defeat of Germany and Japan

- February 4-11: Yalta Conference meeting of FDR, Churchill, Stalin - the 'Big Three' Soviet Union has control of Eastern Europe. The Cold War Begins
- May 8: VE Day - Victory in Europe. Germany surrenders to the Red Army in Berlin
- July: Potsdam Conference - Germany was officially partitioned into four zones of occupation.
- August 6: The United States drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima (20 kiloton bomb 'Little Boy' kills 80,000)
- August 8: Russia declares war on Japan
- August 9: The United States drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki (22 kiloton 'Fat Man' kills 70,000)
- August 14 : Japanese surrender End of World War II
- August 15: Emperor surrender broadcast - VJ Day

1946

- February 9: Stalin hostile speech - communism & capitalism were incompatible
- March 5 : "Sinews of Peace" Iron Curtain Speech by Winston Churchill - "an "iron curtain" has descended on Europe"
- March 10: Truman demands Russia leave Iran
- July 1: Operation Crossroads with Test Able was the first public demonstration of America's atomic arsenal
- July 25: America's Test Baker - underwater explosion

1947 Containment

- March 12 : Truman Doctrine - Truman declares active role in Greek Civil War
- June : Marshall Plan is announced setting a precedent for helping countries combat poverty, disease and malnutrition
- September 2: Rio Pact - U.S. meet 19 Latin American countries and created a security zone around the hemisphere

1948 Containment

- February 25 : Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia
- March 2: Truman's Loyalty Program created to catch Cold War spies
- March 17: Brussels Pact organized to protect Europe from communism
- June 24 : Berlin Blockade begins lasting 11 months

1949 Containment

- April 4 : NATO ratified
- May 12 : Berlin Blockade ends
- 29 August : Russia tested its first atomic bomb
- October 1 : Communist Mao Zedong takes control of China and establishes the People's Republic of China
- December 1 - Chiang Kai-shek moved to Formosa and created Nationalist government

1950

- January 30 - Truman approved H-bomb development
- February : Joe McCarthy begins Communist witch hunt and loyalty tests
- June 24: Korean War begins. Stalin supports North Korea who invade South Korea equipped with Soviet weapons

1951

- January 12: Federal Civil Defense Administration established
- April 11 : Truman fires MacArthur

1952

A-bombs developed by Britain

1953

- March 17-June 4 Nuclear Arms Race atomic test series of 11 explosions at Nevada Test Site
- April 15: RAND report on the "Vulnerability of U. S. Strategic Air Power"
- July : Korean War ends
- December 8: Ike's Atoms for Peace speech

1954

- March 1: H-bomb Castle-Bravo test
- March : KGB established
CIA helps overthrow unfriendly regimes in Iran and Guatemala
- July : Vietnam split at 17th parallel

1955

- May : Warsaw Pact formed

1956

- June 29: USSR sent tanks into Poznan, Poland, to suppress demonstrations by workers
- September 4: USSR sent military aid to Afghanistan
- October - November : Rebellion put down in Communist Hungary.
- October 29: Suez Crisis began with Israeli attack led by Moshe Dayan against Egyptian forces in the Sinai
- Egypt took control of Suez Canal

1957

- August 26: Vostok rocket launched 1st ICBM
- October 4 : Sputnik launched into orbit
- November 3: Sputnik II launched - Laika died in space

1958

- January 31: Explorer I launched
- July : NASA began Mercury project using Atlas rocket
- November : Khrushchev demands withdrawal of troops from Berlin

1959

- January : Cuba taken over by Fidel Castro
- September : Khrushchev visits United States; The Kitchen Debate

1960

- A-bombs developed by France
- May : Soviet Union reveals that U.S. spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory

November : John F. Kennedy elected President of USA
December 19: Cuba openly aligns itself with the Soviet Union and their policies.

1961

April : Bay of Pigs invasion see Cuban Missile Crisis Timeline
August 13 : Berlin border is closed
August 17 : Construction of Berlin Wall begins

1962

U.S. involvement in Vietnam increases

October : Cuban Missile Crisis

1963

July : Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ratified
November 22: President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas, Texas

1964

August : Gulf of Tonkin incident
October: A-bombs developed by China

1965

April : U.S. Marines sent to Dominican Republic to fight Communism
July : Announcement of dispatching of 200,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam

1966

B-52s Bomb North Vietnam

1967

The US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara admits that the US bombing raids had failed to meet their objectives

1968

January : North Korea captured U.S.S. Pueblo
President Johnson does not run for the presidency and Richard Nixon Elected President of the USA

August : Soviet Red Army crush Czechoslovakian revolt

1969

July 20 : Apollo 11 lands on the moon

1970

April : President Nixon extends Vietnam War to Cambodia

1971

Publication of the Pentagon Papers

1972

February: President Richard Nixon visits China

July : SALT I signed

1973

January : Cease fire in Vietnam between North Vietnam and United States

September : U.S. supported coup overthrows Chilean government

October : Egypt and Syria attack Israel; Egypt requests Soviet aid

1974

August : President Nixon resigns

1975

April 17: North Vietnam defeats South Vietnam which falls to Communist forces

1976

February: Soviet and Cuban forces help to install Communist government in Angola.

1979

January: U.S. and China establish diplomatic relations.

July : SALT II signed

November : Shah of Iran overthrown; Iranian Hostage Crisis

December: Soviet forces invade Afghanistan

1980

August: Polish shipyard workers strike Solidarity Union formed. Strike leader Lech Walesa is elected as the head of Solidarity

1983

President Reagan proposes Strategic Defense Initiative

October : U.S. troops invade and overthrows regime in Grenada

1985

Mikhail Gorbachev becomes leader of the Soviet Union initiating a campaign of openness called "glasnost" and restructuring called "perestroika"

1986

October : President Reagan and Gorbachev resolve to remove all intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe

1987

October : Reagan and Gorbachev agree to remove all medium and short-range nuclear missiles

1989

January : Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan

June : Poland becomes independent

September : Hungary becomes independent

November : Berlin Wall is demolished and East Germany allows unrestricted migration to West Germany

December : Communist governments fall in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania

Decline of the Soviet empire

1990

March : Lithuania becomes independent

May 29 : Boris Yeltsin elected as President of Russia

October 3: Germany reunited

1991

August : End of Soviet Union and the Cold War Ends

Source from: <http://www.datesandevents.org/events-timelines/03-cold-war-timeline.htm>